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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The critical observation for public administration and governance in South 
Africa has been the relationship between senior managers and political 
officials since the establishment of the democratic government in the 
country. The first documented observation in the United States of America 
by Woodrow Wilson marked the launch of public administration as an 
independent faculty, breaking away from the political sciences. The 
dominant theory that characterised public administration was that there 
must be a clear distinction between politics and public administration. This 
theory suggested that politics had nothing to do with public administration 
and, therefore, politicians should not intrude into matters of public 
administration.  
 
For contemporary academia, it is crucial to ask questions about the 
relevance of Wilson’s perspective with regard to the relationship between 
senior managers and political officials. Nevertheless, contemporary 
scholars are challenged by the emergent need to study the dual nature of 
public administration, suggesting that public administration should not be 
separated from politics, since public administration is merely the 
expression of the political ideology. Hence, politics and public 
administration should be inseparable. To refute or reaffirm these notions, 
this thesis explores this study by reviewing the relationship between senior 
public managers and political officials through analysing the politics–
administration interface in South Africa between 1999 and 2009.  
 
In congruence with the main research questions of this study, the 
researcher utilises four pre-claims to examine the politics–administration 
interface and the factors that lead to strained relationships around the 
interface. The first pre-claim in this study examines the notion suggesting 
that it is the nature of the political bureau to dominate public 
X R Shazi 584200 PHD WSG 
ii 
 
administration. The second pre-claim examines the notion suggesting that 
there could be conflicting leadership styles between a political official and 
a senior public service official. The third pre-claim is that political officials 
may have a different political ideology as compared with the political 
ideology upheld by a senior public service official. The fourth pre-claim is 
that political officials or public service officials or both parties may have 
some disregard for documented duties and responsibilities. Consequently, 
this study examines the politics–administration interface in South Africa 
within the scope of the pre-claims as presented in the introduction to the 
study.  
 
The study found that the colonial legacy in the Commonwealth Nations 
with features of the Westminster system of governance perpetuates 
political bureau dominance over public administration. The study further 
found that it is conventionally accepted that the political bureau should 
provide guidance to the public administration bureau and dominate public 
administration which is only the expression of the prevailing political will. 
The researcher has examined the pre-claim of conflicting leadership styles 
between the elected officials and senior public servants. The study found 
that between 1999 and 2009 there was a transition from the collective 
leadership of the ruling political bureau to a closed conventional leadership 
system where political power was centralized in the presidency, resulting 
in leadership through fear and mistrust. 
 
Regarding the pre-claim on different ideologies, this study argues that 
public administration is the implementation of political ideologies, and 
public service managers are at the apex of implementing policies for the 
benefit of the social classes on behalf of the political bureau, which drives 
the ideologies of a ruling political party. Therefore, different political 
ideologies between the political bureau and the administration bureau may 
be one of the factors of a strained politics–administration interface. The 
study found that in cases (Buthelezi and Masetlha as well as Zille and 
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Mgoqi) where officials from different political parties attempted to work, the 
arrangement resulted in a power struggle in the politics–administration 
interface.  
 
With regard to the pre-claim on disregard for documented rules and 
responsibilities, the study found that the problem in the interface is not 
always the neglect of documented rules and responsibilities, but rather 
that in some cases the documented rules and responsibilities are not 
always clear, resulting in grey or nondescript areas in the 
politics−administration interface that are ultimately claimed by the political 
bureau.  
 
This study has further proposed a public service governance structure with 
an added governance responsibility for the Public Service Commission to 
oversee the administration in order to distance the political bureau from 
public administration operations and direct engagement with senior public 
servants, such as the directors-general.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION   
 
The concept of the politics–administration interface refers to the link 
between politics and administration; hence the study problem is rooted in 
establishing the lines of demarcation between these two spheres. The 
academic discourse on the concept of politics–administration interface 
became the main academic phenomenon in the 19th century and it is still 
the peculiarity of this correlation that baffles contemporary scholars in 
public administration and political science faculties (Akers, 2006:3). It is 
therefore essential that South African scholarship examines this concept in 
detail, tracing it from its roots in 18th-century literature. This study 
examines the politics–administration interface through the pre-claims as 
conceptualised by the researcher in this contribution to the contemporary 
academic discourse.  
 
The main claim of this study is that there are leadership conflicts between 
the political bureau and the public service bureau when there are differing 
views on how service delivery should be executed. The main claim is 
premised on the political conflict arising in the public service bureau in 
2008 between the former South African President, Thabo Mbeki and the 
then Minister of Justice, Brigitte Mabandla, as well as the then National 
Director of Public Prosecutions, Advocate Vusumzi (Vusi) Pikoli, who was 
suspended and later dismissed. The first reason for the main claim of 
leadership conflict is that there is a tendency by political officials to 
dominate public service functions. The researcher examines the notion 
that political officials want to dominate public service functions because 
they want to influence the public service’s supply chain and the awarding 
of tenders. The underlying intent for seeking to control public service 
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functions could thus be corruption. Another reason for the tendency to 
dominate public service functions could be that political officials want to 
enforce cadre deployment in order to retain their political ideology in the 
execution of service delivery. The second reason for the main claim is that 
there could be conflicting leadership styles between a political official and 
a senior public service official. If, for example, there are particular personal 
behavioural traits, as well as leadership styles, that are dominant in a 
political bureau and not in the public service bureau or vice versa, there 
could be leadership and governance conflicts. Leadership conflict may 
also occur due to leaders’ allegiance to either a closed system or open 
system of leadership. The third reason for the main claim is that political 
officials may have a different political ideology compared with the political 
ideology upheld by a senior public service official. If there is such a clash 
based on political ideologies, there could be conflict between political 
bureau and public service bureau. The fourth reason for the claim of this 
study could be that political officials or public service officials or both 
parties have some disregard for documented duties and responsibilities. 
Hence, there could be overlapping actions between political bureau and 
public service bureau. Such overlap could be related to State and political 
party overlap, which could be one of the challenges of the one-dominant-
party governance model in the Westminster system of democracy. This 
pre-claim and sub-claims are further elaborated upon in the problem 
statement of this research. The four pre-claims could be contributing 
factors to the politics–administration interface challenges. However, this 
study does not attempt to establish the causes of politics–administration 
interface conflict and challenges but is limited to examining the politics–
administration interface in relation to the above-mentioned four pre-claims 
as possible contributing factors to conflict between political bureau and 
administration bureau. 
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1.2 BACKGROUND  
 
It is essential to begin this study by discussing the main concepts as 
contained in the study subject matter. According to Schaap (2011:4), 
politics refers to a process by which societies take shared resolutions on 
public affairs involving authority and regulation of social matters within a 
nation. The word politics stems from the Greek word politikos, meaning ‘for 
citizens’, and politikos comes from the parent word politika, which stems 
from Aristotle’s book Affairs of the City. The word politikos was adopted by 
English scholars in the 15th century to formulate the English word politics 
(Ranciere, 2001:1). Another key term in the subject matter is 
administration. The United Nations (UN) (2006:5) defines administration as 
a public process related to the organisation of government programmes 
and policies as well as the behaviour of non-elected bureaucrats in the 
execution of service delivery. It is also important to define interface in the 
context of this study. The politics–administration interface is a view that 
suggests that there must be a clear distinction between political bureau 
and public administration bureau (Dubnick and Romzek, 1991:30). 
Furthermore, the interface is the intersection of leadership roles within a 
tradition of a dichotomous relationship between political and administrative 
realms. This definition means that although the roles of politicians are 
traditionally distinct from those of professional and career civil servants, 
this distinction is becoming steadily more blurred as the roles intersect at a 
certain point (Miller and McTavish, 2009:1). The politics–administration 
interface is a concept that defines the borders of public administration and 
declares the separation of roles between elected bureaucrats and 
administrators in democratic governance (Wilson, 1887:18). It is at this 
point of intersection where there may be conflict between political bureau 
officials and their senior professionals in the public administration. The 
contested territory at the point of intersection needs to be carefully defined 
and managed for the political bureau and administration bureau to work 
together effectively for the common good. However, it is usually not clear 
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who should manage the point of intersection. This study therefore 
examines the politics–administration interface in South Africa between 
1999 and 2009 in order to understand the underlying factors that can be 
linked to conflict between the political bureau and the public administration 
bureau. 
 
The study examines the four pre-claims together with the research 
questions. A pre-claim is an apparently consistent supposition, a 
reasonable guess or an educated conjecture that tentatively explains the 
research problem regarding the phenomenon under study (Nartey and 
Yankson, 2014:23). 
 
The etymology of the word bureau stems from the word bureaucracy, 
which was created by the French economist Jacques Claude Marie 
Vincent de Gournay, who combined the early Greek suffix kratia with the 
French word bureau. Kratia means ‘power of’ and the French word bureau 
literally means ‘desk’ but can also be used to mean ‘office’. Hence, 
bureaucracy means ‘official authority’ (Grimm, 1813:146). The term 
bureaucracy was reviewed by Max Weber in the 19th century in his 
literature wherein he discussed official authority extensively (Weber, 
1946:196). 
 
The politics–administration interface developed from the four political 
epochs over centuries. These epochs are: (i) ancient politics and 
administration; (ii) medieval politics and administration; (iii) modern politics 
and administration; and (iv) contemporary politics and administration. The 
concept under review and public administration as an autonomous faculty 
of practice are as old as the formation of States. However, its recognition 
as a study emerged only in the 19th century. It is mainly linked with the 
publication of the article, ‘The study of public administration’ by Woodrow 
Wilson in 1887. What would later evolve into public administration was 
governance, which was part of ancient societies. Furthermore, public 
XR Shazi 584200 PHD WSG 
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administration is rooted in the early study of politics in the ancient Greek 
era between 500 BCE and 300 BCE, an era in which distinguished political 
philosophers such as Plato, Socrates and Aristotle emerged (Smith, 
1968:88). However, a distinction between political bureau and public 
service bureau was not realised until the 19th century after Woodrow 
Wilson had written his article on the subject of the political–administration 
interface. Ancient politics and administration were an integrated institution 
premised on tradition and customs of ancient societies (Kennett, 1931:1). 
Ancient philosophers did not regard the politics–administration interface as 
a governance problem. However, the medieval epoch followed the 
collapse of the Roman dynasty and preceded the first part of the modern 
era, marking the end of ancient politics epoch (Krumbacher, 1897:4). The 
medieval epoch was marked by the writings of philosophers such as 
Thomas Aquinas, St Augustine of Hippo and Peter Damian, who 
advocated independent philosophical inquiry that influenced modern 
philosophy in areas of natural law, ethics, metaphysics and political theory 
(Gracia and Noone, 2002:1). The medieval epoch, which lasted in Europe 
from the 5th century to the 15th century, was premised on religion and 
theological reasoning based on the authorship of the ancient philosophers 
such as Plato and Aristotle (Pearcey and Thaxton, 1994:7). The politics–
administration interface in the medieval administration was not 
scholastically realised until the modern era. Writings on politics and 
administration in the modern era stem from philosophers such as the 
political economist and sociologist Max Weber who wrote about 
bureaucratic administration, which defined complex modern organizations 
(Allan, 2005:145). Woodrow Wilson (1945:95) also conceptualised the 
organisational idea in the politics–administration relationship which was 
established by Max Weber (1946:95) as bureaucracy to formulate the 
politics–administration interface. According to Akers (2006:2), Wilson 
believed that partisan politics should not form part of an efficient process 
of government and with this belief he established the science of public 
administration. The present study is a contribution to contemporary 
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scholarship on the politics–administration interface in South Africa 
between 1999 and 2009.  
 
Political leadership implies political guidance and collective duties that are 
achieved by creative adaptation in line with political ideology in a particular 
environment and an established social setting (Heifetz, 1994:3). According 
to Masciulli, Molchanov and Knight (2009:14), the seven components 
listed below ought to be considered when defining political leadership: first, 
the temperament of a leader as well as a leader’s moral and behavioural 
character; second, the personality and moral-cultural charisma of 
constituencies with whom leaders work together (not forgetting that 
followers of different leaders interact with leaders of different followers 
supportively and or competitively); third, the social or structural setting 
where a leader and follower interacts including the culture of politically 
awareness, political stability, customs and societies should be considered 
when we define political leadership. The fourth element is the challenges 
that the leaders and constituencies are faced with, particularly previous 
experiences and uncertainties. Fifth is the character leaders’ discernment 
as environments do not reveal themselves but must be defined by leaders’ 
perceptions that are also recognised by constituencies. The sixth element 
is the attributes of management (that are perceived, material or figurative, 
permanent or temporary). The seventh component is the tactics (physical 
and conceptual) utilised by leaders to reach the objectives as well as the 
objectives of the constituencies; a leader uses such tactics to get public 
backing in order to execute his/her agenda that appears to also benefit the 
constituencies (Peele, 2005:192). This study further examines leadership 
traits and styles as one of the underlying factors for conflict in the politics–
administration interface.  
 
This study does not intend to examine all the concepts used in public 
administration or to examine the suitability or the accuracy of all likely 
implications provided by numerous writers. It is necessary to clarify that 
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since the Zuma administration in South Africa, the names of some national 
state departments were changed; those changes are reflected in this study 
as they fall within the study period and scope of 1999 to 2009. To 
circumvent ambiguity and vagueness in the explanation of theories and 
expressions employed in the study, all main concepts are described. The 
researcher defines key concepts in the context of this research as follows: 
 
Administration is a public process attempting to ensure the organisation of 
government work and guidelines, including the performance of 
bureaucrats in the execution of service delivery (United Nations, 2006:5). 
 
Closed system of leadership is a traditional and fundamentally discreet 
leadership style that holds information and strategy at the senior 
leadership level (Katz and Kahn, 1978: 27). 
 
Margins are performance measures for which political officials are 
accountable and performance measures for which public administrators 
are accountable (Terry, 1998: 190). 
 
Politics is a practice by which groups make joint resolutions of social 
relations involving authority or power and regulation of public affairs in a 
country (Schaap, 2011:4). 
 
Political officials are elected officials, including the State President, Deputy 
State President, Ministers of government departments at a national level 
and Members of Executive Councils at a provincial level (McNair, 
1995:164).  
 
Politics–administration dualism is a view suggesting that government 
performs two basic functions, one political and the other administrative 
(Dubnick and Romzek, 1991:30). 
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One dominant party is a system in which, despite the multi-party situation, 
only one party is so dominant that it directs the political system and is 
firmly in control of State power over a fairly long duration of time, so that 
even opposition parties make little if any impression in the political 
hegemony of a dominant governing party (Matlosa and Karume, 2004:10). 
 
Political ideology means a set of beliefs about the appropriate order of 
society and how it can be achieved (Erikson and Tedin, 2003:64). 
 
Senior managers refer to most senior public servants in South Africa who 
are at the apex of the interface between administration and politics; this 
includes directors-general, deputy directors-general and chief executive 
officers (Miller, 2005:27). 
 
Open system of leadership is a modern leadership model that prioritises 
distribution of information and change in order to maintain relevance and 
effectiveness in shifting environments (Katz and Kahn, 1978:27). 
 
1.3 THE POLITICS–ADMINISTRATION INTERFACE WORLDWIDE AS 
AN ACADEMIC PHENOMENON  
 
As further background to the study, the researcher examined the politics–
administration interface of a few relatively established governments in the 
world by selecting a limited number of diverse countries: the United 
Kingdom (UK), the United States (US), India, Brazil, South Africa, 
Australia, Canada, Nigeria, Ghana, Uganda and Botswana. It is useful to 
note that this study argues that the interface discourse is perpetual 
because of observed traits of the politics–administration interface where 
there is interference from the political bureau on administration matters; 
conflicting leadership styles between political bureau officials and public 
administration managers; different political ideologies between political 
officials and public administration managers; and disregard for 
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documented duties and responsibilities as stipulated in constitutions and 
public service guidelines. 
 
As in the many different countries presented below, the researcher argues 
that in the South African context, public administration is a significant part 
of administrative science, indicating the instrument of the government and 
the functioning of administrative tools to execute governance for the 
satisfaction of the ruling class and the pacifying of the constituencies. 
According to Goodnow (1900:9), public administration is politics and policy 
in practice; the purpose of the political bureau is to outline the will of the 
State whereas the purpose of the administration bureau is to accomplish 
the will of the State.  
 
The politics–administration interface is an administrative theory also 
known as politics–administration dichotomy made popular by Woodrow 
Wilson in the 19th century. Woodrow Wilson (1887) wanted to protect the 
functioning of administration from continuous interference from the political 
bureau, hence he suggested administration should be viewed as public 
business and should not be at the centre of political struggle. Wilson 
(1887:18) envisioned shielding “administration from political interference”, 
hence he argued that, “The field of administration is a field of business. It 
is removed from the hurry and strife of politics ... Administration lies 
outside the proper sphere of politics. Administrative questions are not 
political questions. Although politics sets the tasks for administration; it 
should not be suffered to manipulate its offices.”  Wilson’s view was that 
administration would not be appropriately categorised within the sphere of 
politics. Wilson further argued that administrative questions are different 
from the political questions. Despite the fact that politics provides the 
background and outlines the functions of public administration, politics 
must not continuously dominate and manipulate public administration 
(Wilson, 1887:18). 
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According to Kettl (2002:17), “public administration without a guiding 
theory is risky; administrative theory without connection to action is 
meaningless”. Such gridlock is the bedrock of a conceptual predicament in 
the study of public administration. Therefore, this study argues that politics 
and administration should work together for effective and efficient 
government machinery in the complementary model of the politics–
administration interface. The political bureau’s role includes an obligation 
to serving the public and prioritising the basic needs of the collective, 
utilising the power of government to enforce government policy resolutions 
to challenges such as unemployment, poverty, homelessness and poor 
infrastructure (Bourgon, 2010:34). The administration bureau should focus 
on implementing the public policy solutions, provide feedback to the 
political bureau on policy performance, and advise the political office on 
policy gaps. The contemporary discourse on politics–administration 
interface stems from the parent governance models, namely the 
Westminster and presidential systems. 
 
The Westminster system is a parliamentary model taken from the politics 
of the UK. The term derives from the Palace of Westminster where the 
Houses of Parliament are situated in London. The Westminster system 
was adopted by former colonies of Britain around the world. The 
Westminster system “is characterized by the supremacy of the political 
bureau that determines the governance of a country” (Burnell, 2004:5). 
The Westminster system upholds political parties as the most important 
part of governance, since “political parties are fundamental to 
representative democracy and to the process of democratisation”. Political 
parties are recognized by the Westminster system as being an entity that 
connects society and the state. Burnell (2004:5) argues that the political 
bureau “socializes citizens into democratic politics and they manage 
conflicts of interest and, importantly, in societies that have recently 
experienced violent conflict, they can offer a forum for social and political 
integration, a tool for nation-building. Thus in the Westminster system, 
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democracy in the modern world is perceived to be inconceivable without 
healthy political parties and an effective party system”. The governments 
of the Commonwealth countries today are influenced by the Westminster 
system that was popular in the 18th century, one such example being 
Canada which was colonized by Britain and whose governance is 
influenced by the Westminster system. In Canada the Prime Minister 
seeks permission from the Governor-General when implementing 
executive decisions, a model similar to that of the United Kingdom. In 
Canada, Ministers of departments account to the Governor-General for 
public administration work and not senior public service managers (Roy, 
2008:564).  
 
Australian governance is also influenced by the Westminster system; the 
Queen has ultimate political power embodied by the Governor-General. 
Furthermore, the Governor-General is closely involved in public 
administration matters. Section 64 of Australia’s Constitution empowers 
the Governor-General to employ bureaucrats to run divisions of 
government as the Governor-General in Council may decide. The 
employed bureaucrats may be in office as long as the Governor-General 
requires them in office. It is a general expectation that such bureaucrats 
should be official participants in the Federal Executive Council and they 
are Queen’s Ministers of State for the Commonwealth. Section 67 states 
that the appointment and removal of civil servants is entrusted to the 
Governor-General, except in cases where the nomination is delegated in 
Council by the Governor-General or by a regulation of the Commonwealth. 
In Australia there are few restraints in the Constitution should a political 
bureau seek to control public administration. The members of the 
Executive who are also MPs draft legislation for the public administration 
bureau (Alvey, 2005:167). The Australian government is directed by 
Parliament through a political agenda and legislation passed by 
Parliament. Like many countries examined in this study, the political 
bureau in Australia provides direction for the public service. In the process 
XR Shazi 584200 PHD WSG 
12 
of providing direction, it is usually a generally accepted trend to dominate a 
directed entity. As discussed above, this study argues that the 
Westminster system in Australia upheld the supremacy of the political 
bureau over the administration bureau. 
 
In India, section 75 of India’s Constitution states that the Prime Minister is 
employed by the President and all Ministers are selected by the President 
as advised by the Prime Minister. Schedule 6, item 14(3), states that in 
assigning the responsibilities of government to the selected Ministers, the 
Governor can designate one of the Ministers to lead the welfare of the 
independent regions and independent provinces of the government. Thus 
India’s fate was no exception, as being part of the Commonwealth nations 
India’s government is characterized by the dominant political bureau.  As 
is the case with India, the Westminster system vests ultimate authority of 
public administration in the political bureau.  
 
The political dimension has always been present in the public 
administration; politics is the essential part of public administration. The 
new public management (NPM) has also increased the significance of the 
Westminster system by upholding that the public service should be loyal to 
the government of the day, be completely receptive to political bureau 
direction, and be willing and zealous in the advancement of the 
government policies (Kernaghan, 2003:5). Therefore a non-aligned public 
service is considered by the political bureau not as a base for good public 
administration but as a stumbling block to be eradicated by politicians in 
the quest for a political bureau agenda (Aucoin, 2006:304). Thus the 
Westminster system as the root of the politics–administration interface 
phenomenon perpetuated the generally accepted culture of political 
bureau domination in public administration matters, particularly in the 
Commonwealth countries.  
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According to Blaug, Horner and Lekhi (2006:18), social democracy in the 
Westminster system “has not left much room for citizen voice and 
autonomous public administration. Popular participation in government is 
limited to voting in elections and to involvement in political parties. Citizens 
can influence policy by selecting the political actor that best represented 
their political views. With ‘politics’ restricted to the institutions of state and 
democracy to the periodic selection of autonomous representatives, public 
managers are expected to somehow achieve what politicians had not; an 
understanding of constantly evolving public preferences”. Thus the political 
bureaux could sometimes abuse the public mandate and dominate some 
faculties of government. The Westminster system as the root of the 
politics–administration interface phenomenon perpetuated the culture of 
political bureau domination in public administration matters. According to 
Gruening (2001:2), the NPM movement stems from the Westminster 
system of the UK under Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in the last part 
of the 1970s and first part of the 1980s. The NPM was first adopted as a 
consequence of alleged failures of traditional state bureaucracy such as 
public inaccessibility, excessive corruption and the self-serving agenda of 
the political bureau in order “to reduce the role of public bureaucracy and 
transfer resources and services from the public sector to the private 
sector” (Haque, 2004:3). The NPM intended to shift accountability from the 
political bureau to the managerial sphere, and from input and processes to 
output and outcomes (Fatemi and Behmanesh, 2012:1). However, the 
political bureau dominance on administration remains a prevailing 
occurrence despite the improved accountability brought in by the NPM. 
The political bureau supremacy as a feature of the Westminster system 
could not be eradicated by the NPM because NPM is a service delivery 
programme and not a governance model. When NPM was introduced in 
the late 1970s, politicians embraced it as a service delivery programme 
and took control of its performance in the public service (Hood, James, 
Peters and Scott, 2005:5). The Westminster system and NPM are 
characterized by the supreme political bureau. 
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The peer countries in the emerging economies, loosely associated as 
BRICS, are Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. In this study, 
therefore, the researcher examines peer countries’ nature of politics–
administration interface in comparison with South Africa. In Brazil, the 
establishment of public administration can be outlined from the 1930s. 
Public administration in Brazil had previously tended to be identified with 
governmental regulation or, according to Muñoz, ‘with legislative 
requirements, restricting its challenge to policy development and execution 
of policies’ (Keinert, 1994:42). The Roman law traditions, introduced by 
Portuguese colonization, influenced public administration in Brazil until the 
1930s, bringing it nearer to what Hood (1995) called ‘law-oriented 
tradition’, a feature of Europe as the continent. Despite the traditional 
governance being based on legislation, in reality public administration was 
characterized by partisanship (Nunes, 1997:18). However, between 1937 
and 1945 the new state underwent administrative reform that attempted to 
formulate a public service in Brazil in line with the Weberian bureaucracy 
characterised by values of worth and objectivity that was expected to 
counteract the patrimonialist nature that previously prevailed within public 
administration in the country. The American influence was realised when 
professors from the American universities arrived in Brazil to teach and 
train public service officials (Fischer 1984:282). According to Morelo 
(2011:5), Brazil’s public administration has evolved from three epochs, 
namely partisan administration, bureaucratic administration and 
managerial aligned with NPM. Hence, Brazil’s public administration has 
features of all three models.  
 
During the period 1995 until 2002, President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, 
the leading member of the Brazilian Social Democracy Party, led Brazil 
through the establishment of market-oriented economic policies (Gaetani, 
2002:1). In the period 2003 to 2010 under the leadership of President Luis 
Inácio Lula da Silva of the Workers Party, Brazil continued with formulation 
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and implementation of market-oriented economic policies (Meyer, 2014:3). 
The political bureau leads public administration in Brazil’s politics–
administration interface as it is the case with developing countries where 
administration is characterised by political control. According to 
Mainwaring (2006:98), despite the managerial regime of public service, the 
political bureau in Brazil is the supreme authority of the public 
administration and politicians influence service delivery. Like most 
Commonwealth nations, as demonstrated in this study, Brazil is 
characterized by political bureau dominance in public service function. 
Similar to Brazil, South Africa’s public service is influenced by Roman-
Dutch law which divides state authorities between the Legislature, 
Executive and Judiciary (Van Heerden, 2009:48). The public service is 
part of the Constitution (Chapter 10) in South Africa, which provides 
guidance on the arrangement and direction of the government 
departments. In the case of both Brazil and South Africa, the political 
bureau is ultimately accountable for public administration and provides 
feedback to the Executive. Furthermore, in both cases the political bureau 
has a constitutionally justified political interference provided for in the 
Roman-Dutch law. This study argues that Brazil’s Public Administration is 
influenced by the political bureau stemming from the historic colonialism 
under the Portuguese culture and control. 
 
Prior to the 19th century, recruitment of public administration employees 
had characteristics of political patronage, nepotism and favouritism which 
were acceptable in that era. Public administrators were the eyes and ears 
of rulers, presidents, kings and empires, until Woodrow Wilson posed 
questions about politics and administration relations. The separation of 
politics and administration presented by Wilson continues to play a crucial 
role in American contemporary public administration (Rabin and Bowman, 
1984:51). However, Wilson’s views were challenged by Frank Goodnow, 
Luther Gulick, Lyndall Urwick, Henri Fayol and Frederick Taylor. Gulick, for 
example, developed a comprehensive theory of organisation that 
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emphasised the scientific techniques, efficiency, professionalism, 
structural reform and executive control; he presented the duties of 
administrators with the abbreviation ‘POSDCORB’, for the words 
‘planning’, organising, staffing, directing, co-ordinating, reporting and 
budgeting’. The new public administration epoch called ‘new public 
management’ was presented by Ted Gaebler and David Osborne in their 
book ‘Reinventing Government’ (1993:322). The NPM as supported by 
Vice-President Al Gore during the Clinton Administration advocated for the 
utilisation of private sector-style models, and modern organisational ideas 
as well as standards to advance the productivity and stewardship of the 
public sector (Henderson, 2005:273). Therefore, New Public Management 
too required the adoption of the political bureau to function; in the case of 
the US, the Presidency had to support NPM for it to function. 
 
According to Burnell (2004:13), in the Westminster model or presidential 
model, the variations of a robust or feeble executive, robust or feeble 
parliament and robust or feeble parties are possible. Some developed 
countries have a well-constructed constitution but whatever the 
documented constitutional position, the practical environment can be 
contrary (Mbondenyi, Ojienda and Hlalele, 2013:3). As demonstrated 
below, in most countries in Africa the elected officials’ domination of the 
administration is more likely where the ruling party dominates the mode of 
governance including the democratic system. Africa is challenged by weak 
multi-party systems and usually the ‘winner takes all’ during the elections. 
Where parties do not win the presidency they have less likelihood of 
having political influence. 
 
1.4 THE AFRICAN CONTINENT AND THE POLITICS–
ADMINISTRATION INTERFACE 
 
In Nigeria a parliamentary system modelled along the lines of the 
Westminster model operated from independence in 1960 to 1966. 
However, the country later moved to a presidential system somewhat 
XR Shazi 584200 PHD WSG 
17 
similar to that of the United States (Osieke, 2006:1). The political bureau in 
Nigeria is more dominant where most power rests with the President and 
State Governors who are the powerful authority in the political bureau 
(Akindele, Olaopa, Sat-Obiyan 2002:252). The President of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria is the elected Head of State, Principal of Government, 
and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, as well as the overseer of 
the day-to-day administration of government (Kaiser, 2005:19). The 
political bureau is the power hub in Nigeria. Public administration is mostly 
driven by the political bureau. However, in principle public administration is 
neutral and independent of political influence (Omotola, 2008:59). By law 
civil servants in Nigeria are prohibited from engaging in partisan politics 
and public officers must resign their appointments before going into 
partisan politics (Akindele et al, 2002:250). The boundary between politics 
and administration is still the point of contemporary discourse. Public 
administration is viewed as politics, that is, the political character of public 
administration. Despite the contemporary theory of New Public 
Management, the conceptualised non-separability of politics and 
administration is still the major discourse among academics (Philip and 
Daganda, 2013:12). In Nigeria, both the presidential system and 
Westminster system are characterised by the power of the political bureau 
that influences public administration (Brown, 2013:173). The unanswered 
question in the contemporary academic discourse relates to the analysis of 
the contributing factors to the politics–administration interface and how the 
government machinery can function better in this interface. This study 
examines the contributing factors to the politics–administration interface 
through the pre-claims and research questions. 
 
In the Ghanaian public administration, senior public officers are political 
appointees and they are subject to the vagaries of the political bureau 
(Antwi-Boasiako, 2010:169). The structure of the Ghanaian State is made 
up of the executive, the legislature and the Judiciary, although, the 
ultimate political power is held by the executive whose members are 
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drawn from the largest political party in parliament, which by virtue of its 
majority has won an electoral mandate to govern (Kuzu, 2011:5). 
Developing countries and most countries in Africa are characterized by 
power that is centralized in the political bureau. For example, while the 
Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) in 
Ghana has the authority to scrutinise all charges of fraud, only the Minister 
of Justice and the Attorney General can decide whether or not to 
prosecute cases recommended by the CHRAJ, which is subordinate to the 
politically appointed Minister of Justice and Attorney General and can 
disregard the judgments of anti-corruption organizations (Abdulai, 2009:9). 
Political parties in the African continent “became vehicles for the elite’s 
ambition to capture power, influence the legislative and executive 
branches, and control the administrative functions of the State 
bureaucracy through the political Executive” (Salih and Nordlund, 
2007:43). The separation of roles between the political bureau and the 
public administration bureau is largely unrealized in Ghana, thus the 
location on the politics–administration interface may become 
insurmountable. Like many African governments, the political bureau in 
Ghana is in control of public administration matters and there are no 
boundaries in the politics–administration interface. Echoing the sentiments 
suggesting that politics and administration are intertwined to an extent that 
it is empirically difficult to determine the dichotomy, this study suggests 
that countries of the world in general and Africa in particular are 
characterised by the cryptic contributing factors in the politics–
administration interface, and Ghana is no exception.  
 
Patterson and Fadiga-Stewart (2005:5) argue that “African nations had 
authoritarian pasts and it is well known that authoritarian politics is often 
associated with the political dominance of a single political party”. Hence, 
there is no identifiable dichotomy in the politics–administration relationship 
in most African governments. The Constitution of Uganda (Preamble) 
states that the President is required to report to Parliament and the nation 
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at least once a year with all possible steps being taken to ensure the 
realization of Uganda’s policy objectives and principles. Section 16 of the 
Ugandan Constitution further states that the President has the prerogative 
to appoint board members of the National Citizenship and Immigration 
Board, and section 51 requires the President to appoint members of the 
Uganda Human Rights Commission. As in many countries in Africa and 
the world, governance power is concentrated in the political bureau. The 
Ugandan Constitution divides powers among the political bureau, the 
public administration and the people, and depicts that ultimate power rests 
in the political power, which is the President and Parliament. Uganda has 
a multiparty government. However, the political bureau dominates the 
administration function (Juma, 2009:113). Juma, (2009:113) further argues 
that the “political operatives in Cabinet and Parliament have continued to 
justify an oversized Executive as necessary to enhance political 
supervision to ensure effective delivery of government programmes”. The 
influence of politicians in administration continues to be part of the 
Ugandan public service (Tumushabe, 2009:43). Public administration in 
the Ugandan public service is dominated by the political bureau, and there 
is no interface marking the responsibilities of the government bureaucrats 
and the duties of the political bureau.  
 
In African jurisdictions such as Botswana and other Commonwealth 
African countries, it can be argued that political “neutrality” does not 
constantly triumph within the public service, predominantly in cases where 
there is single party dominance (Maphunye, 2001:33). The separation of 
powers between the political bureau and the administration bureau has not 
succeeded as Wilson desired. The commonwealth nations sustained the 
British colonial legacy of the Westminster government system which puts 
the political bureau at the centre of administration. Since 1966 the 
Botswana Democratic Party has dominated politics and administration in 
Botswana (Cook and Sarkin, 2010:461). The political bureau of the 
colonial era influenced the present politics–administration interface. 
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“Botswana’s current public administration benefited from a mixture of 
French, Dutch and British civil service traditions, which influenced its 
institutions during the colonial era and which have since strengthened its 
structures” (Maphunye, 2009:24). Consequently, Botswana’s public 
administration is dominated by the Botswana Democratic Party, which has 
centralized policy-making and policy implementation (Lotshwao, 
2011:103). Political bureau dominance in the public service function is a 
general trend in Africa, thus the concept of an independent public 
administration as envisioned by Wilson is still not a reality in many 
developing countries, including Botswana. In the absence of empirical 
evidence of a dividing line between politics and administration, countries 
are faced with political bureau interfering and dominating public 
administration. However, it is necessary to comprehend the factors around 
the politics–administration interface in line with the proposed pre-claims of 
this study, and provide guidance as to how this relationship can work 
better. 
 
In South Africa, public administration is exercised in the context of a three-
tier structure of national, provincial and local government. The South 
African Constitution makes provision and provides for roles and 
responsibilities for public administration requirements and political 
involvements where necessary. Section 40(1) of the South African 
Constitution prescribes that “government is constituted as national, 
provincial and local spheres of government which are distinctive, 
interdependent and interrelated”, while Section 41(1) states that “all 
spheres of government and all organs of state within each sphere must 
respect the constitutional status, institutions, powers and functions of 
government in the other spheres; not assume any power or function 
except those conferred on them in terms of the Constitution; and exercise 
their powers and perform their functions in a manner that does not 
encroach on the geographical, functional or institutional integrity of 
government in another sphere”. Thus, in terms of section 195(5), 
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“legislation regulating public administration may differentiate between 
different sectors, administrations or institutions”. Section 195(6) states that 
“the nature and functions of different sectors; administrations or institutions 
of public administration are relevant factors to be taken into account in 
legislation regulating public administration”. Section 197(1) states that 
“within public administration there is a public service for South Africa, 
which must function and be structured, in terms of national legislation and 
which must loyally execute the lawful policies of the government of the 
day”. The politics–administration interface is an abstract; it is the dual 
nature of public administration, which is the execution of policies of the 
government of the day and the fulfilling of the administration role 
(Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2010:21). Public service administrators 
have a constitutional responsibility to implement the official policies and 
programmes of the government of the day loyally. Thus, the correlation of 
the political bureau and the administration bureau is the standard feature 
of government in South Africa and elsewhere as presented above. 
 
1.5 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK BACKGROUND  
 
The politics–administration interface theory was developed as the public 
administration version of organisational theory (Shafritz and Hyde, 
2007:28). Since the 19th century, there has had to be a clear separation 
between the political bureau and the administration bureau. That theory 
was established by Woodrow Wilson (1886:3) who argued for the 
importance of a politics–administration interface. Wilson’s perspective 
places management at the centre of government administration, while 
making politics irrelevant and undesirable (Dubnick and Romzek, 
1991:30). Wilson (1886:3) suggested that the function of political officials 
was to control or govern, and therefore the politicians should govern and 
not interfere with administration. However, Frank Goodnow (1900:140), a 
legal scholar, argued that government performed two basic functions, one 
political and the other administrative. The political function involves the 
expression of the ‘State will’ while the administrative function involves the 
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execution of the State will. Even though these two spheres of government 
are analytically distinct, in practice the two are not separable. The nature 
of public administration is that these two spheres are inevitably linked 
because they both reflect the State will. Public administration is not 
distinctive because it is devoid of politics but because in government 
administration considerations take priority over political considerations 
(Dubnick and Romzek, 1991:30). Therefore, Goodnow’s argument 
suggests that public administration has a dual nature. Senior public 
managers have an obligation to report to their political heads; the political 
heads have an obligation to report to the parliament on the manner in 
which the budget of the department was utilised for the benefit of the 
public (Pauw, Woods, Van der Linde, Fourie and Visser, 2002:30). 
Governments are under pressure to maintain power as well as being 
placed under constant pressure to operate in an efficient and business-like 
manner. Therefore, governments must create an environment where these 
two spheres (politics and public administration) can co-exist. For 
governments to function effectively there must be a good rapport between 
the Cabinet Ministers and the Directors-General (Muller and Van Rooyen, 
1994:194). That is the dual nature of public administration which keeps the 
administration and policy skills functioning in both the political and 
administrative sphere. According to Jordana and Levi-Faur (2004:69), 
public administration is a specialized field of political science concentrating 
on the manner in which government organisations are administered and 
how administrative incumbents participate in the political processes of 
policy formulation and execution. Therefore, this study examines politics 
and administration relationships (for example, how can politics and 
administration co-occur), leadership styles, roles and responsibilities in 
both the political sphere and the administration sphere. 
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1.5.1 The Marxist approach to politics–administration roles and 
responsibilities  
 
The Marxist scholars Antonio Gramsci (1937:247), Wilhelm Reich (1934:6) 
and John Plamenatz (1860:40) argued that in the superstructure of society 
there is a governing class that controls the economic system, a notion that 
was upheld by Baradat (1984:164). The government is thus part of the 
upper class controlling what happens in the lower social classes. Public 
service managers are also at the apex of implementing policies for the 
benefit of the social classes on behalf of the political bureau, which drives 
the ideologies of a ruling political party. The main function of the upper 
class is to assure the bourgeoisie of continued control and to keep the 
controlled classes in their place. Therefore, public managers are there to 
satisfy the needs of society through service delivery and to pacify the 
society so that it remains governable. In a contrasting view, Marxist 
analyst Raymond Williams (1977:77) argued that the superstructure was 
not discrete from the base and it could not be understood apart from the 
base. Williams argued that the elevation of the superstructure over the 
base was unnatural, since no social class was naturally dominant over 
other social classes. He argued that while social beings determined social 
consciousness, it could not be accepted that the base determined 
superstructure (Williams, 1973:7). According to Appelrouth and Edles 
(2008:45), “division of labour expresses itself in the superstructure as the 
class of intellectual and material workforce so that within the upper class 
few people appear as the thinkers of the class, while the rest are more 
passive and receptive because they are active members of the class and 
have less time to make up illusions and concepts about themselves and 
governance”. According to Karl Marx (1845:27), “division of labour 
manifests itself in the ruling class as the division of mental and material 
labour”. This view submits that the interface is determined by the ruling 
class who are the intellectuals or think tank of the country, while the other 
classes are passive and receptive implementers of thoughts, ideas and 
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illusions from the upper class which controls the superstructure. Moreover, 
analysing social class theory in the politics–administration interface 
displays the dislodged senior public service manager division in the social 
classes. Senior public service managers may perceive their class as that 
of thinkers who are part of the superstructure, whereas the elected officials 
may see these managers as mere servants who implement policies on 
behalf of the bourgeoisie who are the think tank in the upper class. 
Therefore, misconceptions about class positions between the elected 
officials and the public administrators may result in contestation for 
authority in the politics–administration interface regarding public policy 
direction. 
 
The government works to preserve socio-politico-economic stability in a 
country by developing policies that will persuade the majority of people to 
retain their confidence in government. The researcher in the present study 
argues that the government can achieve the goal of retaining its power by 
working together with senior public managers who comprehend the main 
agenda of the political bureau. It is important to note that the 
superstructure is made up of main entities that determine policies and 
programmes; such entities are the executive, the legislature and the 
judiciary, among others. Senior public managers are liable for enforcing 
policies on behalf of the government and advise elected officials on policy 
performance. It is the ideology that joins the political bureau and public 
administration bureau in the public service superstructure. This study 
further argues that senior public managers should monitor the policies and 
inform the Ministers on policy improvements for better service delivery. 
Marx’s structural division between the intellectual and the implementing 
class is the basic factor in the formation of false consciousness (Pines, 
1993:191). The empirical state of the public administration bureau is that it 
is the political bureau’s means to an end; the end is political power to keep 
the public under control. As a result, senior public managers bear the 
weight of political ideology translated into national agenda and political 
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influence. Furthermore, politics is about maintaining the power of the ruling 
political party through ideology as the hope of a better life for the people. 
To further examine the politics–administration interface in South Africa, the 
researcher scrutinised the social contract theory and identified 
documented roles for senior public service managers and roles for the 
political bureau. The documented rules pre-claim below is discussed along 
with South African researchers’ conclusions after they had examined the 
politics–administration interface.  
 
1.5.2 Social contract theory exploration  
 
The social contract practice was pioneered in antiquity, in Greek and Stoic 
philosophy and Roman law, as well as in the biblical concept of the 
covenant. Social contract theory is the governance model introduced by 
Jean Jacques Rousseau into academic discourse during the Age of 
Enlightenment. In the book, ‘The social contract’, published in 1762, 
Rousseau argued that “the public person was formed by the union of all 
other persons and took the name of the Republic or body of politics” 
(Rousseau, 1762:14). However, people cannot all govern at the same 
time, so people gave up some authority to elected representatives to take 
decisions on behalf of the people. Such a relationship between the people 
and government Rousseau referred to as the “social contract”. He argued 
that the public needed a body of politics to decide for them since they did 
not always agree on what they needed and what they needed today might 
not be what they needed tomorrow (Rousseau, 1762:18). The government 
is in a social contract with its citizens since they are the ones who give it 
an opportunity to govern through elections. Cloete and Wissink (2000:131) 
argue that government is bound by the Constitution to serve its people as 
the Constitution demands. Therefore, the government, its Cabinet 
Ministers and public administrators are servants of the people who 
participate during elections. For a democratic government to remain in 
power it must do the necessary work to improve the lives of the people if 
that government does not want to be voted out of power by the people. In 
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accordance with the Constitution the government must fulfil pledges by the 
Constitution; for example, chapter two of the Constitution is the Bill of 
Rights ensuring basic human rights for people by virtue of being 
inhabitants of the country. The government has a duty to comply with 
ensuring human rights as the Constitution demands. The political bureau 
employs senior public service managers and administrators to execute the 
political agenda and pacify the public so that during the elections people 
will continue to surrender authority to the political bureau to govern on 
behalf of the people. 
 
1.6 BACKGROUND TO THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION THEORY 
QUESTION  
 
According to Torgerson (1986:34), scholarship has failed to provide a 
universally acceptable theory of public administration. The main 
philosophy of public administration in contemporary academia, namely the 
politics–administration dichotomy, faltered because of its binary opposite 
logic that desired to abolish politics in public administration. Furthermore, 
in 1965 Robert Parker suggested that there was no subject called ‘public 
administration’ since there was no science or art identified by that title. 
This study argues that the epistemological discourse on public 
administration should concede that the basis of public administration is 
politics; politics has an element of passion for justice interspersed with 
passion for personal gratification on the part of politicians. However, public 
administration in Wilson’s view (1887:209-210) is impersonal and all about 
professional service delivery. Whether or not public administration has a 
universally acceptable theory, contemporary academics should 
acknowledge that public administration deserves its intellectual discipline. 
The main political question of who gets what, how and when needs to be 
answered, and it can be better answered in the public administration 
discipline based on facts and not on emotion. In theory, public 
administration is the empirical, professional and impersonal side of politics. 
Empirically public administration is the implementation of political 
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ideologies. Wilson himself was more of a politician than an impartial 
administrator. He acknowledged that there was no demarcation line 
between politics and administration as he stated that “the science of 
administration is the latest fruit of the study of the science of politics” 
(Wilson, 1887:198). In Wilson’s analogy it can be deduced that if politics is 
a plant it can only produce the fruit of its own kind which is the 
administration, therefore politics and administration are within the same 
family. However, the critique of Wilson’s article seems to have been 
biased and mainly highlighted the politics–administration dichotomy, 
whereas Wilson himself acknowledged the dualistic nature of public 
administration, that is, politics and administration in public administration.  
 
A theory is a scientifically proven hypothesis that has never been 
disproved through scientific experiment (Sandoval and Morrison, 
2002:380). The universally acceptable theory of public administration is 
that public administration is the fruit of politics as much as politics is the 
fruit of protest against a deity and clergy epoch (Himmelfarb, 1962:204). 
The correlation between politics and administration has never been 
scientifically disproved. What seems to be the source of contention in 
public administration scholarship is the demarcation line between 
administration and politics. This study acknowledges the dual nature of 
public administration as acknowledged by Wilson (1887:198) and 
Goodnow (1900:9) and proceeds to examine the impact of the proposed 
pre-claims in this study. 
 
1.7 PROBLEM STATEMENT FOR THE STUDY 
 
The problem identified prior to this research topic was that political officials 
and senior public service managers find it difficult to maintain good 
working relationships as they execute political leadership and 
administration in the public service.  
 
XR Shazi 584200 PHD WSG 
28 
In a politics–administration interface relationship, conflict occurs when a 
senior public service manager is not in agreement with a political official 
about political views or a particular public policy decision (United Nations, 
1997:03); for example, in the Ginwala (2006:63) report on the inquiry into 
the fitness of Advocate Vusi Pikoli to hold the office of National Director of 
Public Prosecutions, it is stated that the Minister of Justice had complained 
that Pikoli’s view as the National Director of Public Prosecutions needed 
greater administrative and operational distance from the Minister, and he 
did not need to sign a performance agreement or account to the Minister 
on operational decisions.  
 
The discourse on politics–administration interface suggests that political 
interference in administration will undermine the prospect of administrative 
proficiency; the policy-formulation responsibilities of government should be 
completely disconnected from the administrative responsibilities; and that 
bureaucrats should have a plain mission of specific goals before they can 
begin to embark on improving an administrative bureau (Shafritz, 
1985:415). The researcher in this study has identified the research gap in 
his examination of the politics–administration interface, as well as the 
relationship between public service managers and political officials. The 
identification of the problem in South Africa’s public administration has 
resulted in the topic of this research, namely “the politics–administration 
interface in South Africa between 1999 and 2009.”  
 
Although much research has been conducted on the politics–
administration interface and working relationships (Wilson,1887; 
Goodnow, 1900; Torgerson,1986; Parker, 1965; Dubnick and Romzek, 
1991; Shafritz, 1985; Mafunisa and Maserumule, 2004), little is known 
about studying margins1 and overlaps in the political officials’ and senior 
public service managers’ relationship in South Africa. The researcher has 
identified the knowledge gap in examining the politics–administration 
                                                            
1 Performance measures for which political officials are accountable and performance measures for which public 
administrators are accountable (Terry, 1998: 190). 
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interface in South Africa in order to determine who does what, how and 
when. This study is thus a necessary examination and identification of the 
margins in political officials’ and senior public service managers’ roles in 
South Africa with regard to politics–administration interface theory. 
 
The aim of this research is to scrutinise the political leadership and 
administration relationship between senior public service managers and 
political officials. The study also identifies the margins in political officials’ 
roles, as well as senior public service managers’ roles in South Africa with 
regard to politics–administration interface theory.  
 
1.8 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
 
The rationale for this study is to examine the politics–administration 
interface in South Africa between 1999 and 2009. From the research 
problem stated above and research questions, study aims and objectives 
can be formulated. The overall aims of this study are to examine the 
interface and identify the margins and overlaps in political officials’ and 
senior public service managers’ roles in South Africa with regard to 
politics–administration interface theory between 1999 and 2009.  
 
In addition to these aims, the research will state the following objectives: to 
provide a theoretical background and literature review on the political 
leadership and administration and relationship between senior public 
service managers and political officials. Another objective will be to 
examine the application of public administration and politics–administration 
interface in the South African environment. This study further highlights the 
examples of case studies where state organs were involved in the public 
administration and politics dichotomy and conflict in South Africa.  
 
Finally, the study draws conclusions, evaluates successes and failures, 
and makes recommendations to improve political leadership and 
administration in South Africa in the future. It is also important to note that 
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this study is not aimed at ending any tensions in the politics–administration 
dichotomy relationship. However, it evaluates successes and failures in 
the politics–administration interface in South Africa, and makes 
recommendations to improve political leadership and administration for 
South Africa’s future.  
 
The objective of this study was to examine the politics–administration 
interface and identify the margins and overlaps in political officials’ roles 
and senior public service managers’ roles in South Africa with regard to 
the politics–administration interface theory. 
 
1.9 RESEARCH QUESTIONS FOR THE STUDY 
 
The above problem statement identifies the research gap that informs this 
study. The research questions listed below are analysed in this study as 
they could lead to a possible resolution of the research problem: 
 
1. What were the political leadership and administration roles of 
political officials in the rendering of their services to the public 
between 1999 and 2009? This question provides a basis for 
examination of political leadership and administration 
responsibilities of the senior public service managers in the 
implementation of programmes and policies and the manner of 
reporting to the political bureau.  
 
2. What political leadership and administration challenges have taken 
place in the politics–administration interface in South Africa 
between senior public service managers and political officials since 
the African National Congress (ANC) government came into power, 
and which challenges resulted in conflict? These questions 
reviewed the pre-claims of political dominance, conflicting 
leadership styles, political ideological differences and disregard for 
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documented responsibilities as possible contributing factors to 
conflict between the political bureau and the administration bureau. 
 
3. How has one dominant party in South Africa’s democracy affected 
administration? This question examines the relationship between 
the political bureau and public administration in South Africa. This 
question further reviews the effect of ANC dominance in the 
politics–administration interface and majority power in determining 
the strength of political bureau dominance.  
 
1.10 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY  
 
This study has academic value because examining the politics–
administration interface may assist academia and the public sector in 
understanding complementary and conflicting relationship challenges in 
the public service. It is necessary to understand problems that negatively 
affect public administration and the public policy process in order to devise 
solutions to enhance service delivery. This study contributes to the 
governance and public administration discipline by analysing the politics–
administration interface and the relationship between senior public service 
managers and political officials and to identify the margins and overlaps in 
political officials’ and senior public service managers’ roles in South Africa 
with regard to politics–administration interface theory. 
 
First, this study examines the extent and the impact of conflict between 
senior public service officials and political officials. Second, the study 
provides clarity and guidance on the roles of political officials and the roles 
of senior public managers, as well as how this relationship can be 
maintained in a manner that moderates conflict. Third, the study presents 
the state of the politics–administration interface in South Africa and how it 
has succeeded in functioning or failed to function in good governance. 
Fourth, the study is aimed at contributing to the knowledge hub within 
public administration as a faculty of study by adding research input into 
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contemporary academic discourse on this subject. The author has 
identified the potential value of the study as adding value to the knowledge 
base relating to the politics–administration interface in South Africa so as 
to inform current and future decisions in the public administration.  
 
For contemporary scholarship, it is necessary to ask questions about the 
complementary and conflicting relationships between senior public service 
managers and political officials in order to recommend resolutions for 
effective service delivery in South Africa.  
 
1.11 CONCLUSION  
 
This first chapter provided the introduction to the study by discussing the 
concept of ‘politics–administration interface’. The background to the study 
presented the state of politics–administration interface in the world, in 
Africa, southern African countries and in South Africa. In this chapter the 
researcher discussed the problem statement, the study questions and the 
importance of the study. The introduction presented the state of Africa and 
the world characterized by the politics–administration interface that is 
generally managed by political bureau through coded or un-coded 
constitutions of jurisdictions in the world.  
 
The global trends in the context of politics–administration were analysed 
by reviewing selected countries that have a fairly stable government, such 
as the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia, Canada, Brazil, India, 
South Africa, Nigeria, Ghana, Uganda and Botswana. Furthermore, the 
problem statement for the study is presented in this chapter, while the 
purpose of the research is also discussed and the study questions 
outlined. The main emphasis of this study is to examine the politics–
administration interface in South Africa between 1999 and 2009. The 
research also examined the theoretical base and review of the politics–
administration interface.  
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This chapter provided the context and justification for the study; problem 
declaration for the study; study questions for the study; aims and 
intentions of the study; as well as explaining the importance of the study. 
The second chapter of the study will present the literature review of the 
politics–administration interface in different epochs of governance. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
This chapter deals with the literature on politics–administration interface. 
The researcher discusses the significance of the existing knowledge of the 
study under review. The premise of the study pre-claims are discussed in 
conjunction with existing knowledge prior to the findings of this study. The 
existing knowledge on the theoretical framework is outlined by discussing 
the main concept as argued by Woodrow Wilson and the contrary view of 
Frank Goodnow. The theoretical framework in this chapter outlines 
academic knowledge of the politics–administration interface, the closed 
system and the open system of governance. 
 
2.2 SIGNIFICANCE OF LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
Remenyi, Williams, Money and Swartz (1998:65) suggest that literature 
review is the material part of the research process where a researcher 
should present existing knowledge in a particular field of study. Before 
attempting to answer the research questions, the researcher needs to 
understand what has been done before, the strengths and weaknesses of 
existing studies, and what they might mean (Boote and Beile, 2009:3). 
This section examines the academic sources on the subject of politics and 
administration, the politics–administration interface and the development 
of theories in relation to the academic discourse. The chapter analyses the 
politics–administration interface and its existing academic discourse 
coherent with the pre-claims and the research questions.   
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2.3 THE PREMISE OF THE STUDY PRE-CLAIMS 
 
As stated in the introduction to this research, the main claim of the 
proposed study is that there could be leadership conflict between the 
political bureau and the public service bureau when there are differing 
views on how the service delivery must be executed. The first reason for 
the main claim of the leadership conflict is that there is a tendency by 
political officials to dominate the public service function. The researcher 
examines the notion that political officials want to dominate this service 
function since they want to influence the public service’s supply chain and 
the awarding of tenders. The reason for seeking to control the public 
service function could therefore be corruption as an underlying objective.  
 
Another reason for this tendency to dominate the public service function 
could be that political officials want to enforce cadre deployment in order to 
keep political ideology alive in the execution of service delivery. According 
to Gijana (2011:29), the public service in South Africa has been highly 
politicized since the National Party (NP) took control of government in 
1948. The NP deployed its dedicated members to various strategic posts 
in government departments. According to Fry and Nigro (1996:36), “the 
senior public administrators deployed were those who understood and 
were faithful to the party’s policies of administration hence the government 
of the day was always in congruence with the public service”. The senior 
public administrators installed were those who appreciated and were 
devoted to the NP policies of administration based on skin colour, ethnic 
groupings, language and gender; thus it was problematic to isolate the 
government of the day and the public service. The political bureau 
dominance trend continued, despite the guaranteed independence of state 
bodies in section 181 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996 (the Constitution), and the ruling party ensured that people who were 
faithful to the political party’s transformation agenda would occupy 
strategic positions in the public service (Fry and Nigro, 1996:36). 
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Furthermore, the claim that political officials seek to dominate the public 
service in order to dominate public administration is supported by 
Snowman (2007:5) who believes that ruling party interference may result 
in the misuse of delegated authority by elected officials for self-
gratification, with the intent of advancing domination.  
 
The second reason for the main claim is that there could be conflicting 
leadership styles between a political official and a senior public service 
official. The Thabo Mbeki presidential tenure – between 1999 and 2009 – 
was characterized by controversy with regard to ANC policies and 
programmes. He was inclined towards the classic closed system as 
opposed to an open system of leadership. His system of leadership was 
revealed in a number of ANC programmes and policies such as foreign 
policy; health policy; Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR); the 
Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA); and 
the Joint Initiative on Priority Skills Acquisition (JIPSA), which Singh 
(2006:164) described as being imposed on the constituency, ANC 
Ministers and on members of the executive. Singh further argues that the 
handling of the arms procurement deal since early 2001 has entrenched 
the suspicion that the government was not only being closed and 
defensive, but also dishonest in the way in which it was protecting its 
members from open public scrutiny. Dissatisfaction with the way in which 
the former President handled the political crisis in Zimbabwe, his rejection 
of the connection between AIDS and HIV, and the accessibility of 
nevirapine to pregnant women in the AIDS crisis in South Africa led to the 
development of grassroots mobilisation from across racial and class 
boundaries that raised serious questions about Mbeki’s closed and 
defensive leadership style, and his commitment to the needs of the poor. 
Further highlighting Mbeki’s closed and imposing style of leadership, 
Brecker (1999:1) stated that “Mbeki is much more intellectual than 
Mandela. More importantly, he has unchallenged control over the 
structures of the ANC.” The present study examines former President 
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Mbeki’s closed system of leadership and its bearing on the politics–
administration dichotomy in South Africa.  
 
The third reason for the main claim is that political officials may have a 
different political ideology compared with the political ideology upheld by a 
senior public service official. For example, Gevisser (2007:109) argues 
that Thabo Mbeki advocated for the African industrialist stratum as an 
indispensable requirement for South Africa’s transformation, since Mbeki 
believed that it was essential to encourage an African industrialist stratum 
and “bring it into the ruling elite and to hold it there with a set of policies 
and an ideological frame (Africanism) that resonated with its own 
aspirations”. Hence he needed to keep those who perceived his ideology 
as the ANC ideology close, while rejecting those who “questioned” the 
corrupt means of joining the black capitalist class; for example, Mbeki 
suspended the then National Director of Public Prosecutions, Vusi Pikoli, 
who tried to investigate and prosecute senior ANC member Jackie Selebi, 
whose contract as the Commissioner of the South African Police Services 
(SAPS) was renewed by Mbeki despite allegations of corruption. Bratton 
and Van de Walle (1997:62) define such a leadership style as 
“neopatrimonialism founded upon Max Weber’s explanation of patrimonial 
authority”. A patrimonial political system is rooted in a strong individual 
who regularly governs on the basis of individual standing and reputation. 
Klippenstein (2009:12) argues that in a patrimonial political system, 
followers of an autocrat are associated exclusively based on their 
attachment to the strongman and the leader rules on a temperament basis 
as opposed to documented laws. Thus, in providing security and stability 
utilising positive discrimination and incentives to those faithful to him, 
followers of the cluster become patrons of the strongman. Therefore, 
public service managers who act or speak contrary to what the strongman 
pursues can be sanctioned politically. This could be defined as tension 
between the political bureau and the public administration bureau.  
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The fourth reason for the claim of the proposed study could be that 
political officials or public service officials or both parties have some 
disregard for documented duties and responsibilities. Hence, there could 
be overlapping actions between the two bureaux. Such overlap could be 
related to the state and political party overlap, which could be one of the 
challenges of one dominant party in a democracy. According to 
Klippenstein (2009:12), the dominant political leader, in association with 
his inner circle (such as Cabinet Ministers or appointed senior public 
officials), uses particularised and personalised interactions that disregard 
efficient government administration, constitution and legislation but seek to 
access government resources for party benefaction. The government 
becomes influenced by partisan interests where administrators and 
politicians fail to execute their duties for public service whereas they use 
their authority and positions to amass affluence and prestige. Bratton and 
Van de Walle (1997:62) argue that neopatrimonialism and disregard for 
coded laws are the core features of African politics; the other main feature 
of African States is that they rely on one dominant party model of 
government dominated by the liberation movements. Disregard for 
documented responsibilities and engaging in personal relationships are 
the common attributes of the partisan establishments in Africa (Bratton 
and Van de Walle, 1994:455). The proposed study further examines the 
claim that political officials or public service officials or both parties have 
disregard for documented duties and responsibilities, and that there could 
be overlapping actions between the political bureau and public service 
bureau, and that such overlap could be related to the state and political 
party overlap which could be one of the challenges of a single dominant 
party state model. 
 
This study therefore intends to examine the politics–administration 
interface and how the working relationship between public service 
managers and political officials has functioned since the Mbeki era in 1999 
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until 2009, and will make recommendations for improved governance for 
the future.  
 
2.3.1 The premise of politics–administration interface discourse 
 
The initial academic recognition of the problem of political domination in 
public service matters emerged in North America. The early 19th century 
theory of Woodrow Wilson (1886:3) suggested that there must be a 
distinct separation between public administration and politics. That theory 
was introduced in Wilson’s article “The study of administration”, where he 
argued for the importance of politics–administration interface. Wilson’s 
viewpoint positioned management at the centre of government 
administration, while making politics inappropriate and even unwanted. 
Political theorist Frank Goodnow (1900:140) conversely argued that 
government performed two critical functions, one political and the other 
administrative. Goodnow stated that the political function involved the 
expression of the will of the State, while the administrative function 
involved the execution of this will. Leonard White (1948:48) suggested that 
politics should not intrude on administration and public administration 
should be left on its own to accomplish its mission of efficiency and 
economy, rather than politics that is riddled with a diversity of values. Apart 
from viewing public administration as being separate from politics, White 
viewed it as being factual and scientific as opposed to politics that he 
considered as being value-ridden and embedded in social controversies. 
Subsequently, Luther Gulick and Lyndal Urwick (1943:57) and Henri Fayol 
(1947:81) introduced the principles of administration. They argued that the 
practice of public administration should be enriched by generic principles 
that could be scientifically proven to be applicable in all administrative 
situations, regardless of national setting. These scholars further argued 
that public administration should be compelled to apply these principles in 
public agencies in order to accomplish the mission of government. Gulick 
and Urwick (1943:58) are also known for what is referred to as 
‘POSDCORB’, since they argued that in every organisation there was 
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planning, organising, staffing, directing, co-ordinating, reporting and 
budgeting. Nicholas Henry (1994:63) classified the paradigms of public 
administration, arguing that the first epoch was the politics–administration 
interface between 1900 and 1926, the second epoch was the philosophies 
of public administration between 1927 and 1937, the third paradigm was 
the public administration as political science between 1950 and 1970, the 
fourth epoch was public administration as management between 1956 and 
1970, the fifth paradigm was public administration as public administration 
between 1970 and 1990, and the last paradigm was the new public 
administration since 1990. Throughout these paradigms of public 
administration, government performed a political function as well as an 
administrative function (Henry, 1994:63). However, for senior public 
servants, it had become difficult to determine where politics ends and 
where administration begins.  
 
The South African National Development Plan (NDP) (2011:366) argues 
that “all democratic regimes have to balance the need for public servants 
to be responsive to the priorities of the government of the day with the 
need for the public service to treat citizens equally and not to discriminate 
on the grounds of political allegiance”. “There has to be a clear 
demarcation between the roles and responsibilities of public servants and 
their political principals”. The NDP (2011:366) further suggests that “where 
the public service is too insulated from political pressure, this is likely to 
lead to concerns that it is failing to serve the interests of the government 
and is therefore not fulfilling its democratic mandate”. However, “where the 
public service is insufficiently insulated, standards can be undermined, as 
public servants are recruited on the basis of political connections rather 
than skills and expertise, or access to state resources and services 
become defined by political affiliation rather than citizenship”. Countries 
have sought different ways to balance these two extremes. The NDP 
(2011:365) further argues that “following the end of apartheid, there was 
good reason to give political principals wide-ranging influence over the 
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public service to promote rapid transformation of a public service that had 
become closely associated with the apartheid regime”. “Having achieved 
significant improvements in the representativity and focus of the public 
service, attention now needs to shift to ensuring the public service is 
adequately equipped to play its part in transforming society”. One of the 
key objectives of the NDP is to create a proficient public service that 
assists government, while being sufficiently independent to be segregated 
from politicisation of service delivery. Such a state of government 
necessitates a decisive division between the roles of elected officials and 
the employed bureaucrats. The government of South Africa has 
acknowledged the gap in the definition of roles in the interface between 
the political bureau and the administration bureau. This study provides 
possible clarification of the problem in the interface as conceded by the 
South African government through the Planning Commission in the NDP.  
 
2.4 THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK BACKGROUND AND 
CONTRIBUTION TO THEORY 
 
The politics-administration interface and its nature in governments has 
been the subject of academic research since the postulations by Woodrow 
Wilson (Wilson, 1887). The upsurge of philosophical discourse in the 
academic world continues to generate further search for knowledge with 
regard to the nature of the politics–administration interface. At the centre 
of philosophy philosophical questions are located about the nature of the 
politics–administration interface as driven by the researchers’ love for 
knowledge and wisdom. The term “philosophy” is derived from the Ancient 
Greek word ‘philosophia’, which means “love of knowledge” (Russell, 
1945:120). The word ‘philosophia’ was created by merging the binary 
Greek terms ‘Phileo’ meaning love and ‘Sophia’ meaning wisdom (Crome, 
2002:2). Philosophy is thus the pursuit of clarifying the mysteries of 
creation, birth and mortality, sadness and pleasure (Lewis, 1996:11). 
Numerous epochs have over time formulated diverse concepts which 
reveal the mystic regions of the universe and life. The absolute and 
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ultimate truth is yet to be established about life and the universe. This 
ongoing search for the truth provides the foundation of philosophy. The 
commitment to wisdom and knowledge thus provides the impetus for any 
philosophical examination.  
 
The faculty of philosophy has conventionally been divided into five main 
divisions of study: 
1. Metaphysics (or ontology) is the examination of realism. The term 
metaphysics originates from the Greek terms ‘metá’ (meaning ‘after’ 
or ‘transcending’) and ‘physiká’ (meaning ‘physics’), ‘physics’ 
denoting the material works (Pihlström, 2006:23). According to 
Gardner (2006:163), metaphysics is the branch of philosophy that 
investigates principles of reality transcending those of any particular 
science, traditionally cosmology and ontology. Some of the 
questions that metaphysics deals with are: (1) what is ultimate 
reality?; (2) Is it one thing or is it many different things?; (3) Can 
reality be grasped by the senses or is it transcendent?; and (3) 
What is the mind and what is its relation to the body? (Hull, 
1967:311).   
 
2. Epistemology is the study of knowledge which is derived from the 
Greek words ‘episteme’ (knowledge or science) and ‘logos’ or 
reason (Tennis, 2008:203). This branch of philosophy is known as 
the theory of knowledge and is the rational examination of all 
knowledge claims. According to Foucault (1972:191), amongst the 
questions that epistemology considers are: (1) What is knowledge 
and wisdom?; (2) Is knowledge and wisdom acquired entirely 
through the senses or by some other means?; and (3) How do we 
get assurance that what we observe using our senses is accurate?.  
 
3. Ethics is the examination of right and wrong in human behaviour 
and actions whereas governmental principles (sometimes called 
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public ethics or political morality) is the function of deciding on 
ethical choices about governmental accomplishments, and the 
examination of such behaviour (Benhabib, 1988:32). According to 
Cohen and Eimicke (1995:99), as an academic faculty, ethics is 
allocated into binary subdivisions. The first branch is the moral 
principles of practice (or professional ethics), concentrates on public 
bureaucrats and the techniques they utilise. The second sub-
division is the moral principles of public policy which focuses on 
decisions regarding policies and regulations. Among the variety of 
the inquiries undertaken by the faculty of ethics are: (1) Concept of 
what is right?; (2) Are there any impartial values as to what is moral 
and what is immoral?; and (3) Are ethical standards outright or 
comparative? 
 
4. Aesthetics is the examination of physical or physical-conceptual 
values, occasionally referred to as conclusions of emotion and 
perception. Aesthetics is a sub-discipline of axiology, a sub-division 
of philosophy known as the philosophy of the arts (Walton, 
2007:147). 
 
5. Logic is the examination of the values of correct thinking and the 
main instrument that philosophers utilise to examine realism 
(Shields, 1995:4). Some of the inquiries proposed by logic are: (1) 
What renders an argument binding or unbinding?; and (2) What is a 
valid argument?  
 
Above are the main divisions of philosophy. However, the faculty of 
philosophy is also utilised as an instrument to examine other fields of life, 
such as the philosophy of deity, philosophy of faith, party-political 
philosophy, collective philosophy, philosophy of natural science, 
philosophy of legislation, and philosophy of public administration (Samier, 
2005:9).  
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The research questions and pre-claims are premised in the philosophical 
ethos of humanity’s sense of wonder and curiosity expressed in the 
questions such as “What are things really like?” and “How can we explain 
the process of change in things?” (Stumpf, 1975:3). What prompts 
research questions is the gradual recognition that things are not precisely 
what they seem to be, and thus face value differs from reality (Hacker, 
2009:2). The suspected gap between what is apparent and imperceptible 
reality prompts researchers to be inquisitive about the state of things, thus 
the curiosity of researchers is a major impetus behind scientific discovery 
(Loewenstein, 1994:75). This study sought to understand the reality of the 
nature of the politics-administration interface and the factors that 
contribute to strained relationships between the political bureau and the 
administration bureau. 
 
La Porte (1971:31) remarked that “our primary normative premise should 
be that the purpose of public organisation is the reduction of economic, 
social and psychic suffering, and the enhancement of life opportunities for 
those inside and outside the organization”. The quest to improve public 
service and ease human suffering thus requires scientific enquiry to assist 
governments and policy-makers to take informed decisions that will 
promote the collective benefit of the citizens. Such scientific enquiry is 
fundamental in this study to comprehend the nature of the politics–
administration interface in South Africa in order to propose improved 
governance options in the public service. This study examines the pre-
claims to augment the understanding of the current politics-administration 
interface.  One of the pre-claims examines the notion that one of the 
contributing factors to strained relationships at the interface could be 
conflicting leadership styles between a political official and a senior public 
service official. The section below discusses the contribution to knowledge 
by reviewing the open system of leadership in comparison with the closed 
leadership system in the politics-administration interface. 
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2.5 CONCEPTUALISATION OF PRE-CLAIMS AND KEY STUDY 
ASPECTS 
 
Conceptual framework is an organised and comprehensive guideline to 
define the nature and purpose of studied concepts by considering 
theoretical and abstract aspects surrounding the concepts under review 
(Miller and Redding, 1986:98). The conceptual framework is utilised as a 
tool for organising various factors that affect the politics-administration 
interface and it is structured using the four pre-claims and the research 
questions to search for knowledge. The document analysis, case study 
design and interviews are utilised as techniques to reach conclusions 
about the nature of the politics-administration interface in South Africa. 
The pre-claims sought to establish the effects and nature of political 
officials’ dominance over public administration, conflicting leadership 
styles, different political ideologies, and the disregard for documented 
duties and responsibilities. This study argues that the main leadership 
paradigms that may determine successful or unsuccessful working 
relations in the politics-administration interface are the open systems 
paradigm or closed systems paradigm. The researcher endeavoured to 
contribute the open and closed systems paradigm in the politics-
administration interface discourse in South Africa. 
 
2.5.1 Open-systems paradigm  
 
Newton’s clockwork universe theory was replaced with a world in which 
the future is open and is characterized by an unstable and non-linear 
system where the new inquisitive view of reality and linear processes are 
being replaced (Kotze, 1998:8). An open system is a leadership system 
which frequently provides information to its surrounding environment. 
Open systems determine approach to input, processes, output, objectives, 
valuation and assessment and knowledge management. Features that are 
significant to open systems comprise the borders, surrounding 
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environment and multiple ways to achieve similar outcomes. Open 
systems further acknowledge that the external environment is unstable, 
chaotic and characterized by the processes of empowerment, horizontal 
relationships and consensus-building (Daft, 1995:13). The open system in 
the South African context can also be aligned with the empirical cases of 
the pre-democracy ANC and Mandela’s collective leadership with broad 
consultation, as witnessed in the case of the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP) formulation. Similar to South Africa’s 
traditional collective leadership, vigorous open systems continually provide 
information to surrounding environments, examine the constituency 
reaction, amend internal systems where necessary to reach the system’s 
objectives and then communicate required knowledge back out to the 
surrounding environment. The researcher in this study argues that for the 
political bureau and the administration bureau to uphold a harmonious 
politics–administration interface they need to enforce an open system of 
leadership where the general constituency will be part of decisions through 
consultation and share the leadership and development challenges faced 
by their government.  
 
2.5.2 Axiology of altruism and the open-systems paradigm 
 
The open systems paradigm is based on accountability and openness to 
public scrutiny, therefore it is characterised by broader consultation which 
is in line with democratic principles (Ray and Ray, 2012:3). Altruism is not 
merely selflessness but is an inclination to act with concern for the needs 
of other individuals and societies without any concealed intentions (Nigel, 
1970:79). The first attribute of altruism is that the act must be undertaken 
with consideration for others. The second attribute is that a person should 
not have ulterior motives entrenched in egoism to describe altruistic 
behaviour. The theoretical development of altruism is rooted in, for 
example, Jesus Christ of Nazareth, Anselm of Canterbury, Rene 
Descartes, Thomas Aquinas and Emmanuel Kant. Altruism is criticized for 
being disconnected from any ordinary motivational organisation in human 
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life; it is based on the wisdom of individuals and the willingness to sacrifice 
personal virtues for the happiness of many. Kantianism succeeds under 
pro-social behaviour with aspirations of an open system of governance, 
which is also aligned with collective leadership and openness for the good 
of the people (Warneken and Tomasello, 2009:457). Furthermore, 
Vandenabeele, Scheepers and Hondeghen (2006:14) suggest that 
altruism is an ideal virtue for public servants. Altruism is not just 
selflessness but it is the purposeful consideration of the good of the 
collective. The primary feature of altruism is that the actions must be 
based in the consideration of the collective. Selflessness and love for 
fellow human beings cannot be guaranteed in government to ensure that 
there will be a collective effort to achieve improved standards of living for 
as many people as possible. Therefore, the ethical problem that societies 
constantly struggle with is that human beings will always be tempted to 
satisfy their own needs first and it remains a social challenge to promote 
altruism to politicians and public servants who believe their own needs 
should be addressed and that they are primarily entitled to a better 
standard of living. This view is supported by the statement by the former 
spokesperson of the ANC, Smuts Ngonyama, who observes that, “we did 
not join the struggle to remain poor”. This may denote that private interest 
is one of the features in some government officials who seek to benefit 
from access to power and government contracts (Shapiro and Tebeau, 
2011:273). The altruistic approach to public service is one of the major 
features that would ensure a selfless attitude and interacting with great 
consideration for others in the politics- administration interface.  
 
Gilman (2005:8) argues that officials in the political bureau and in the 
administration bureau should uphold the code of ethics and conduct and 
that ethical behaviour should become a lifestyle to allow both bureaucrats 
and elected officials to evaluate their engagements alongside probable 
ethical ideals. Maphunye (2009:5) argues that “public administration must 
be professional; its officials must be selfless in service delivery, be highly 
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motivated and goal-directed, and have the capacity to support the State’s 
developmental and strategic vision of social transformation”. Hence the 
administration bureau leading the execution of the State will on behalf of 
elected officials uphold high ethical standards while enforcing best 
leadership techniques. Therefore, in the public administration occupations 
there should be good and moral officials complying with the correct 
processes as well as standards, and ensuring accountability at all times. In 
the world where collective human behaviour attempts to develop 
humankind and its standard of living, both the political and administration 
bureau would harmoniously work towards ethical outcomes. The 
researcher in this study argues that the open systems leadership paradigm 
and altruism are the ultimate values that may result in positive outcomes 
and a progressive politics–administration interface, therefore attempts to 
improve the politics–administration relationship may focus on installing the 
open systems leadership paradigm and displaying altruism towards 
political officials and public administration officials.  
 
2.5.3 Closed-systems and conventional leadership parallels 
 
The conventional leadership is paralleled with the closed-systems 
paradigm that focuses on impersonal processes and systems for 
effectively functioning machinery, while it views the constituency as 
subjects or means to leadership power (Stückelberger and  Mugambi, 
2007:114). The leadership in the political bureau and in the administration 
bureau in government can achieve improved standards of living if they 
understand and manage human nature as well as demonstrating best 
leadership techniques in various circumstances. The poor leadership 
trends in modern democratic governance are entrenched in the inclination 
towards a closed system of leadership. The closed-system models are the 
outcomes of the challenges and consequent shifts that developed 
throughout the Industrial Revolution. During the commencement phase of 
industrial development in the mid-1800s, the initial workshops were 
incompetent. There were no standardised precise operational methods. 
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Companies were continuously inventing methods to revive and realise 
working methods to improve production, whereas the emphasis was 
principally on internal systems. During the 17th-century there was a rise of 
scientific intellectualism and material revolution with their spirit of 
Newtonianism, whereby the world was viewed in mechanistic terms as 
everything was explained in terms of reference to the machine (Davies 
and Gribbin, 1991:7). Following the Industrial Revolution, organisations 
sought management models that would improve productivity and output in 
the factories. However, the management models focused on the internal 
aspects of organisations similar to the examination of the engine 
compartments. The management models that resulted from that era were 
referred to as closed system models or Newton’s clockwork universe 
model (Hope, Bunce and Roosli, 2011:82). Furthermore, Amagoh (2008:2) 
argues that “all conventional models and theories of organizations typically 
embraced the closed systems approach to the study of organizations by 
assuming that the main features of an organization are its internal 
elements”. 
 
The closed-systems or machine model in the post-modern era is not 
successful due to the realisation that people cannot behave like machines 
and they cannot be managed like machines in the mould of the Newtonian 
paradigm (Wheatley and Kellner-Rogers, 1996:18). Closed-systems 
standards are not dependent on the exterior surroundings or environment 
for justification or answers to management questions and challenges; 
however, they are encircled and impenetrable from the external 
environment (Daft, 2013:2). The closed-systems approach is therefore 
impersonal and does not provide constant feedback to stakeholders; it 
mainly focuses on the effective machinery of the day-to-day functioning of 
internal processes and systems. 
 
In an ambiguous and controversial turn behind the Presidency’s closed 
doors, Mandela’s collective leadership principle entrenched since his 
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childhood was relinquished without proper consultation regarding the 
policy formulation. In 1996, President Nelson Mandela declared the 
closing of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) 
Department. The RDP Fund was passed over to the Ministry of Finance 
and the duties of the office shifted to various departments while in the 
same year (June 1996) the Department of Finance produced its GEAR 
strategy. The ANC government “encountered its first major currency crisis, 
starting in February1996 when the value of the Rand plummeted by more 
than 25%; thus in order to calm domestic capital and foreign currency 
markets, the government embraced a macroeconomic strategy, referred to 
as GEAR” (Visser, 2004:8). The Economic Policy Committee of the ANC 
had been excluded from the drafting process, which led to disgruntlement 
about the lack of consultation (Wehner, 2000:2). Unlike the RDP, GEAR 
was formulated by a technical group of 15 officials consisting of 
bureaucrats from the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA), the 
South African Reserve Bank (SARB), three government departments, 
scholars, and two agents from the World Bank (Kotzé, 2000:12). The RDP 
bureau was closed and the RDP Office was reassigned to the Office of the 
then Deputy President, Thabo Mbeki. In contrast to the RDP, GEAR was 
not the product of consultation with COSATU and the SACP and would 
generate considerable internal disagreement within the Tripartite Alliance 
(Kotzé, 2000:12). GEAR is defined by the members of the tripartite 
alliance members as the macroeconomic policy that was imposed by the 
then Deputy President Thabo Mbeki and the World Bank through the 
Minister of Finance to prioritise macroeconomic growth over poverty 
alleviation. Furthermore, GEAR is identified as the initial sign of political 
bureau dominance in governance matters. Moreover, “South Africa is 
known for having enacted one of the fastest economic liberalization 
programmes, and for having been pushed in this direction of GEAR by 
both the World Bank and the IMF” (Agupusi, 2011:38). Thus GEAR 
became the symbol of macro political power over South Africa’s public 
service. Mandela’s principle of collective leadership would not survive for 
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long in governance since the Western authorities are perceived as 
controlling the developing countries. “We were taken from the bush, or 
from the underground or from prison, to come and take charge. We were 
suddenly in this immense responsibility of running a highly developed 
country,” admitted Mandela (Sampson, 1999:495). Mandela’s leadership 
on local economic policy development diminished as he focused on 
reconciliation and foreign policy, while preparing for retirement. By the time 
Thabo Mbeki took over as the President of South Africa, the collective 
leadership style of the pre-democracy ANC and Mandela had already 
ended with the RDP policy development process and had been replaced 
with a conventional leadership and closed-systems leadership style that 
did not consult with the constituency due to powers outside the ANC and 
its culture, starting with the Presidency during the GEAR policy formulation 
and the continued trends of authoritarian and closed-systems leadership.  
 
The leadership in the political bureau as well as in the administration 
bureau will attain their aim of improving standards of living if they 
understand and manage human nature and apply best leadership 
techniques in different circumstances. Brooks suggests that 
“organisational culture should create an environment to discuss sensitive 
issues openly and to confront differences of view and seek ways of 
clarifying vague and ambiguous ideas and data” (Brooks, 2003:256). 
However, the disastrous leadership trend in modern democratic 
governance is inclined towards a closed system of leadership.  
As demonstrated above, document analysis in this study suggests that a 
closed system which is also aligned with conventional leadership focuses 
on the internal aspects of organisations and does not promote stakeholder 
participation; therefore a closed systems model may create conflict 
between the political bureau and the administration bureau in the politics–
administration interface and is thus an undesirable feature of leadership. 
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2.5.4 Egoism and closed-systems paradigm 
 
The normative version of ethical egoism sets as its goal the benefit, 
pleasure or greatest good of the self alone; the pursuit of personal 
gratification and own contentment is the uppermost moral drive conflict of 
life which results in leadership for personal interest to boost one’s personal 
ego or level of happiness (Morrison, 2009:9). Egoism seeks to uphold the 
greatest good of the self which is the pursuit of his/her own egocentricity 
and where his/her own pleasure becomes the highest aspiration of life 
which results in leadership for personal gain to boost personal esteem or 
level of pleasure (Paul and Elder, 2006:4). The undue sense of self-
prominence in the political bureau or in the administration bureau is the 
basic ingredient of failure of the harmonious politics–administration 
interface relationship. Most people have one ultimate aim; that is their own 
welfare. Egoism is less concerned with collective well-being.  Egoism 
submits that each person has one primary aim which is his or her own 
prosperity. In such a context, constituency is mainly the means to the 
power and ultimate happiness of an individual. Rousseau argues that 
“Nothing is more dangerous than the influence of private interests in public 
affairs; it leads to the corruption of the legislator, which is an even worse 
evil than the abuse of the laws by the government; it makes a substantial 
change in the State, and all reformation becomes impossible” (Rousseau, 
1762:34). Hence the aspirations of egoism in public administration may 
result in hindrance to reformation and successful service delivery.  In ideal 
governance, egoism should not be a major attribute of public 
administration; government should be driven by aspirations aligned with 
improved standards of living for the greatest number of people. According 
to St Augustine of Hippo (05AD:287), God created the human race and 
gave it authority over animals, but not dominion over others of its own 
kind. Human beings were envisioned to live together in congruence and 
egalitarianism under natural rule with a single main dictum which was “do 
not do to others what you would not want to have done to you”. However, 
the elevation of personal gratification over the wellbeing of the collective 
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corrupted human nature and made natural social collaboration 
unmanageable. According to Kant (1819:231), “the avarice and self-love 
that distinguish the behaviour of fallen humankind manifest themselves 
above all in what is a desire to rule and control”. It was such human 
determination that brought the government into existence, thus the 
government is the institutionalisation of the human longing for domination, 
and collective human behaviour in the struggle for domination became 
known as politics. Hence the politics–administration interface exists in the 
context of persons whose personal desires are to dominate others of their 
kind, amass resources and achieve individual gratification. In ideal 
governance, egoism should not be a foremost feature of public 
administration; government should be driven by aspirations aligned with 
improved standards of living for the greatest number of people. 
 
2.5.5 Ethical aspirations of politics–administration interface  
 
Beyond all challenges of a politics–administration interface is the generally 
desired harmonious politics–administration relationship. In such a 
congruent relationship, the political bureau would aspire for best 
leadership to achieve improved standards of living for the greatest number 
of people (Kant, 1819:231). The political bureau would continually strive to 
make the world an improved habitation for humans and the human 
behaviour in the political bureau would endeavour to achieve such ethical 
postulation. Furthermore, the administration bureau leading the execution 
of the State would, on behalf of elected officials, uphold high ethical 
standards while enforcing best leadership techniques (Sindane, 
2011:754). Therefore, in the employ of public administration would be 
good and moral people complying with good processes and standards, 
and ensuring accountability at all times. In the world where collective 
human behaviour attempts to make the world a better place, both the 
political and administration bureaus would work harmoniously together 
towards the ethical proposition.  
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In the scientific realm, philosophy functions in the world where the reality 
and factual knowledge is examined and re-examined; the desired future 
remains a desired future until advances in knowledge develop it to reality. 
The Medieval Metaphysica – the title of Aristotle's dissertation on the 
subject in 350 BCE – from the Greek meta-physika, broadly means “the 
physical works”. Therefore, metaphysics is a division of philosophy that 
examines the fundamental nature of reality and existence, and includes 
ontology, cosmology and often epistemology. ‘Metaphysics’ can be 
defined as the examination of the world’s basic components and concepts 
as they are understood in the scholastic faculty of empiricism. 
 
2.5.6 Categorical imperative 
 
Socio-political and ethical consensus is rooted in the general proposition 
that the needs of the collective are more important than personal needs 
(Anello, 2006:15). Thus what brings the political bureau and administration 
bureau together are the shared goals of a better society and continually 
improving standards of living. Despite the personal desires naturally 
pulling towards personal gratification, it is a collectively understood virtue 
that all persons put together are more important than the needs of each 
individual, thus Émile Durkheim (1912:97) argues that the collective is the 
super-individual. Therefore, human beings in power are expected to use 
their power for the benefit of powerless communal persons (Brewer, 
Selden and Facer II, 2000:255). It is the general consensus that 
sustainable human development can only be achieved through good 
governance; hence, community leaders (elected or appointed) should 
primarily be concerned with good governance. In an ideal world, both the 
political bureau and the administration bureau should agree on human 
development as the mandate appears straightforward in principle. 
However, human behaviour towards human development is characterized 
by a struggle for power and domination which results in inevitable conflict. 
Since the politics–administration interface is managed and defined by 
human beings with egoism as a natural attribute, there will be clashing 
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relationships between these two spheres. The compelling force for the 
good of many is the collective longing for a better world for all. The political 
bureau and the administration bureau seek to attract good people, which 
results in good governance for processes and leadership. The challenge to 
a tolerant and progressive politics–administration interface is that the 
human attitude towards human development is characterised by 
competition for supremacy and dominance which results in unavoidable 
conflict. In agreement with Pikoli and Wiener (2013:358), this study argues 
that for the politics–administration interface to fail there would be a bad 
politician, bad public servant, and a bad private sector official. Therefore, 
corrupt politicians, corrupt public servants and corrupt private sector 
officials result in bad governance as well as a struggle for resource control 
which results in conflicts in the politics-administration interface. For the 
establishment and maintenance of good governance all three spheres 
(political bureau, administration bureau and private sector) high ethical 
standards aligned with principles of altruism should be upheld.  
 
2.6 PROGRESSIVE ATTRIBUTES OF THE POLITICS–
ADMINISTRATION INTERFACE IN THE REST OF THE WORLD 
 
Socio-economic growth as a measure of general success is the centre of 
countries’ general growth concept. This section begins by examining 
progressive attributes in selected countries to demonstrate positive 
features in the politics–administration interface. The few countries selected 
for examination were chosen for their socio-economic growth as a 
measure of success and the main driving force for efficient public service. 
Such countries include the United States, Japan, China, Russia, Brazil, 
India, Singapore,  Nigeria and Botswana. It is important to note that the 
discussion concerning these countries is only for the purpose of 
demonstration of a progressive politics–administration interface. 
Developing countries such as Singapore, Brazil, Russia, India, China, 
South Africa, Nigeria and Botswana managed to achieve relatively 
progressive economic growth through active and strategic co-operation 
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between the political bureau and the administration bureau. In some 
cases, as demonstrated below, success is attributed to the lack of a 
professional administration bureau. Administration is thus driven by the 
political bureau without tensions resulting from professional administrators’ 
ideas.  
 
For over a century, American scholarship and the general public debated 
the significance of the politics–administration interface. Over the years, the 
United States reduced partisanship coercion in the public administration 
context and safeguarded the administration bureau against official 
favouritism, and this brought about fundamental change in the country’s 
public service (Rosenbloom, 2008:58). Furthermore, public administration 
in the United States “was distinguished from both partisan politics and 
politics involving policy-making by asserting that the domain of 
administrative work is governed by non-partisan principles”. The American 
public administration functions autonomously of the incumbent political 
leadership. The stability of the American public service does not 
necessarily mean that there is no political interference in public 
administration, but it may mean that politicians and administrators prioritize 
public administration as an important tool to persuade citizens to support 
the government led by political authorities. America has provided political 
ground for socio-economic growth to prevail over political pressures and 
domination. The common goal that binds the political bureau and the 
administration bureau is the American dream, which is the national ethos 
of the United States, or a set of ideals in which liberty means opportunities 
for prosperity and upward social mobility achieved by Americans working 
together for socio-economic growth. Over the past years the United States 
has proven that the political bureau and the administration bureau can 
work together harmoniously to achieve common goals for socio-economic 
improvement.  
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In Japan the employment and monitoring of the Heads of Government 
departments is managed centrally by the Civil Service Commission and 
the public administration is removed from direct political control 
(Matheson, Weber, Manning and Arnould, 2007:52). Japan’s politics–
administration interface is managed by creating a buffer (which is the 
Commission) between the political bureau and the administration bureau 
to ensure that public administration focuses on policy implementation to 
maintain socio-economic development without political interference. The 
politics–administration interface that provides separation between politics 
and administration has proven to have a correlation with successful socio-
economic development as shown by the politics–administration interface 
nature of Japan.  
 
China, however, does not have professional public administration, thus 
China’s public administration is performed by the political bureau. China’s 
governance challenges are complex and unique, as the country does not 
have a typical governance challenge of managing the politics–
administration interface. China is challenged by the management of the 
relationship between administrators of the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) Committee and governors of the administration who are also 
aligned with the CCP. There is no separation between political party 
administrators and the governors of the administration, thus the politicized 
administration works with the CCP to further socio-economic development. 
Despite the lack of separation between politics and administration in 
China, the country has managed to achieve remarkable socio-economic 
growth over the years. The case of China casts doubt on the concept that 
countries with clear politics–administration separation achieve greater 
socio-economic growth. The absence of a strong professional 
administration means that the political bureau manages the administration 
without disagreements and tension arising from the governors of the 
administration bureau. When measured by socio-economic growth, China 
has displayed positive returns from the politicized administration. However, 
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the country has faced negative impact of labour dissatisfaction, human 
rights and poor working conditions in the public service which lead to 
recurrent labour protests (Estlund and Gurgel, 2013:88). The lessons 
learnt from the case of China is that there are positive elements from the 
political bureau driving the national agenda for socio-economic growth, 
although the negative effects of the politicized administration are protests 
from the employees who feel oppressed by the political bureau.  
 
Russia’s public administration model is created “on the basis of Marxist–
Leninist principles characterized by the political subordination of public 
administration to the political bureau led by the Communist Party” 
(Verheijen and Rabrenovic, 1999:8). Thus Russia’s public administration is 
dominated by the political bureau, resulting in a highly politicized public 
administration. The country has no documented policies to ensure public 
administration protection from undue political interference; hence public 
administrators in Russia cannot be innovative or influence policy 
development. It is a prevalent trend in Russia that the change in political 
bureau due to elections or re-alignment results in change at the senior 
management level of public administration (Gill, 2012:176). Russia’s socio-
economic development expanded notwithstanding the politicized public 
administration and moved towards the developed country status in socio-
economic aspects. The culture of public administrator allegiance to the 
political bureau is the main attribute that propels service delivery and 
maintains stability in the politics–administration interface.  
 
In Brazil “senior public servants are not appointed on the basis of political 
allegiance; however, the country experiences blurred politics–
administration interface” (Gurria, 2012:56). To resolve the politics–
administration interface challenge of poorly defined roles between the 
political bureau and the administration bureau and ensure progressive 
governance, according Vergez, Bertok and Sheppard, (2012:57), “Brazil 
had established central integrity authorities within the centralised public 
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administration, including the Office of the Comptroller General, the Public 
Ethics Commission, the Department of the Federal Police, the Office of 
Attorney-General of the Union and the Federal Public Prosecutors. The 
functions of the Office of the Comptroller General include citizens’ 
relations, public service relations and corruption prevention. In 2006 the 
Secretariat for Corruption Prevention and Strategic Information was 
established within the Office of the Comptroller General and it has 
achieved remarkable success in combating corruption in the public 
service”. The Public Ethics Commission in Brazil was established in 1999 
to maintain ethical conduct in government departments. The Commission 
is further accountable regarding the execution of the Federal Code of 
Conduct of High Administration and further oversees and co-ordinates 
decentralised ethics activities in order to ensure competence and ethical 
standards in the public service (Iyer, 2013:2). The Federal Police has 
broad powers, both administrative and of judicial police, and its duties are 
defined not only by the Constitution, but especially in documented 
constitutional legislation, and include the duty to combat misuse of public 
resources (Martini, 2011:5). Furthermore, “Brazil’s central integrity 
authorities such as the Comptroller General, the Public Ethics 
Commission, and the Department of the Federal Police are some of the 
positive attributes in Brazil’s public service and governance”  (Martini, 
2011:5). 
 
In India, the recruitment of administrators is done on the basis of political 
allegiance. Upon the recruitment process there is a formal examination 
required to enter the civil service and politicians can influence promotions 
and transfers of politically aligned employees (Dasandi, 2014:14). The 
positive attribute in India is that the government embraced the NPM and 
achieved economic growth in line with the national agenda of liberalisation, 
privatisation and globalisation. India’s work ethic and culture are based on 
the objective of common good, which results in efficiency, citizen 
satisfaction and increased public service productivity (Bajpai, 2014:3). 
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India has an autonomous Union Public Service Commission at the national 
level of government responsible for public service monitoring and 
disciplinary enforcement (Muttalib, 2007:373). Despite apparent political 
interference, the relative success of India’s politics–administration 
interface is largely attributed to the centralised Union Public Service 
Commission, national agenda and common good which bind together the 
political bureau and the administration bureau to achieve shared 
imperatives. 
 
Another country with features of a progressive politics–administration 
interface is Singapore, which achieved significant economic growth after 
attaining independence despite its prevalent blurred boundaries between 
politics and administration. Singapore’s extraordinary success over the 
past 50 years was in no small part achieved by developing the capacity to 
undertake long-term planning (Everest-Phillips, 2014:5). Singapore’s 
nation-building agenda was a key pillar of the national strategy after 
independence in 1965, with the government adopting measures to 
encourage a collective sense of national identity and a harmonious society 
that was collectively working to achieve prosperity for Singapore as a 
whole.  
 
The Nigerian politics–administration interface is characterized by elites in 
the political bureau dominating the administration. The “elite theory directs 
attention to the source of policy flow and the identification of beneficiaries 
of public policies” (Arowolo and Aluko, 2012:800). Furthermore, “the theory 
attempts a practical explanation of the source of policy by predicating it on 
the elite rather than the masses. It also explains the nature and source of 
policies in Nigeria. Various policies in the public service can also be 
viewed as emanating from the Nigerian elite, the political bureau, with 
exclusive influence in administration and economic growth”. It is rare to 
find positive attributes in the Nigerian politics–administration interface 
since the country is known for poor governance and weak democracy. The 
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main positive attribute in the sustainability of the Nigerian government is 
the country’s wealth in oil production. According to Adewale (2011:4), the 
energy sector is the driving force of the Nigerian economy since the 
country is the largest oil producer in Africa. Nigerian governance, which is 
mainly dominated by the political bureau, recently decided to deregulate 
the oil industry, which resulted in a more efficient economy, a less 
politically influenced economy, and less corrupt oil and gas production. 
Thus the intermittent positive attribute in Nigeria’s governance has been 
due to deregulation and the promotion of non-partisan investors in the oil 
and gas industry. 
 
In the case of Botswana, the relationship between politicians and 
bureaucrats played a key role in Botswana’s democratic developmental 
success. Some of Botswana’s positive attributes in the politics–
administration interface include that administrators have an enormous 
amount of influence in the policy-making process, in terms of the initiation, 
design and implementation of policies (Dasandi, 2014:7). Furthermore, 
Botswana’s politicians and bureaucrats have a collective developmental 
ideology which was strengthened by the country’s high economic growth 
rates following independence. Botswana has a progressive politics–
administration interface because most of the country’s high-level 
politicians are former civil servants, since the ruling Botswana Democratic 
Party actively encourages civil servants identified as being politically 
astute to enter politics at both the local and national levels. Botswana’s 
public servants are thus more aligned with the national political agenda 
and sensitive to the aspirations of the political bureau. 
 
2.7 EUROPEAN POLITICS WITH DOMINANCE OVER 
ADMINISTRATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
The research problem and the political dominance pre-claim in this study 
are rooted in the political and administrative history of South Africa. 
Conflict between the political leadership and the public administration 
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bureau has existed since the introduction of the Western form of 
governance in South Africa. The politics–administration interface 
phenomenon may have co-existed with South Africa’s public 
administration since humans began to occupy Southern Africa. However, 
the written history of the politics–administration interface can be traced 
from the arrival of Europeans and the establishment of the Western mode 
of governance in South Africa. According to Theal (1897:45), Afrikaner 
public administrators rejected the British political leadership that 
Christianized the natives and abolished slavery in the Cape Colony. This 
contributed to conflict between the political leadership and the public 
administration in the public service administered by the Afrikaners. The 
conflict resulted in the eastward and north-eastward expedition away from 
the British political leadership in the Cape Colony throughout the 1830s 
and 1840s, in the migration known as the ‘Great Trek’ (Theal, 1897:62).  
 
Furthermore, the changes in political paradigms in Britain and the 
Netherlands affected political leadership and governance in the colonies. 
According to Christopher (2001:2), the reforms in British policy effected in 
1832 were to have a profound influence on South Africa since the colonial 
reformers moulded public administration to suit British needs and 
aspirations. The political leadership tried to dominate public administration 
during the colonial governance epoch in South Africa which resulted in the 
politicization of public administration as a means by the colonial masters to 
maintain power over their colonies. The problem of conflict between 
political leadership and governance is thus an old problem with minimal 
research output in the fields of public management and political 
leadership.  
 
The Westminster Parliament has full constitutional supremacy (Carney, 
1993:5). Westminster governance is regarded as majoritarian and is 
“characterized by the concentration of power in the hands of the largest 
party, on the grounds that this promotes accountability with effective 
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governance; the party in government is empowered to take and implement 
difficult and tough decisions during its tenure in office, assured of the 
ability to pass its legislative programme without many checks and 
balances so long as they can carry their backbenchers with them. At the 
end of their term of office, the government can be held accountable for the 
results of their actions and voted out, if unpopular” (Norris, 2000:3). Owing 
to the limited tenure of the political bureau, politicians utilize their limited 
time in office to facilitate policy formulation and policy implementation to 
appease their constituency. Therefore, as discussed above, the political 
realm in Westminster democracies dominates decision-making in the 
public administration realm. The present democratic government of South 
Africa inherited the Westminster system of government, which was 
dominant in the apartheid era where politics dominated administration 
(Bond, 2010:13). 
 
According to Saunders, Bundy, Barker, Bell, Duggan, Horler, Leroux and 
Maurice (1988:7), “the Portuguese were the first Europeans to reach the 
Cape of Good Hope, arriving in 1488”. However, “permanent white 
settlement did not begin until 1652 when the Dutch East India Company 
established a provisioning station in the Cape”. In subsequent decades, 
“French Huguenot refugees, the Dutch and Germans began to settle in the 
Cape”. Collectively, they form the Afrikaner section of today’s population. 
According to Saunders, et al (1988), “the establishment of these 
settlements had far-reaching social and political effects on the groups 
already settled in the area, leading to upheaval in these societies and the 
subjugation of the native people”. White people were the embodiment of 
European political hegemony and white male-dominated governance in 
South Africa. Hence, the tendency of the political bureau to dominate the 
public service function is a conventional practice that was already 
noticeable as early as in the 16th century in South Africa (Saunders et al., 
1988:7). 
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Furthermore, the Western mode of governance began as a colonial 
authority from Britain and the Netherlands whose governance was meant 
to provide services only to the white settlers in South Africa. The direction 
and nature of public administration in South Africa was thus determined by 
European politics. African communities were deprived of land and natural 
resources in order to give ownership to the white minority settlers. The 
African people are the majority in South Africa but they were only 
considered useful as servants or workers for white settlers. The British 
settlers gained control of the Cape of Good Hope towards the end of the 
18th century as a consequence of the Napoleonic Wars in Europe 
(Thompson 2001:28). Subsequent to British settlement and governance, 
the period marked the commencement of extensive conflict between the 
Afrikaners and the English settlers. Even during this era, public 
administration was inseparable from European politics. 
 
According to Fredrickson (1981:40), the British political domination 
continued to gain strength and controlled public administration in South 
Africa. Commencing in 1836, somewhat to escape British governance and 
social hegemony as well as partially out of bitterness at the ending of 
slavery, many Afrikaner farmers (Boers) commenced a northward 
migration which became known as the Great Trek. This exodus brought 
Afrikaners into interaction and conflict with African groups in the area, the 
most resistant of which were the Zulus who countered the European 
political hegemony at that time.  
 
Chernis (1990:159) states that “in 1852 and 1854, the independent Boer 
Republics of the Transvaal and Orange Free State were created; the 
relations between the republics and the political sphere in the British 
government continued with being strained”. Saunders et al (1988:8) states 
that “the discovery of diamonds at Kimberley in 1870 and the discovery of 
large gold deposits in the Witwatersrand region of the Transvaal in 1886 
caused an influx of European (mainly British) immigrants and investment”. 
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In addition to resident Africans in South Africa, many people from 
neighbouring countries also moved into the area to work in the mines. 
Hattersley (2007:53) states that “the construction by mine owners of 
hostels to house and control their workers set patterns that later extended 
throughout the region”. In this early mining era, Africans began to interact 
closely with their white oppressors to become part of the economic growth 
that would only benefit the white population that perceived itself as being 
superior to the natives. At the centre of political leadership and 
administration were conflicts between the political sphere and the civil 
society.  
 
Viljoen (1902:11) states that “Boer reaction to this invasion and British 
political collusion led to the Anglo-Boer War (also known as the South 
African War) of 1880–1902”. Wessels (2011:88) argues that “the British 
forces prevailed in this conflict and the republics were incorporated into the 
British Empire, hence in May 1910 the two republics and the British 
colonies of the Cape and Natal formed the Union of South Africa; a self-
governing dominion of the British Empire”. The Union's constitution 
retained all political control and public administration in the hands of a 
white elite minority, while it excluded and deprived the majority African 
people. This resulted in continued conflict between the government and 
the oppressed African masses.  
 
2.7.1 Resistance to colonial political hegemony 
 
According to Yeboah (2007:8), to counteract colonial political hegemony 
and discriminatory governance, “in 1912 the South Africa Native National 
Congress was founded in Bloemfontein and eventually became known as 
the ‘African National Congress’ (ANC); its goals were the elimination of 
restrictions based on colour and the enfranchisement of, and 
parliamentary representation for, Africans”. Despite many efforts to liberate 
Africans, the government continued to enact laws limiting the rights and 
freedoms of Africans. Therefore, there was always a close relationship 
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between South African politics and public administration, which meant that 
service delivery would only benefit the people of European descent. 
 
Furthermore, Pretorius (2008:53) posits that in 1948, when “the NP won 
the all-white elections it began passing legislation codifying and enforcing 
an even stricter policy of white domination and racial separation known as 
‘apartheid’ (separateness)”. Lodge (2012:378) argues that “in the early 
1960s, following a protest in Sharpeville in which 69 protesters were killed 
by the apartheid government police and 180 injured, the ANC and Pan-
African Congress (PAC) were banned”. Nelson Mandela and many other 
anti-apartheid leaders were subsequently sentenced and imprisoned on 
charges of treason. 
 
The ANC and PAC were forced by the oppressive National Party 
government to go underground and they continued to oppose apartheid 
through guerrilla warfare and sabotage. According to Van den Berghe 
(1967:74), “in May 1961 South Africa abandoned its British dominion 
status and declared itself a republic and it withdrew from the 
Commonwealth in part because of international protests against 
apartheid”. Lindelof and Van der Westhuizen (1996:5) states that “in 1984, 
a new constitution came into effect in which whites allowed coloureds and 
Asians a limited role in the national government and control over their own 
affairs in certain areas”. The change of the constitution was seen by the 
freedom fighters as a sign of government yielding to civil society pressure. 
However, all control remained vested in the apartheid government. 
Africans remained disenfranchised and excluded from administration 
matters, resulting in further expression of civil society dissatisfaction as 
demonstrated below. 
 
Murison (2002:967) posits that “popular uprisings in African townships in 
1976 and 1985 helped to convince some NP members of the need for 
change”. Clandestine negotiations between the NP government and 
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Nelson Mandela began in 1986. Hence, “in February 1990, then State 
President F.W. de Klerk, who had come to power in September 1989, 
announced the unbanning of the ANC, the PAC and all other anti-
apartheid groups” (Christie, 2006:373). Two weeks after the 
announcement, Nelson Mandela was released from prison after spending 
twenty-seven years in confinement. By this time, some senior public 
service managers were stealing government assets to save the wealth for 
the future and in part in protest against coming political changes. While 
some senior public service managers supported political changes that 
were proposed by the freedom fighters to end oppression of the African 
people, there were some white groups such as the Afrikaner Weerstands 
Beweging (Afrikaner Resistance Movement) (AWB) that resisted the 
political changes. Therefore, rational decisions from senior public officials 
were sometimes in contrast with political decisions (Radaelli and 
Francesco, 2007:4). 
 
The pre-democratic administration in South Africa was designed by the 
discriminatory political regime to deprive non-white citizens of basic 
services. The power of political hegemony was prevalent in regulation and 
policy formulation processes. According to Lahiff (2003:10), “in 1991, the 
Group Areas Act, Land Acts and the Population Registration Act, the last 
of the so-called pillars of apartheid administration, were abolished and a 
long series of negotiations continued, resulting in a new constitution 
promulgated into law in December 1993”. “South Africa’s first non-racial 
elections were held on 26–28 April 1994, resulting in the swearing in of 
Nelson Mandela as President on 10 May 1994” (Lahiff, 2003:10). That 
historic milestone became the foundation for the contemporary political 
leadership and administration that is under review in this study. 
 
2.7.2 The new political leadership and administration in South Africa 
 
In examining politics and administration in the South African setting, it is 
essential to look at the history and structure of public administration after 
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the establishment of the new government led by the ANC. Muller and Van 
Rooyen (1994:194) argue that South Africa went through victimization by 
colonialism and segregation policies that marginalised the majority of the 
South African people. South Africa has a history of institutionalized racially 
informed policies known as ‘apartheid’, which resulted in the wealth of the 
country being concentrated in the minority white elite and left the majority 
black communities poor (Cloete and Wissink, 2000:86). The long-
anticipated era came for the new politics and administration in South 
Africa. Murison (2003:1021) posits that “following the 1994 elections, 
South Africa was governed under an interim constitution establishing a 
Government of National Unity (GNU) and that constitution required the 
Constitutional Assembly (CA) to draft and approve a permanent 
Constitution by 9 May 1996”. “After review by the Constitutional Court and 
intensive negotiations within the CA, the Constitutional Court certified a 
revised draft on 2 December 1996; then President Mandela signed the 
new Constitution into law on 10 December and it entered into force on 3 
February 1997” (Powell, 2010:11). The GNU continued in effect until the 
1999 general elections. Brooks, (2004:4) argues that “the parties originally 
comprising the GNU, the ANC, the NP and the Inkatha Freedom Party 
(IFP) shared executive power. However, on 30 June 1996 the NP 
withdrew from the GNU to become part of the opposition”. 
 
During Nelson Mandela’s five-year tenure as President of South Africa, the 
government devoted itself to revolutionising the country through the RDP. 
According to Hirsch (2005:2), “the ANC-led government focused on social 
issues that were neglected during the apartheid era, such as 
unemployment, housing shortages and crime thus Mandela’s 
administration began to reintroduce South Africa into the global economy 
by implementing a market-driven economic plan known as GEAR”. 
Furthermore, intending to heal the wounds of the apartheid regime, the 
new government established the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(TRC) led by Archbishop Desmond Tutu. Throughout the first tenure of the 
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ANC's post-apartheid governance, President Mandela focused on national 
compromise, ceasefire and reconciliation to forge a distinct South African 
identity and single-mindedness among a diverse and fragmented 
population, after years of struggle and bloodshed. The decrease of party-
political battles after 1994 and its remarkable disappearance by 1996 were 
testimony to the capabilities of the new government to achieve better 
political leadership and administration compared to the previous 
discriminatory political leadership and administration. 
 
2.8. SOUTH AFRICAN PUBLIC POLICY BACKGROUND TO THE 
POLITICS–ADMINISTRATION INTERFACE 
 
The ANC outlined democratic South Africa’s political economy through 
their main policy in the RDP White Paper in 1994 (Weeks, 1999:23). The 
RDP White Paper set a broad framework for the new government’s 
economic and social policy aimed primarily at poverty alleviation through 
infrastructure and livelihood development. The RDP was formulated in 
consultation with the affiliates of the three-party coalition that included the 
Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African 
Communist Party (SACP). However, in March 1996, the South African 
Ministry of Finance, led by the then Minister of Finance, Trevor Manuel, 
announced its budget that laid the foundation for GEAR.  
 
In contrast, before 1994, the Commission for Administration had extensive 
executive powers. However, in 1996 the policymaking authorities of the 
new Public Service Commission (PSC) were relocated to the Minister of 
Public Service and Administration. Hence “the Public Service Amendment 
Act of 1997 made the Minister of the Department of Public Service and 
Administration (DPSA) responsible for policy on functions of the public 
service, determination of policy on conditions of service, salary scales, 
organisational structure, rank and grades, promotions, and transfers” 
(Ncholo, 2000:89). The “executive powers were given to the political 
bureau and not administrators because the new ANC government did not 
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trust white bureaucrats of the old government who were still occupying 
high positions in the bureaucracy, thus the executive politicians were 
required to transform the higher echelons of the bureaucracy” (Cameron, 
2009:8). The politics–administration interface has been the government’s 
concern since 1994 and efforts have continually been made to define 
responsibilities and functions at the political bureau as well as at the 
administrative bureau. The Public Finance Management Act 29 of 1999 
(PFMA) places the accountability with senior managers, whereas 
managers are not given sufficient power to manage. According to Levin 
(2004:13), “a developmental state takes more control of public 
administration and it is premised on a strong interventionist ‘activist’ 
approach”. The present study further scrutinises the politics and 
administration in South Africa, and a politics–administration interface as a 
government concern and a key structural means to assist government in 
providing service delivery. 
 
According to Cameron (2009:2), “the NPM has been highly influential in 
shaping public sector reforms in post-apartheid South Africa”. 
Furthermore, “in the 1980s, the traditional bureaucratic public 
administration model of Max Weber and Woodrow Wilson was challenged 
in Anglophone countries and a new model of public sector management 
emerged in these countries which was called NPM” (Cameron, 2009:3). 
NPM is the set of ideas that promotes the use of private management in 
the public service, including greater utilisation of capitalistic techniques 
such as denationalization, public–private partnerships and customer 
service (translated in South Africa into Batho Pele or People First). The 
NPM focused on business-like management borrowed from the private 
sector. The main criticism against introducing the commercial ideal to 
public governance is that “it introduced privatized individual values in place 
of common community ideals and decisions that are in the public interest” 
(Godsell, 2004:151). Crucial to the concept of public administration is the 
word ‘public’ which relates to ‘open to everybody’, ‘transparent’ and ‘open 
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to community scrutiny’. Furthermore, Baker (1972:12) argues that the word 
‘administration’ has a Latin parent administrare, which means ‘to serve’, ‘to 
assist’ or ‘to direct’. The phrase ‘to administer’ has a relationship with the 
word ‘Minister’ which means a servant in various contexts. Therefore, a 
Minister of a government department is a servant who gets things done, 
the word ‘Minister’ does not carry the meaning of being a manager, but it 
does carry the meaning of being a servant (Baker, 1972:12). Thus the 
public service is about serving the people instead of dealing with the 
people as customers. The concept of NPM seemed to move away from 
the original nature of public administration as a concept of serving the 
people and being open to public scrutiny. 
  
The background of the South African democracy is the Westminster 
system. According to Licht and De Villiers (1994:166), the Westminster 
system of democracy was inherited from the period when South Africa was 
a British colony. The system was transplanted with some variations to 
most of the former British colonies when they became independent. The 
majoritarian structure of the system, coupled with the pre-eminence 
accorded to the will of Parliament, has not proved conducive to the growth 
of democracy in many of those former colonies. Among the challenges of 
the Westminster system is the politics–administration interface in the 
former colonies. The public policies are developed and owned by the 
legislature and the senior public service officials are merely employed 
implementers of policies from the political bureau. In South Africa, for 
example, Directors-General are deemed to be accounting officers by the 
PFMA. There is thus a need to examine the politics–administration 
interface in South Africa. 
 
2.9. THE PRESIDENT THABO MBEKI ERA IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
Reynolds (1999:174) states that “Nelson Mandela stepped down as 
President of the ANC at the party’s national congress in December 1997, 
when Thabo Mbeki assumed the mantle of political leadership; and Mbeki 
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won the presidency of South Africa after national elections in 1999, when 
the ANC won a two-thirds majority in Parliament”. President Mbeki “shifted 
the focus of government from reconciliation to transformation, particularly 
on the economic front” (Meersschaert, 2005:9). The politics–administration 
interface can be raised in the Mbeki period when he was the President of 
South Africa, since there were noticeable cases of conflict between the 
political bureau and the administration bureau. With “political 
transformation and the foundation of a strong democratic system in place 
after two national elections, the ANC recognised the need to focus on 
bringing economic power to the black majority in South Africa; in April 
2004, the ANC won nearly 70% of the national vote and Mbeki was re-
elected for his second five-year term” (Piombo, 2004:10). In his 2004 State 
of the Nation address, Mbeki pledged that his government would alleviate 
poverty, encourage fiscal progression and combat crime. Mbeki stated that 
“the government would play a more prominent role in economic 
development”. However, “defeated in a bid for a third term as ANC Chair in 
party elections in December 2007, Mbeki was ‘recalled’ by the ANC and 
resigned as President in September 2008” (Gevisser, 2009:321). The 
proposed research also reviews Thabo Mbeki’s leadership style to attempt 
to understand contributing factors to conflicts between the politics and 
administration during his tenure. According to Wheatley (2005:67), 
“leaders use primitive emotions of fear and self-interest to get people to do 
their work, rather than the more noble human traits of co-operation, caring 
and generosity”. This concept will be examined further in the present study 
to further understand the politics–administration interface by examining the 
Thabo Mbeki era as the President of South Africa. 
 
President Mbeki resigned from his position on 21 September 2008. He 
was replaced by senior ANC member Kgalema Motlanthe who led the 
country for the rest of Mbeki’s tenure. “South Africa held its fourth 
democratic election on 22 April 2009 where the ANC won with 65% of the 
vote followed by the Democratic Alliance (DA) with 16% of the vote” 
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(Human Rights Watch World Report, 2009:115). Furthermore, the “DA 
also won power in the Western Cape, which became the only province that 
the ANC does not govern while the newly formed Congress of the People 
(Cope), launched by ANC members who were angered by the firing of 
Mbeki won 9% of the vote”. The “National Assembly elected Jacob Zuma 
as President, with Motlanthe as his Deputy, following the ANC’s win in the 
2009 national election” (Wehmhoerner 2009:1).  
 
The contemporary state of governance means that the segregation history 
left the present democratic government with a challenge to improve the 
lives of previously disadvantaged communities. Thus “the structure of the 
present government with three spheres (national government, provincial 
government and local government) is designed to better render service 
delivery to the majority of previously marginalized citizens” (Moeti, Khalo, 
Mafunisa, Nsingo and Makondo, 2007:68). The South African government 
runs a developmental state to improve the lives of the people by providing 
basic needs such as water, electricity and shelter to many people whose 
income cannot sustain their households. Service delivery is a political 
mandate facilitated by the ruling party and has to be adopted by senior 
public managers and their subordinates. However, there can be conflict 
between public administrators and political appointees (Radaelli and 
Francesco, 2007:11) and there is a need for the study of political 
leadership and an examination of governance and the politics–
administration interface in the South African governance.  
 
2.10 THE STATE OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU AND 
ADMINISTRATION BUREAU IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
According to De Villiers (2008:19), “the Constitution provides that South 
Africa is a so-called composite state with at least three particular federal 
features, namely the constitutionally entrenched distribution of powers 
between the national and provincial spheres, along with the power of the 
judiciary, specifically the Constitutional Court, to adjudicate jurisdictional 
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disputes between these spheres and the right of the provinces to enact 
their own constitutions”. South Africa’s constitution (section 40(1)) 
established three spheres of government comprising (i) national, (ii) 
provincial, and (iii) local governments. The co-operative government power 
in South Africa comprises the executive, the legislative and the judiciary. 
The power of the executive is bestowed upon the President to serve both 
as Head of State as well as Head of Government. The legislative control is 
bestowed upon Parliament, consisting of the National Assembly and the 
National Council of Provinces. The power of the judiciary is entrusted in 
the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal as well as the High 
Court. While the spheres of government were intended for effective and 
efficient governance, “the political reality and one-party dominance is such 
that these spheres are subservient to the national government and the 
national leadership of the ANC” (De Villiers, 2008:6). The co-operative 
government structure is dominated by the political bureau. Goodnow 
(1900:140) suggests that it was the nature of government to be dominated 
by the political bureau. What is of importance in the politics–administration 
relationship is to determine how the government system can function 
better for common developmental goals. 
 
According to Aucoin (2006:298), “there has always been a political 
dimension to public administration, as politics is an inherent part of public 
governance; while at the same time, the new public governance has 
significantly upped the ante for Westminster systems by insisting that the 
public service not only be loyal to the government of the day, but that it 
also be fully responsive to political direction, and be seen to be 
enthusiastic and zealous in its promotion of the policies of the government. 
In this context, a neutral public service is viewed by some Ministers not as 
a foundation of good public administration, but as an obstacle to be 
overcome by political officials in the pursuit of their agenda”.  
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In the South African context, Cloete and Wissink (2000:131) argue that 
senior public managers such as the directors-general succumb to political 
bureau influence, and politics is then about maintaining the power of the 
ruling party. Political power can influence the decision-maker who wants to 
protect his or her own interests, as well as the political party’s interests. As 
a result of political power, a politically inclined public service manager 
could satisfy a political need instead of taking the best decision for the 
public service. In contrast, Du Toit and van der Waldt (1999:150) suggest 
that public officials may belong to political parties, serve on the 
management of political parties and attend their meetings. However, the 
Public Service Act of 1994 proscribes bureaucrats from delivering partisan 
addresses or working as chairpersons at partisan gatherings. A public 
official may also not distribute political documents. The vision and direction 
that a country must embark upon is centralized at the major conferences 
of the ruling party. Mafunisa and Maserumule (2004:129) argue that it is 
the mandate of the Ministers to provide political leadership with regard to 
the vision and policy direction of their departments; ensure that 
government policies are properly carried out; secure resources necessary 
for the funding of the operations of their departments; represent their 
departments in Cabinet and Legislature; give an explanation of the 
performance and actions of their departments to the public and legislature; 
and take collective responsibility for Cabinet decisions. The tasks of 
Directors-General as accounting officers are to advise the Ministers on a 
variety of issues that pertain to their departments; implement government 
policies and ministerial decisions; manage their departments in an efficient 
and effective manner; and give an account to the Ministers, and when 
necessary to parliament, on matters that concern their departments.  
 
Muller and Van Rooyen (1994:194) identify two public administration 
models, namely (i) the “political activist model”, and (ii) the “professional 
public administration model”. These authors argue that the political activist 
model is based on political expediency and political patronage and senior 
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public service managers are appointed because of their allegiance to the 
ruling party, whereas a professional public manager is an impartial and 
administratively skilled person who is politically neutral but not politically 
insensitive and is always ready to serve under any political leadership. 
Such a manager is a skilled and qualified public manager, a person with 
impeccable integrity who maintains high ethical standards under all 
circumstances (Muller and Van Rooyen, 1994:194). Thus both a political 
activist Director-General and a professional public Director-General in the 
South African setting have a requirement to work smoothly with political 
officials such as the Ministers of their departments to avoid conflicts that 
might result in poor service delivery.  
 
As demonstrated above, the politics and administration, as well as the 
relationship between public administration bureau and political bureau, 
have been part of discussions in academic documents, but examining the 
phenomenon in isolation has been minimal. The researcher has identified 
the research gap and intends to examine the politics–administration 
interface in South Africa between 1999 and 2009 in the sections that 
follow. 
 
2.11 POLITICS–ADMINISTRATION INTERFACE IN SOUTH AFRICA  
 
There are occurrences of progressive politics–administration interface in 
almost all government models which keep governments functioning. The 
starting point in the politics–administration interface problem discourse 
should also highlight some progressive attributes as indicators of 
prospective resolutions. The first attribute that leads to constructive 
politics–administration interface is the common goal of a better country as 
a driving force for co-operation between politicians and administrators. 
Quality leadership that focuses on the common good is one of the key 
factors that enable countries to realise the visions contained in their 
national vision statements (Kathyola, 2010:56). For example, harmonious 
efforts between the political bureau and administration bureau in planning 
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the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) Football 2010 
World Cup Tournament in South Africa is an example of the political 
bureau working together with the administration bureau towards a 
common goal. Such collaboration between the politicians and the 
administrators resulted in improved infrastructure in public transport, public 
sports facilities, such as parks, and the hospitality industry, including 
accommodation facilities. The common goal of a successful World Cup 
tournament was embraced by the public, the public administration 
managers and employees, and by the Parliament of the Republic of South 
Africa. The South African politics–administration interface worked well 
when there was a clear common goal of hosting a successful football 
tournament. For an effective politics–administration interface, countries 
should identify common goals for diverse societies and prioritize them as 
part of their national socio-economic development agenda. As 
demonstrated in this section, there are features of a progressive politics–
administration interface in the South African public service where the 
country’s common goals are prioritized over the generally accepted notion 
that politics is superior to administration. 
 
The second aspect that leads to positive politics–administration interface is 
the separation of functions between the political bureau and the 
administration bureau. Good governance requires separation of the 
political functions from the administrative or technical ones, while at the 
same time ensuring a clear point of connection between the two, since 
both functions are mutually reinforcing (Kathyola, 2010:56). In instances 
where a Director-General is given sufficient autonomy to implement 
policies and manage administration in line with the national political 
agenda, there is generally progressive politics–administration interface. In 
the case of the Republic of South Africa, the politics–administration 
interface was the crucial aspect to manage during the transition from the 
apartheid regime to the post-apartheid era. Consequently, the first 
democratically elected President, Nelson Mandela, appointed Ministers 
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and Directors-General who would focus on the transition during the GNU 
period. The first Minister of Finance2 appointed during the post-apartheid 
era in 1994 was Chris Liebenberg, with strict instructions from Nelson 
Mandela that he would remain non-partisan and assist the then 
administration in transforming without being politicized. President Mandela 
further appointed the academic Professor Estian Calitz as Director-
General in the National Treasury who would focus on administration 
matters and manage the non-partisan administration. The public service in 
the GNU was required to be autonomous and avoid political interference. 
In 1996, cadres from the ANC were deployed in the public administration, 
hence the then President Nelson Mandela appointed an ANC member, 
Trevor Manuel, as the Minister of Finance and another ANC member, 
Maria Ramos, as Director-General in the National Treasury. The positive 
rapport and trust between the Minister and the Director-General resulted in 
the progressive politics–administration interface in the Department of 
Finance in South Africa. The Director-General was trusted to take 
decisions in line with the national political agenda and ensure efficient 
administration in the National Treasury. When Maria Ramos left the 
National Treasury in November 2003, another ANC cadre, Lesetja 
Kganyago, was appointed as the Director-General in the National Treasury 
and assumed duties in 2004. The Minister and the Director-General 
continued to compatibly work together to establish an efficient finance 
regime. It has become an established culture that the Director-General in 
the National Treasury focuses on the technical matters and drafts budget 
speeches and reports for the Minister to present in Parliament. The 
administration bureau in the Department of Finance is largely given 
autonomy to apply technical skills in the administration and report progress 
to the Minister as required by the National Treasury Regulations. The 
politics–administration interface in South Africa’s financial sector remains 
constructive and proactive due to the trust between the Minister and the 
Director-General which results in autonomous administrators who exercise 
                                                            
2 The researcher in this study has been working for and examining the finance sector since 2005 at the National 
Treasury, then at the South African Reserve Bank. 
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their administrative skills without interference from the political bureau. The 
state of South Africa’s finance regime suggests that good rapport between 
the political officials and administration officials results in positive politics–
administration interface and largely autonomous Directors-General who 
are trusted by the politicians to do a good job in the administration. As 
demonstrated in this section, there is usually a progressive politics–
administration interface where government allows separation of 
responsibilities between the political bureau and administration bureau, 
and allows the administration bureau the liberty to take administrative 
decisions in line with professional skills and national priorities without 
political interference. 
 
The third attribute of a positive politics–administration interface is an 
administration bureau that is focused on administration but sensitive to 
political aspirations. Whether the Director-General is apolitical or politically 
aligned, it is crucial that senior managers in the public administration 
remain focused on the technical matters of administration and are 
politically considerate so as to align the administration work with the 
national policy agenda from the political bureau. The National Treasury in 
South Africa has been successfully managed by an apolitical Director-
General, Professor Estian Calitz, and by politically aligned Directors-
General Ramos and Kganyago. Throughout the post-apartheid period, the 
politics–administration interface in the public finance sector has been 
successfully managed by prioritising administration and service delivery 
over the natural supremacy of the political bureau. As demonstrated in this 
section, the administration bureau’s strict focus on administration matters 
and being sensitive to political agendas may lead to a positive politics–
administration interface. 
 
The fourth attribute of a positive politics–administration interface is the 
mutual trust between the political bureau and the administration bureau. 
There is significant success in the politics–administration interface where 
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politicians trust public servants to do their work in accordance with their 
skills and experience; as well as public servants trusting politicians, 
particularly the Minister and the President, to protect departments from 
political interference. Although South Africa has a depoliticized civil service 
in theory, in accordance with section 195 of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa of 1996, in practice it is not always possible for 
politicians to trust senior public servants and senior public servants may 
not trust politicians and view them as a stumbling block in the public 
service (Kruger, 2010:474). What continuously sustains the positive 
politics–administration interface in the government departments such as 
the Department of Finance is the mutual trust between the political bureau 
and the administration bureau, specifically a Director-General, Minister 
and President. Despite the political concerns from the trade unions, the 
SACP and politicians representing the workers, the finance sector has 
remained bound by the mutual trust between the administration bureau 
and political bureau. As demonstrated with the finance sector, there are 
features of a progressive politics–administration interface in the South 
African public service. 
 
2.12 CONCLUSION  
 
This chapter has presented literature on the conceptual argument for a 
politics–administration interface, as well as the literature contrasting that 
interface. Authors such as Frank Goodnow dismissed the theory of 
politics–administration interface as an imaginary dichotomy. They argue 
that it is in the nature of the political bureau to dominate public 
administration. In this chapter the literature explains that European politics 
driven by colonial masters held dominance over public administration in 
South Africa, hence there was intense resistance to colonial political 
hegemony. The contemporary scholarship also depicts the new political 
leadership dominating administration in South Africa.  
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The premise of the pre-claims in this chapter is supported by the literature 
suggesting, firstly, that political officials want to dominate the public service 
function since they want to influence public service. Secondly, the 
literature presented above also suggests that there could be conflicting 
leadership styles between a political official and a senior public service 
official. Thirdly, the literature also argues that political officials may have a 
different political ideology compared with the political ideology upheld by a 
senior public service official. This chapter has also outlined the ethical 
dilemma rooted in personal egotistic aspirations and the need for the 
categorical imperative of the greatest good for the greatest number of 
people. Lastly, there is a view proposing that political officials or public 
service officials or both parties have some disregard for documented 
duties and responsibilities. 
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This section clarifies the practice applied in this study and specifies the 
choices that have been made and the criteria followed for selecting 
possible options. This chapter describes the research design and 
methods, and discusses the reasons for using the qualitative method, the 
overall strategy and the specific design elements. The qualitative enquiry 
in which the researcher was directly involved is outlined. The objective of 
this qualitative enquiry was to collect data utilising the comprehensive 
content-based explanations of society, occasions and circumstances by 
drawing on various methods to ascertain the participants’ behaviour and to 
examine the collected information; and, lastly, to deduce the conclusions 
in the form of a theory or contextual realisation. Qualitative research is 
compatible with this study which examined the politics–administration 
interface in the public service in South Africa between 1999 and 2009. 
This is because qualitative enquiry is a multi-concept method in relation to 
politics-administration interface. Hence, this study used a multi-concept 
tactic or various qualitative procedures and information collection 
techniques to establish truthful knowledge. Conger (1998:108) argues that 
“quantitative research cannot produce a good understanding of a social 
science phenomenon such as politics–administration interface that 
involves multiple levels of phenomena, possesses a dynamic character 
and has symbolic components, elements better addressed with qualitative 
methodologies”.  
 
Although qualitative and quantitative analysis represents binary authentic 
techniques to examine politics–administration interface, examiners utilising 
one or the other approach practical examination in different ways. Everett 
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and Louis (1981:386) explain the suppositions that distinguish two 
research positions, namely ‘inquiry from the outside’, which is usually 
implemented through quantitative studies, and ‘inquiry from the inside’ 
through qualitative studies. In “the ‘inside’ or qualitative approach, the 
researcher aims for a holistic picture from historically unique situations, 
where peculiarities are crucial for meaning, and the examiner thus utilises 
an inductive mode, letting the data speak”. In contrast, “outside or 
quantitative researchers aim to isolate the phenomenon to reduce the level 
of complexity in the analysis and to test hypotheses derived from previous 
studies”. The researcher in this study used qualitative method and multiple 
case studies as a research method and information gathering techniques 
namely document analysis and open-ended individual interviews to obtain 
data.  
 
As stated above, this study is mainly intended to examine the politics–
administration interface in South Africa. The study was conducted through 
qualitative research using document analysis of primary sources, the 
Parliamentary Monitoring Group Committee meeting minutes and Special 
Commissions reports. The study further reviews original books about the 
concept, as well as journal articles on the concept of politics–
administration interface. Research problems and research questions 
provide an important guideline for the researcher in selecting the 
appropriate research methodology or method design. This study is 
therefore compatible with qualitative method, case study design and 
document analysis. Specifically, the study uses case study research 
design and document analysis as the main data collection method as 
elaborated below.  
 
Document analysis was utilised as the main qualitative research method in 
this research. Document analysis is “the methodical examination of 
academic documents and official documents to better understand a 
particular occurrence” (Chism, 1999:38). Document sources were 
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consulted from libraries with public administration documents and from the 
Parliamentary Monitoring Group website, Hansard reports and National 
Government department websites to examine administration and politics in 
the context of the politics–administration interface in South Africa. The 
researcher had access to parliamentary committee meeting minutes and 
commission reports since they are archived on the Parliamentary 
Monitoring Group website. The researcher used a qualitative research 
method to subject literature to analysis and examine relevant public 
administration theories in the context of South Africa. Qualitative research 
denotes the broad methodological method in the research of social action 
using, among other methods, document analysis, which was the main 
approach the researcher undertook to research this study.  
 
Furthermore, qualitative research can also entail case study research 
design. According to Neuman (2011:41), “most case studies use a 
qualitative approach”. In the case study research, the researcher carefully 
selects one or a few cases to illustrate an issue and systematically studies 
the cases in detail. The “use of case studies for the examination of 
theories in social sciences was used by the sociologists Barney Glaser 
and Anselm Strauss who presented their research method called the 
grounded theory” (Strauss, 1987:72). There is no projecting philosophy in 
social science. Social science has failed to produce broad, context-
independent philosophy and has therefore nothing to contribute than 
material, context-dependent information. Campbell (1975:179) argued that 
“the case study design is especially well suited to produce qualitative 
knowledge”. Case studies often “contain a substantial element of good 
narrative that typically approach the complexities and contradictions of real 
life” (Flyvbjerg, 2006: 21). The familiarity of the case study to actual 
circumstances and its numerous facts are necessary for comprehension of 
real life and development of knowledge. Therefore, this study also 
examines three cases of tensions between senior public managers and 
political officials since the ANC government came to power. Dogan and 
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Pelassy (1990, 121) argue that “a researcher can validly explain a 
particular case on the basis of general hypotheses”. In this study, the case 
studies are examined together with the four pre-claims as presented in the 
introduction to this study. First, the main case of the former head of state, 
Thabo Mbeki, and the National Director of Public Prosecutions, Vusumzi 
Pikoli, who was dismissed in 2008, was examined to demonstrate strained 
rapport in the politics–administration interface. Second, the case of the 
former Minister of Home Affairs, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, who is the leader 
of the IFP and Director-General, Billy Masetlha, who is a senior member of 
the ANC was discussed. Third, the case of Wallace Mgoqi, who was the 
ANC-appointed Cape Town City Manager and the Democratic Alliance 
(DA) leader who also led the Western Cape as Premier, Helen Zille, was 
reviewed. As stated above, the main focus is political leadership and 
governance at the national level. However, the cases of Buthelezi and 
Masetlha, and of Mgoqi and Zille were used to compare the main unit of 
analysis, that is, the case of former President Mbeki and Advocate Pikoli. 
The multi-case study design is used to better understand South Africa’s 
politics and administration during the period under review.  
 
3.2 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY  
 
To achieve aspects of the research objectives, this research required the 
use of the most efficient methods available. A wide range of mechanisms 
is accessible to social science examiners, including public administration 
and management academics. The “design of the study involves specifying 
who or what is going to be studied, when, how and for what purpose” 
(Babbie and Mouton, 2001:90). Furthermore, Mouton (1996:107) states 
that a “research design develops subsequent to the formulation of the 
research problem”. In this illustration, the key purpose of the research 
design is to assist the examiner to identify the most suitable research 
approach to maximize the legitimacy of the final results. Mouton 
(1996:107) further defines ‘research design’ as “a set of guidelines and 
procedures to be followed in addressing the research problem”. The 
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guiding principles used to examine the politics–administration interface in 
South Africa between 1999 and 2009 are outlined to determine the state of 
governance during the early stage of democratic governance in South 
Africa. The research design in this study comprises qualitative research, 
case studies, document analysis and open-ended interviews. 
 
3.3 QUALITATIVE RESEARCH METHOD  
 
The study uses a qualitative research method to appropriately respond to 
the phenomenon of politics–administration interface in South Africa 
between 1999 and 2009. Since the nature of the study problem of the 
research is qualitative, this study likewise employed qualitative techniques 
of research. Richards (2010:20) argues that “in order to understand the 
qualitative nature of a study, the research approach requires description, 
analysis, interpretation and evaluation of collected data”. The nature of the 
study problem posited in this study could be viewed as a generally 
articulated problem. The problem is stated as examining the politics–
administration interface in South Africa between 1999 and 2009. This is 
appropriate in that the nature of the study is qualitative. Leedy and Ormrod 
(2001:149) states that “the research problem in a qualitative study does 
not remain general throughout, but as the study unfolds, it becomes 
increasingly better to ask specific research questions”. De Vos (1998: 240) 
argues that “qualitative research should be regarded as a multi-
perspective approach (using different qualitative techniques and data 
collection methods) to social interaction”. In this qualitative study method, 
the methodological aspect of the study is authoritative in drawing the study 
direction and classifying applicable tools to be utilised during the course of 
the study, as well as the objective of the study.  
 
According to Mouton (1996:35), “while the epistemological dimension 
addresses the aspect of what constitutes knowledge, the methodological 
dimension deals with the question of the manner (the ‘how’ part) of 
acquiring knowledge and identifying ways in which the research goal could 
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be reached”. Thus, the rationalisation for obtaining factual knowledge 
requires qualitative study to be carried out. In many qualitative studies, a 
“restricted number of components of examination, such as an individual, 
group or institution, are examined in detail” (Leedy and Ormrod, 
2001:149). The “qualitative research methodology is suited to a study in 
which occurrences are studied within their context” (Yin, 1994:41). In the 
current study, qualitative analysis was used to extract concepts and 
actions from multiple cases and documents to embark on a study of 
politics–administration interface in South Africa. 
 
Choy (2014:102) argues, however, that in a qualitative study there are 
limitations, including the following: first, the researcher’s views may be 
biased, as he or she becomes involved in the study. Second, the 
perceptions and views of the examined subjects may not be interpreted 
accurately and the researcher must use multiple approaches to data 
analysis. Third, participants may not be willing to reveal necessary 
information, believing that they may be misinterpreted or misunderstood. 
The researcher therefore needs to create trust between himself or herself 
and the stakeholders. Qualitative study, concerning its ontological, 
epistemological and methodological aspect, is not a reliable occurrence 
specifically because it syndicates diverse categories of enquiry, for 
example a case study design, lifetime history and document analysis. 
Qualitative investigation is understood as containing simple practical data, 
obtained in the study process, which is orally pronounced or described. 
This study was conducted mainly through qualitative research design, 
using the document analysis approach to access publicly available primary 
sources. The shortcomings of this qualitative research were mitigated by 
applying multiple approaches to the study, and case studies and document 
analysis as well as open-ended personal interviews were employed to 
conduct the study and analyse data. 
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3.3.1 Case study research design 
 
This study adopted case study design as a step towards obtaining the 
relevant data for the purpose of examining how choice and decision-
making impact on the reality of political leadership and governance in the 
public service. Case study research design is one of the qualitative 
research designs. According to Yin (1994:52); “in the case study design, 
the researcher is directed towards understanding the uniqueness of a 
particular case in all its complexity”. Since a case study involves the 
intensive study of a restricted number of components of examination in 
one setting, it is considered appropriate for this enquiry. The objective of a 
case study is typically to examine the changing aspects of a phenomenon, 
usually of a social environment such as, for example, an organisation, 
family, community or group. However, the strength of the case study 
method in this study was in providing an in-depth analysis of the politics–
administration interface in South Africa. The participants were allowed to 
express their experiences. This has a disadvantage in that it is open to the 
perceptual bias and subjective interpretations of the researcher. If a single 
individual is studied in a case study, he or she should be highly 
representative of a particular population. Such an individual should be an 
extremely rare case of the phenomenon being studied. When a researcher 
examines a group or institution, he or she usually conducts fieldwork. This 
implies that the examination is conducted under natural circumstances. 
The “component of examination does not certainly have to be a person, 
however may also involve documents such as diaries, minutes, letters and 
records” (Welman and Kruger, 2002:83). These authors also highlighted 
the following aspects that justify singular reference concerning case 
studies: first, the case should be clearly defined or determined, and its 
boundaries should be identified. In some instances, the researcher may 
find it necessary to adjust the boundaries that were in any case initially 
arbitrarily determined. Second, any procedure is utilised to collect 
information, the aim is not just to define what is being observed, but to 
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search for recurring patterns and consistent regularities. Case studies can 
be beneficial when the examination objective is to define the occurrence or 
predominance of a research subject as a phenomenon or when it is to be 
projecting about certain conclusions. Case studies are suitable for the 
investigation of prevalent political attitudes or examination of historical 
events by analysing archived data. (Yin, 2003:6).  
 
A case study design is a detailed research of a particular occurrence 
rather than a broader statistical survey. A case study method may not 
answer a question completely. However, it gives indications and allows 
further elaboration and theory creation on a particular subject. The case 
study method is “appropriate when a researcher defines research topics 
broadly to encompass appropriate or multifaceted multivariate 
environments and not merely isolated theories and to depend on various 
foundations of evidence” (Yin, 2003:70). According to Yin (1984:58), “case 
studies are used to test scientific theoretical models by using them in real-
world situations and case studies may be conducted alone or in 
combination with the document analysis method, as all have 
complementary strengths and weaknesses”. Case studies have historically 
been one of the most commonly used techniques of piloting a study for 
utilisation in public policy, in the private sector and public administration. 
Multiple cases are “authoritative means to craft theory since they allow 
replication” (Eisenhardt, 1991:620). The study used case study design in 
collaboration with document analysis to ensure replication. This 
collaboration assisted the researcher in perceiving patterns more easily 
and lessening result association with chance. Different cases emphasize 
complementary aspects of an occurrence. By piecing together the 
examined subject patterns, the researcher could draw a more complete 
theoretical picture. The combination of case study design and document 
analysis assisted the researcher in generalizing the findings.  
 
XR Shazi 584200 PHD WSG 
90 
The case study research design focuses on specific cases. According to 
Yin (1984: 63), this is done to examine a scientific theory with a typical 
empirical case. “Evidence for case studies may come from six sources: (i) 
documents, (ii) archival records, (iii) interviews, (iv) direct observation, (v) 
participant observation, and (vi) physical artefacts” (Yin, 1984:83). The 
evidence for case studies in this research comes from document analysis, 
archived records from the Parliamentary Monitoring Group and peer-
reviewed journals. The researcher identified three case studies on political 
leadership and administration tensions in the public service. Each case is 
independently examined and then cross-case conclusions are drawn. The 
cases are examined in relation to the politics–administration interface 
concept and politics–administration dualism theory on governance. The 
researcher collected data from the selected case studies and examined 
them to address the following research questions: 
 
1. What were the political leadership and administration roles of political 
officials in the rendering of services to the public between 1999 and 
2009? This question provided a basis for examining the political 
leadership and administration responsibilities of the senior public 
service managers in the execution of their duties to the public and 
reporting to the political bureau.  
 
2. What political leadership and administration challenges have taken 
place in the politics–administration interface in South Africa between 
senior public service managers and political officials since the ANC 
government came into power; and which challenges resulted in 
conflict? This question sought to examine the pre-claims of political 
dominance, conflicting leadership styles, political ideology differences 
and disregard for documented responsibilities. The pre-claims in this 
study are examined to determine their impact on the politics–
administration interface. 
 
XR Shazi 584200 PHD WSG 
91 
3. How has one dominant party in South Africa’s democracy affected 
administration in South Africa? The question examined the relationship 
between the political bureau and public administration in South Africa. 
This question further reviewed the effects of ANC dominance in the 
politics–administration interface and the majority power in determining 
the strength of political bureau dominance. 
 
3.3.2 The conceptual framework background and premise of the case 
study design 
 
This study adopted a case study design as one of the steps towards 
obtaining relevant data for the purpose of examining the politics–
administration interface. The main claim in this study was conceptualized 
and developed through a chart-like outline known as a ‘storyboard’ where 
the main claim was established using the main case of the phenomenon 
(i.e. politics–administration interface) which is under examination in this 
study. The main claim in a storyboard represents the core argument and is 
supported by reasons and evidence (Booth, Colomb and Williams, 
2003:130). The four pre-claims of this study are further discussed and 
supported with reasons and evidence from other studies in the literature 
review below.  
 
3.3.3 Research approach 
 
Wessels and Pauw (1999:36) state that “research in public administration 
and management is a contribution to the body of knowledge”. These 
authors further argue that  
“the approach is aimed at identifying strategies and methods by 
which the scientific character and credibility of the results may be 
enhanced. Two of the central problems that are essential to 
participate in the tactic or methodology are linked to the following 
characteristics: How should the research be planned? How should 
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the structure of the research be? How should it be executed to fulfil 
the demands of science in public administration and management?” 
 
The answers to the abovementioned problems should be proposed to 
support the researcher in crafting a technique for the complete study 
project. The study methodology further requires consideration of the 
preparation, organising and implementation of enquiry so as to conform to 
prerequisites of reality, impartiality and legitimacy. The methodology or 
procedure that the examiner has to embark upon to complete the research 
project utilises some of the following questions to control research 
conclusions, as indicated by Brynard and Hanekom (1997:28):  
“… first, which decisions need to be taken as the researcher 
progresses? Second, which methods and techniques for data 
collection and data analysis should be selected? Third, which 
factors play a role in the design of the research project? Fourth, 
what influence does a particular purpose of the research project 
have on the selection of methods and techniques? Fifth, which 
factors play a role in the process of research and how do these 
factors influence the methodology of the researcher?”  
 
Such questions are applicable in all categories of research since there is 
continuously a requirement to comprehend not only the methods or 
techniques applicable to a specific category of research, but similarly by 
what means to utilise such tools in the various stages of research. 
Therefore, the study design and methodology is considered as a 
methodical and cautiously premeditated examination that focuses on the 
methodology utilised to authenticate the legitimacy, trustworthiness and 
dependability of the data collection. This is an effort to think through the 
epistemological element of the study problem. Mouton (1996:35) argues 
that “research involves the application of a variety of standardized 
methods and techniques in the pursuit of valid knowledge”. Therefore, 
since researchers seek to present honest and factual information, they are 
XR Shazi 584200 PHD WSG 
93 
dedicated to the utilisation of impartial techniques and procedures that 
promote the probability of legitimacy.  
 
This study mainly intended to examine the politics–administration interface 
in South Africa between 1999 and 2009. The problem identified prior to 
this research topic was that political officials and senior public service 
managers found it difficult to maintain good working relationships. In the 
politics–administration interface, tensions occur if a senior public service 
manager is not in agreement with a political official about political views or 
a specific public policy decision.  
 
Furthermore, research problems and research questions provide an 
important guideline for the researcher in selecting the appropriate research 
methodology or design. This study is compatible with qualitative method, 
case studies design, document analysis and open-ended interviews to 
collect data. 
 
3.4 VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY OF THE RESEARCH  
 
Validity and reliability are intrinsic methodological issues in qualitative 
research. Rudestam and Newton (1992:17) maintains that one cannot 
separate the investigator from the object of inquiry. ‘Reliability’ refers to the 
replication of similar situations and similar studies, so that related 
conclusions can be developed. In this research the subject of reliability 
was considered by multiple instruments to identify and correct 
shortcomings and undertake careful analysis of the behaviours and 
decisions taken by examined subjects. The shortcomings of document 
analysis were mitigated by using open-ended questionnaires and case 
study design to obtain and analyse data. ‘Validity’, according to Stanfield 
(1993:69), “addresses itself to the truth of an assertion that they make 
about something in the empirical world”. Discrepancies in data control and 
data interpretation are expected, as a case study perspective is subjective 
and interpretative (Millon and Diesenhaus, 1972). The validity of the study 
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depends on the observational and inferential skills of the researcher and 
this cannot be considered free from bias. Though this may be a multiple 
paradigm form of research, problems around interpretative bias remain 
unsolved. The validity issues of this study were dealt with in a similar 
manner to the reliability problem, namely to test the instruments thoroughly 
and analyse the responses carefully. The issues of reliability and validity in 
this study are dealt with cautiously by using multiple methods of obtaining 
and analysing data to avoid bias in the study. 
 
3.5 DATA COLLECTION  
 
For a researcher to understand the procedures and techniques of data 
collection utilised in this research, two main components were 
acknowledged, namely design and structure. Such components are 
explained in detail below with regard to how they were utilised in the 
research.  
 
3.5.1 Design and structure of open-ended personal interview 
questionnaire  
 
The design and structure of a questionnaire provide an outline for 
confirming that participants comprehend the reasoning of the questions 
asked. Thus participants can freely state their understanding and opinions 
with comprehensive reasoning (Boyce and Neale, 2006:5). This study 
used open-ended personal interviews to obtain data that responded to the 
study questions, particularly the nature of the relationship between political 
officials and the senior public service managers with regard to 
administration in the public service. This guarantees that the examiner has 
participants in mind when formulating the questions. Open-ended 
individual interview survey questions are flexible in order to permit 
collaboration with the assessor and clarify interview questions. The 
formulation of the survey questions in this study took into account the 
interests, needs, subject matter and language of the participants. 
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3.5.2 Administration of open-ended personal interview questionnaire 
 
The researcher in this study interviewed a total of twenty-five participants. 
The participants were senior academics, elected officials, senior public 
officials and authors who are reviewers of ANC governance and 
administration. The twenty-five participants comprised ten professors in 
the study of governance from four different universities in South Africa and 
ten senior public officials with experience in the South African politics–
administration interface, as well as five elected officials to determine the 
politics–administration interface phenomenon in South Africa. Prior to 
meeting with the participants and directing open-ended individual 
interviews, the questionnaire was sent through electronic mail (e-mail) to 
participants for preparation. Each questionnaire was complemented by a 
covering letter clarifying the intention of the interview, confidentiality, 
suggested questionnaire arrangement and the contact information of the 
examiner for additional information where necessary following the 
conversation.  
 
3.6 OPEN-ENDED INTERVIEWS DATA ANALYSIS 
 
Leedy and Ormrod (2001:159) states that “interviewing in a qualitative 
study is rarely structured and it is either open-ended or semi-structured 
while revolving around a few central questions”. These authors further 
argue that “an interviewer should ask questions relating to the study with 
regard to any of the following: people’s beliefs about facts, motives for 
undertaking certain decisions, present and past behaviours, the standards 
for behaviour (what people think should be done), and conscious reasons 
for actions or feelings”. The open-ended personal interviews in this study 
were embarked upon to ask these questions in the context of the state of 
the politics–administration interface in South Africa.  
 
XR Shazi 584200 PHD WSG 
96 
In public administration and management research, dialogues are usually 
utilised as opposed to various other techniques of collecting data. 
According to Brynard and Hanekom (1997:32), “this is so because 
interviewing allows the researcher to explain questions whenever 
participants are not clear about the questions”. In this study, the 
researcher conducted open-ended personal interviews with directors from 
the public service and academics in the field of public administration and 
management. The researcher has verified, interpreted and clarified 
supplementary data or examined certain assumptions.  
 
The outcomes of the open-ended individual interview questionnaires were 
examined to ensure that the contributions of the participants were properly 
understood and summarized into study conclusions. This is necessary to 
correctly analyse compound views, perceptions and experiences of 
participants, particularly the members of the public service and the political 
bureau. A detailed examination and explanation of facts is provided in 
Chapter 5 to further augment the information in this segment.  
 
3.7 DOCUMENT ANALYSIS DATA COLLECTION AND 
PRESENTATION METHOD  
 
When analysing data, the researcher might start with questions such as 
the research questions in the introduction to the study instead of starting 
with data analysis exclusively (Yin, 2009:130). The researcher should start 
with the study question first and then identify the acquired evidence that 
addresses the question. The researcher can then draw tentative 
conclusions based on the weight of the evidence, also asking how the 
researcher should display the evidence so that readers can check the 
researcher’s assessment tools. The process can be repeated until the 
researcher is satisfied that the research questions are fully addressed. 
This study was conducted through qualitative research using document 
analysis of primary sources, the Parliamentary Monitoring Group 
Committee meeting minutes and Special Commission reports. The study 
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further reviews original books on the concept and peer-reviewed journal 
articles on the politics–administration interface concept. 
 
The document analysis method is unobtrusive and it can be utilised 
without imposing on contributors. Documents can be tested and re-tested 
for consistency. According to Taylor and Bogdan (1998:98), “document 
analysis involves several steps: the first step is selecting material relevant 
to the research subject (the sampling frame) and then sampling the 
material to be analysed from that sampling frame. The second step is an 
undertaking to define the categories of contents that are going to be 
measured, the topics of interest within the documents. The third step is to 
choose the recording unit and decide how to divide the content into 
standard units for analysis (e.g. a single word, paragraph and page). The 
final step is deciding the numeric values that are used to code each 
category in each recording unit”.  
 
Benefits of document analysis as outlined by Taylor and Bogdan (1998:99) 
are that “the documented record permits access to matters that may be 
problematic or unmanageable to study using direct, individual interaction. 
Second, raw data are usually nonreactive. Third, sometimes the record 
has existed long enough to permit analyses of political occurrences over 
time. Fourth, the written record often allows one to increase the sample 
size above what would be possible through either interviews or direct 
observation. Fifth, costs are low because they are borne by the record 
keepers, not the researcher”.  
 
However, there are limitations to document analysis as discussed by Yin 
(1984: 67): “… first, record keepers may not preserve all pertinent 
materials but rather selectively save those that are the least embarrassing, 
controversial or problematic. Second, large gaps in time exist in many 
archives due to loss of records or failure to collect records. Third, the 
written record content may be biased by record keeping that is inaccurate 
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or falsified. Fourth, some written records are unavailable to researchers, 
like classified documents. Fifth, the written record may lack a standard 
format because it is kept by different people”. Finally, the major problem is 
that documents may not have been written for the same purposes as the 
research and, therefore, conclusions were not drawn from document 
analysis alone. In this study, the disadvantages of document analysis were 
mitigated by combining document analysis with open-ended personal 
interviews and case study examination, using a combination of document 
analysis and case studies to improve the validity of the study.  
 
Document analysis, as utilised in this study, is the logical scrutiny of 
academic and official documents in order to better comprehend a 
particular phenomenon (Chism, 1999:38). Document sources were 
accessed from archives with public administration literature and from the 
Parliamentary Monitoring Group website, Hansard reports and National 
Government department websites to examine the politics–administration 
interface in South Africa between 1999 and 2009. The researcher in this 
study obtained access to parliamentary committee meeting minutes and 
commission reports as published in the Parliamentary Monitoring Group 
website. The researcher employed a qualitative research method to 
subject literature to analysis and to examine relevant public administration 
theories in the context of South Africa. Qualitative study denotes a broad 
methodological approach to the enquiry of social action using, among 
other methods, document analysis which is the main approach the 
researcher undertook to conduct this study.  
 
3.8 POPULATION AND SAMPLING 
 
The ‘total population’ refers to the “entire set of elements, persons, 
occurrences, happenings that are the centre of the study and with which 
the examiner seeks to conclude some characteristics” (Mouton, 1996:134). 
To guarantee that data gathering undertakings are carried out and 
finalised, a sample from the target population is typically identified. The 
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target sample in this study was comprised of twenty-five participants, of 
whom ten were senior academics in the fields of politics and public 
administration, who are also political analysts and reviewers of 
governance. The sample also included ten senior public officials and five 
elected officials.  
 
Sampling is defined as “the process of selecting objects or phenomena 
when it is practically impossible to have knowledge of the entire population 
of the phenomena; it is also regarded as the process of drawing 
conclusions about unknown population parameters from the unknown 
sample statistic” (Mouton, 1996:133). Sampling permits examiners in the 
social sciences, public administration and management to expedite a 
methodical assortment of items from the overall population. Unlike the 
quantitative examiner, the examiner in qualitative study does not take a 
decision based on the scope of the sample prior to commencing the study. 
Contributors are not employed on a representative basis but for their 
professional understanding of the investigated phenomenon. In this study, 
the researcher selected participants who have experienced the politics–
administration interface under investigation. In qualitative research 
sample, participants do not statistically represent any meaningful 
population but they represent social concepts (Babbie and Mouton, 
2001:94).  
 
Non-probability sampling was applied in this study; “non-probability 
sampling technique cannot continuously pledge that the sample scope 
identified is a representative sample” (Babbie and Mouton, 2001:78). In 
this study the non-probability sampling utilised was purposive sampling 
that was employed throughout the personal interviews.  
 
Finally, purposive sampling was applied in this study. Selecting a sample 
“on the basis of knowledge of the population and the purpose of the study 
is sometimes appropriate and could be referred to as ‘purposive sampling’. 
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This sampling method is based on the judgement of the researcher 
regarding the characteristics of a representative sample. An approach is to 
select units that are judged to be the most common in the population 
under investigation. However, the danger associated with this type of 
sampling is that it relies heavily on the subjective consideration of the 
researcher rather than on objective criterion” (Babbie and Mouton, 
2001:79). In this research, the selection of the participants was done 
employing such a purposive sampling methodology for the twenty-five 
participants that were interviewed, the senior academics, politicians, 
former senior public officials and commentators who authored books to 
critique the ANC administration. The officials interviewed were targeted or 
purposively constituted in scope of the sample for sampling intentions.  
 
3.9 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
The researcher has attempted to ensure the following ethical 
considerations as stated by the Social Research Association (2003:48): 
first, “the principle of voluntary participation requires that people not be 
coerced into participating in research. Second, prospective research 
participants must be fully informed about the procedures and risks 
involved in research and must give their consent to participate. Third, 
ethical standards also require that researchers not put participants in a 
situation where they might be at risk of harm as a result of their 
participation”. Fourth, the researcher must ensure the participants’ 
confidentiality. Fifth, the researcher must ensure the participants’ 
anonymity. The researcher provided the consent form to all participants 
with the ethical considerations outlining the ethical aspects of qualitative 
research. The people who participated in this research were not coerced 
into participating. The participants were advised of the techniques and 
processes in this enquiry and their approval to contribute was obtained by 
the researcher. The confidentiality of participants was upheld by using 
interviewee codes instead of names of interviewed persons. 
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3.10 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY  
 
The qualitative research data analysis relies on the researcher’s 
objectivity. Hence, the researcher must be ethical and apply a combination 
of research approaches to ensure validity. Open-ended questions result in 
too much data which, in turn, results in an increased workload as the 
researcher is required to intensively analyse and exclude the irrelevant 
data from the study. The researcher must clearly determine the relevant 
data from the total of collected data. Furthermore, even though the 
researcher pledges to ensure confidentiality of the participants, 
confidentiality cannot be fully guaranteed because certain views and 
concepts are generally associated with certain authors, individuals and 
groups. The use of document analysis can have limitations since 
document guardians may fail to retain all relevant resources but instead 
selectively retain data. Thus the researcher utilized the combination of 
approaches, operational and theoretical research to ensure the validity of 
the study. 
 
3.11 DEMARCATION OF THE STUDY  
 
This study focused on the politics–administration interface in South Africa 
between 1999 and 2009. The observation of the study topic is from 1999, 
the period when the GNU ended and the new administration under 
President Thabo Mbeki and the ANC government began to develop new 
public policies aligned with the political ideology of a developmental State. 
This study encompasses a ten-year review of the politics–administration 
interface in the post-apartheid South African public service.  
 
In further examining the demarcation of the research, the following 
features received consideration: the hierarchical dimension, time, and 
geographical region.  
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3.11.1 Hierarchical dimension  
 
The senior academics, political analysts and authors analysing the ANC 
administration were all participants who responded to the open-ended 
questions on politics–administration interface and conflicts between the 
political bureau and the administration bureau. This examination focused 
on the political bureau and the administration bureau in South Africa. This 
study reviewed elected officials and senior public service managers in 
South Africa who are responsible for maintaining the relationship between 
administration and politics.  
 
3.11.2 Time period  
 
The period element for the research was the epoch between 1999 and 
2009. Thus it was a ten-year review of the Mbeki era in the context of 
politics and administration and the politics–administration interface. This 
demarcation in terms of time dimension provided a focus on politics and 
administration in South Africa since President Thabo Mbeki came into 
power. Although the study has a limited scope and time period, it provides 
politics–administration interface implications for the current state and the 
future of governance in South Africa. 
 
3.11.3 Geographical region 
 
The theoretical base of the study was developed in the 19th century in the 
American public administration. However, this study focuses on a similar 
phenomenon in the context of South Africa. 
 
3.12 DATA COLLECTION TECHNIQUE  
 
In this study document analysis and open-ended personal consultations 
were utilised to collect information from the contributors, mainly to 
establish the landscape of the rapport between political officials and the 
XR Shazi 584200 PHD WSG 
103 
senior bureaucrats concerning the administration in the public sector. The 
open-ended personal interview questionnaire was designed to be flexible 
to allow interaction with the interviewer and clarify interview questions. The 
design of the questionnaire has been considered in line with the following 
aspects as outlined by Bless and Higson-Smith (2000:113): “first, do not 
begin to develop a questionnaire by drafting questions. Second, always 
take into account the needs, interests and problems of the participants. 
Third, the researcher should give serious attention to the wording of 
questions. Fourth, the researcher should structure questions cautiously”. 
The survey questions were designed with eleven open-ended questions to 
allow for comprehensive responses from participants.  
 
The researcher in this study interviewed a total of twenty-five participants. 
The twenty-five participants are comprised of ten professors in the study of 
governance from seven different universities in South Africa, and ten 
senior public officials with experience in the South African politics–
administration interface, as well as five elected officials to determine the 
politics–administration interface phenomenon in South Africa. The 
researcher received responses through questionnaires from twenty-five 
participants who shared their knowledge and views on the politics–
administration interface phenomenon in South Africa. Of the twenty-five 
participants, the researcher met fifteen participants face-to-face for sequel 
discussions. Prior to meeting with the participants and directing open-
ended individual interviews, the questionnaires were sent through e-mail to 
participants for preparation. All questionnaires were complemented by a 
covering letter clarifying the intention of the meeting, confidentiality, 
suggested arrangement of the questions and the contact information of the 
researcher for further information where necessary following the interview. 
The researcher conducted the research himself with all twenty-five 
participants to ensure that the response rate and participation was 
satisfactory. The participants were senior academics, politicians, senior 
public officials and commentators on ANC governance and administration. 
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The fifteen participants provided responses without face-to-face 
communication but only by documenting their responses and e-mail to the 
researcher. Furthermore, ten participants were met by the researcher to 
discuss responses that were initially provided in the questionnaires to 
follow up and engage in a face-to-face discussion to obtain further 
information.  
 
The researcher in this study has undertaken to protect the identity of 
participants by coding participants for confidentiality in congruence with 
research ethics. The “use of study codes is a valuable technique for 
guarding the confidentiality of research participants. Study codes can be 
used on data collection tools in place of identifying information to protect 
participants. Furthermore, in the event that a data document is lost or 
stolen, having the data protected by a study code may prevent readers 
from determining the participant’s identity. The researcher must ensure the 
separation of data from identifiable individuals and store the codes linking 
data to individuals securely” (Wiles, Crow, Heath and Charles, 2006:4). 
 
3.13 INTERVIEWS AND MAIN QUESTIONS 
 
The dialogue questions were intended to address the study questions in 
order to refute or confirm the study pre-claims. The first pre-claim sought 
to examine disregard for documented duties and responsibilities. The 
second pre-claim attempted to establish the notion that it is a generally 
accepted norm that political officials should dominate the public service 
function. The third pre-claim examined conflicting leadership styles 
between the political bureau and the administration bureau possibly 
leading to strained politics–administration interface. The final pre-claim 
suggested that there could be different political ideologies between the 
political bureau and the administration bureau leading to strained politics–
administration interface. Furthermore, the research questions of the study 
were examined together with the pre-claims as outlined in the 
questionnaires. 
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3.14 DATA ANALYSIS  
 
The questionnaires analysed in congruence with the study questions and 
the concepts from the questionnaires were categorized to form an 
argument to answer the research questions. According to Taylor-Powell 
and Renner (2003:2), the first steps in qualitative questionnaire analysis 
are to read and re-read the text and document the impressions coherent 
with the research questions; consider the quality of data; and determine 
the data of greater value. Secondly, the researcher seeks to identify 
themes, patterns, ideas, concepts and phrases, and categorizes concepts 
into coherent arguments in accordance with the study questions. In this 
study the researcher analysed the questionnaires and extracted concepts 
that address the three research questions as presented above. This study 
utilized a qualitative research method, the data from questionnaires was 
analysed and findings were made based on the questionnaires, document 
analysis and case study analysis. A qualitative document analysis 
approach to data analysis involves reading and re-reading transcripts, and 
looking for similarities and differences that enable the researcher to 
develop themes and categories (Kawulich, 2004:104). In qualitative 
research, data are analysed with the purpose of answering the research 
questions in line with the study theory. It is important to analyse the data in 
terms of the research questions to enable the researcher to answer the 
questions posed within the study. The answers and quotations related to 
the same topic are categorized by research question and can assist the 
researcher to recognize patterns found in the data. Wolcott (1994:11) 
argues that the researcher should highlight the findings by emphasising 
some data more than other data and summarizing what is important to the 
study. This study also gathered data to respond to the concepts presented 
through the pre-claims as demonstrated below.  
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3.15 CONCLUSION  
 
Chapter 3 presented the study design that was utilised in this study. Data 
collection and analysis and data presentation were discussed in this 
chapter. The chapter also presented the reliability, validity and the 
limitations of the study. The ethical considerations, including the 
researcher’s pledge of confidentiality, were explained. The research 
design and methodology, and the rationale for the research choices made 
were then discussed. 
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CHAPTER 4 
DOCUMENT ANALYSIS RESEARCH DATA REVIEW 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The first pre-claim of this study attempted to establish the notion that it is a 
generally accepted norm that political officials should dominate the public 
service function in order to provide direction. The second pre-claim sought 
to examine conflicting leadership styles between the political bureau and 
the administration bureau, possibly leading to strained politics–
administration interface. The third pre-claim suggested that the different 
political ideologies between the political bureau and the administration 
bureau could lead to strained politics–administration interface. The fourth 
and final pre-claim sought to examine the disregard for documented duties 
and responsibilities of the political officials and senior public 
administrators. This study argues that the ultimate governance 
responsibility is vested in the political bureau through a social contract. 
Thus the political bureau dominance over public administration is justified 
as further discussed below.  
 
The study also argues that the interface is an imagined concept that is 
difficult to locate in the politics–administration relationship. It examines the 
leadership approaches conflict between the political bureau and the 
administration bureau as well as the leadership trends between 1999 and 
2009 in South Africa’s public service sector. The impact of differing 
political ideology on the politics–administration interface is reviewed by 
examining the political parties (the ANC, the DA and the IFP) and the 
politics–administration relationship cases to demonstrate the state of 
governance during the period between 1999 and 2009. The findings of the 
four pre-claims are presented in this chapter on the basis of the document 
analysis research output.  
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The study further examines documented roles and grey or nondescript 
areas or contested roles and unclaimed roles which may be the 
contributing factors that strain working relationships in the politics–
administration interface. The study argues that despite documented rules 
and responsibilities, there are unclear areas in the interface, and such 
unclear areas can be claimed by either the political bureau or the 
administrative bureau, depending on who is strong enough to win control 
of such areas.  
 
The chapter presents the findings mainly from the document analysis, and 
the combination of document analysis and case study design is utilised to 
reach conclusions that are later confirmed or refuted in the next chapter 
when the data from the interviews is presented.  
  
4.2 DOMINANCE OF POLITICAL OFFICIALS OVER PUBLIC SERVICE 
FUNCTION 
 
The political bureau interference justification is based on the legislative 
requirements for political officials to account in parliament regarding the 
failure or success of the public service. The “Guide to tabling of papers in 
Parliament” (2011:8) states that “when papers are delivered to the office of 
Clerk of the Papers for tabling, the departmental officials must have 
obtained approval for tabling of such papers from the Minister and the 
Director-General. As such, the letter sent to Parliament for tabling of a 
paper must be signed and dated”. Policies are drafted by senior public 
managers in consultation with the political bureau that is represented by 
the minister or the deputy minister. Public managers are appointed to 
implement public policies for the public good using the resources of the 
public. Everything public managers do is therefore public and open to 
public scrutiny, and they should account for themselves in relevant political 
forums. All the committees that provide a supervisory role in public service 
work seek to ensure that decisions made by public bureaucrats are 
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intended to develop and improve the lives of the citizens. However, it is 
important to note that public administration will always take place in a 
political environment. This is because politics is the main force behind 
paradigm shifts in the public administration and there is thus a thin line 
between politics and public administration. For example, one would not be 
surprised to see a Director-General attending an ANC conference as a 
delegate. The former President of the United States, Woodrow Wilson, 
who is celebrated as the founder of public administration was a multi-
disciplined public administrator who was a politician, administrator and 
academic. This is because public administration is the science of who gets 
what, how and when. The ‘what’ and ‘when’ are political questions since 
they address matters of race, gender and citizenship, among others. The 
involvement of politics in public administration necessitates the rectification 
of historical imbalances and ensures accountability for public resources 
used for the people’s development. 
 
4.2.1 Political bureau role in the bureaucratic structure  
 
Max Weber (1919:13) suggested that “the role of the political bureau in 
government machinery is to give direction to public policy and expression 
of a policy agenda”. Weber further argued that “the responsibility of 
political office bearers lies in their personal, ethical responsibility for their 
actions, which was to take a stand and to be passionate about social 
fairness”. In contrast, public service managers are expected to exclusively 
participate in the unbiased management of their bureaux. The nobility of 
public servants is seen in their capacity to implement meticulously the 
legalised guidelines of higher political office. In executing their 
responsibilities, a drive of stewardship and duty should be more significant 
than individual political opinions. The responsibility of public servants is an 
impersonal, passionless application of the rules stemming from the 
political policy agenda set by the political bureau. While Weber (1919:3) 
defined the interface, he also posed a crucial question: “The question is 
whether or not the power-holder in the political bureau directs and 
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organizes the administration while delegating executive power to personal 
servants or personal favourites and confidants who are directed by the 
power-holder in the political bureau.” In this question, Weber raises 
another contributing factor to strained politics–administration relationships 
in the politics–administration interface, namely that politicians appoint 
senior public service managers who are aligned with prevailing political 
agendas. In the South African setting, this appointment is referred to as 
‘cadre deployment’. This study found that the problem with cadre 
deployment is that it is founded on the conjecture that a senior public 
service manager will remain faithful and submissive to the political bureau. 
The relationship becomes strained when the senior public service 
manager decides to take a share of power, and become creative and 
innovative outside the ideology and agenda of the political bureau. One of 
the examined pre-claims in this study suggested that the tension in the 
politics–administration relationship is exacerbated when the roles and 
responsibilities are not clearly articulated in the documented guidelines 
such as the constitution, policies and legislation.  
 
4.2.2 Important relationships in the politics–administration interface  
 
Since 1994 there has been an increase in power of the political executive 
over Directors-General. The Directors-General, rather than being their 
Minister’s administrative counterpart, are made to some extent subservient 
and accountable to the Minister in terms of performance agreements and 
the PFMA (1999). The PFMA has made Directors-General more 
accountable as regards financial management of their departments, but 
has limited the role of the Minister to ensure the department complies with 
the Act, which is “to report on the financial transactions of the department 
to Parliament and to hold the Directors-General accountable for financial 
management of the department” (Public Finance Management Act, 1999: 
sections 63 to 65). Therefore, since the commencement of democratic 
governance in South Africa it has become essential that the Directors-
General and their Minister should have a good working relationship and 
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share a common understanding of the administrative and political 
environment. 
 
In the post-1994 era, more demands are being made on Directors-
General; they are responsible for the management of financial and human 
resources and policy advice; and are functioning within an increasingly 
complex social, economic and political environment. The role of Directors-
General has been evolving as each political dispensation introduces 
measures that impact upon the Directors-General in order to ensure the 
balance shifts in favour of the political leadership (Miller, 2005:95). 
Directors-General in the post-1994 era function in a predominantly political 
environment and have a significant responsibility to serve the political 
office well as and when required. Directors-General should uphold the 
political mandate to promote fair labour practices as consistent with the 
Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997, the Labour Relations Act 
66 of 1995 and the values of the ANC’s labour alliance. The appointment 
of a Directors-General is based on a five-year contract with further 
performance contracts intended to hold them accountable for performance 
(Public Service Amendment Act 86 of 1998). The contract may include any 
agreement that the Minister and Director-General enter into, but should 
include the following: the particular duties of the Director-General; the 
specific performance criteria for evaluating the performance of the 
Director-General; the grounds and procedures upon which the services of 
the Director-General may be terminated before the completion of his or her 
contract; and any other matter that may be prescribed by the Minister 
(Public Service Amendment Act, 1997, section 9). The legislative wording 
“any other matter which may be prescribed by the Minister” provides a 
Minister with the power to impose ambiguity through law. 
 
The selection process for a Director-General involves the advertisement of 
the vacant post as decided by the Minister and an interview by a selection 
committee consisting of at least three Ministers (Public Service 
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Regulations, 1999:23). The selection of the suitable candidate is based on 
the following considerations: “information based on valid methods, criteria 
and instruments that are free from bias; the training, skills, competence 
and knowledge necessary to meet the requirements of the post; the needs 
of the department; and a preference for affirmative action appointees” 
(Public Service Regulations, 1999:24). 
 
According to Mafunisa (2003:86), the “ANC has deployed some of its 
members to key public sector positions with a view to promoting loyalty 
and service delivery”. The belief of the ruling party is that “effective service 
delivery depends on people who understand and are loyal to its policies 
and programmes” (Twala, 2014:159). Owing to the history of South Africa, 
the country’s service delivery has been subject to political sabotage by the 
supporters of the previous regime and other opposing forces. Hence, 
service delivery requires the backing of the political office with is political 
mandate. Political values refer to policies formulated by political office 
bearers, whereas ‘administration’ refers to the provision of goods and 
services to members of the public with the help of the administrative and 
auxiliary functions (Mafunisa, 2003:86). It is important to note that 
administration functions consist of policymaking, categorising, funding, 
personnel setting up and deployment, determining work techniques, and 
control. The principal role of senior public managers is to translate political 
goals into administrative practice. Therefore, it is prudent that in a 
developing country a senior public manager appreciates the political 
ideology of the day. However, the politicisation of service delivery should 
only last until there is a high level of professionalism that will drive public 
service to a complementary relationship between public service managers 
and political office bearers (Mafunisa, 2003:86). “Complementarity 
stresses interdependence along with distinct roles, compliance along with 
independence and respect for political supremacy, along with a 
commitment to shape and implement policy in ways that promote the 
public interest. Political office bearers could theoretically dominate 
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administrative practice, but they are constrained by a respect for 
administrative competence and commitment. Senior public servants could 
use their considerable assets to become self-directed, but they are 
controlled by a commitment to accountability in the complementary 
relationship. Overhead democracy executed by citizens and politicians can 
work, but only if it is accompanied by undergirding responsibility from 
senior public servants” (Mafunisa, 2003:86). There is an intersection 
between the ‘domains’ of the bureaucrats and that of elected officials. 
Complementarity is a conceptual outline that recognises various duties 
and accountabilities but also understands the necessity for interface and 
working relations as a substitute for the politicization of service delivery. 
 
4.2.3 Public service managers in a democratic South Africa  
 
Public administration exists in a political environment and the present 
public administration is a result of changes that were part of reparations to 
rectify the shortcomings of the apartheid era. Miller (2005:27) argues that 
“Directors-General were themselves subject to changes”. The role of the 
Director-General was formulated in the early 1980s and particularly during 
the 1990s their role increased in complexity, both administratively and 
politically. They had to support changes in political dispensations and the 
polity, at times a difficult change for those who served during the transition 
period and for those who served in the latter part of the 1990s. These 
changes increased the complexity and demands of the most high-ranking 
positions in the government departments. The post of the Director-General 
was created during the rationalisation process under President P.W. 
Botha. The new post of Director-General was a re-definition of the 
responsibilities and changes in senior management. The post effectively 
gave Directors-General more responsibilities in managing a larger 
organisation and finances. During the rationalisation process, no public 
servant retired, resigned or was dismissed but became part of the new 
political and administration dispensation. The Public Service Act 103 of 
1994 gave effect to one National Public Service and nine Provincial 
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Administrations. This Act made provision for the “amalgamation of the 
National Public Service, the Public Service Commission, the composition 
and organisation of the public service, and career incidents of public 
servants in the new South Africa” (Public Service Act 103 of 1994). The 
Public Service Amendment Act 47 of 1997 introduced a number of 
revolutionary changes. First, it adjusted the authorities and duties of the 
Public Service Commission as consistent with the Constitution (1996), and 
shifted policy matters relating to the government departments to the 
Minister for Public Service and Administration, thereby increasing his or 
her powers over public service. Policy matters relating to the public service 
thereby shifted from a neutral custodian such as the Public Service 
Commission to the Minister and therefore the Cabinet. Second, it 
decentralized the organization, administration and staff matters of 
departments rather than a central institution. Third, it introduced 
performance management into the public service with section 12 
specifically focusing on senior management and Directors-General. 
Fourth, it changed the role of the Provincial Director-General and heads of 
departments. The Act also introduced affirmative action and a Code of 
Conduct for the Public Service. Since the post of the Director-General in 
South Africa was initially created by the political bureau in the apartheid 
government under President Botha, such is evidence that the organisation 
and restructuring of the public service is driven by the political bureau. 
 
Miller (2005: 87) argues that an important development in South African 
public administration is that the appointment of a Director-General is by 
the authority of the President (Public Service Amendment Act, 1999: 
section 1). This shifts the most senior public service echelon from a career 
to a political appointment system. The reason for the introduction of the 
presidential appointments of Directors-General is to achieve two 
objectives, namely (i) administrative expediency, and (ii) political clout. The 
objectives of administrative expediency are to expedite the transformation 
of the government departments in terms of representation and leadership 
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of the public service transformation process; increase the recruitment of 
diverse skills by appointing persons from outside the public service; 
redeploy Directors-General so that their valuable expertise would not be 
removed from the government once they have served five years or if there 
was a problem between the Director-General and the Minister; 
depersonalize the relationship between the Minister and Director-General; 
and save the State costs in paying out a Director-General who did not 
complete his or her contract should the Minister not wish to retain the 
services of a Director-General who could be deployed to another 
department. 
 
The Explanatory Manual on the Code of Conduct for the Public Service 
(2002:20) states that “as far as the Public Service is concerned, all its 
clients must be served equally in accordance with the policies of the 
government of the day. An employee must therefore clearly understand 
the difference between his or her responsibilities towards the government 
of the day and becoming directly involved in party political issues; for 
example, employees are expected to actively support their respective 
Ministers in preparing documents, among other things, which will be used 
for official purposes, such as debates on draft legislation. Employees may, 
however, not become involved in preparing and drawing up documents to 
be used by a Minister for party political purposes”. In contrast, “managers 
must be given the flexibility to manage, within a framework that satisfies 
the constitutional requirements of transparency and accountability” 
(National Treasury: Guide for Accounting Officers on PFMA, 2000:2). This 
means that senior public service managers must be accountable to the 
political bureau, particularly the Minister. 
 
4.2.4 Public managers as accounting officers to the political office 
 
It is the basic principle for every public office to have accounting officers 
(i.e. the Director-General) to be responsible for public finance 
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management and account to the political authorities concerned. The Public 
Finance Management Act 1 of 1999 (PFMA) states that,  
“the accounting officer is there to ensure that the department 
maintains effective, efficient and transparent systems of financial 
risk management and internal control. The accounting officer is also 
there to ensure the maintenance of a system of internal audit under 
the control and direction of an audit committee, complying and 
operating in accordance with regulations and instructions 
prescribed in terms of sections 76 and 77 (PFMA, Act No. 1 of 
1999: section 36). It is expected of an accounting officer to ensure 
an appropriate procurement and provisioning system that is fair, 
equitable, transparent, competitive and cost-effective. Among many 
things, an accounting officer is responsible for the effective, 
efficient, economical and transparent use of the resources of the 
department; collect all money due to the department, prevent 
unauthorized, irregular and fruitless and wasteful expenditure or 
loss resulting from criminal conduct; manage available working 
capital efficiently and economically”.  
 
All management decisions taken by an accounting officer are made 
available for scrutiny by appropriate committees and offices such as the 
Office of the Auditor-General on behalf of the public. According to the 
PFMA,  
“an accounting officer bears reporting responsibilities such as to 
keep full and proper records of the financial affairs of the 
department in accordance with any prescribed norms and 
standards and to prepare financial statements for each financial 
year in accordance with generally recognized accounting practice. 
The accounting officer must submit the financial statements within 
two months after the end of the financial year to the Auditor-General 
and the Treasury to consolidate financial statements. The Auditor-
General must scrutinise the financial statements and submit an 
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audit report to the accounting officer within two months of receipt of 
the statements”.  
 
An accounting officer is thus guided by legislation stemming from 
constitutional law which is mostly a political document. Accounting officers 
work in a political environment and they are bound to report to the political 
office. 
 
The “financial data are leading indicators of performance, but the 
accounting officer must also include non-financial indicators, which are 
produced quarterly” (National Treasury: PFMA Guide for Officers, 
2000:11). The  
“non-financial indicators should be stipulated in the performance 
agreement between the accounting officer and executive authority, 
and endorsed by the portfolio committee in the legislature 
concerned. Thus the monthly monitoring reports will be 
consolidated and published in the national Government Gazette, in 
line with international best practice. Such reports will facilitate the 
compilation of the year-end financial statements and the annual 
report. The annual report must review performance and 
achievements against the plan and budget approved by the 
legislature at the start of the year. It must include the financial 
statements of the department, together with its achievement against 
the service delivery indicators agreed at the time of the budget. The 
report must also quote the “audit opinion” of the Auditor-General, 
based on the external audit. Once published, the annual report will 
be tabled in the appropriate legislature and will be available for 
scrutiny by the public accounts committee concerned. Portfolio 
committees should also consider such reports to ensure that 
accounting officers address any issues raised in the audit report or 
any recommendations of the public accounts committee”.  
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The guidance for accounting officers clearly reveals that the work of public 
managers is dependent on political direction and guidance.  
 
The PFMA Guide for Accounting Officers states that “no accounting head 
can carry out all the operational responsibilities in the department, thus the 
PFMA allows the accounting head to delegate any authority of 
responsibility in writing to a proficient bureaucrat (National Treasury: 
PFMA Guide for Accounting Officers, 2000:26). Nevertheless, the 
delegation does not strip the accounting officer of the responsibility for 
exercising the delegated power or duty, thus the delegator must ensure 
that systems and processes are adequate to document, monitor and 
review the exercising of those powers or assigned duties. All officials in the 
department are accountable for their specific areas of responsibility”. The 
accounting head whose appointment was approved by the Minister of a 
department remains the official accounting officer in the political forum, 
such as Parliament. 
 
The Division of Revenue Act 2 of 2006 (DoRA, section 24) states that an 
accounting officer has a duty to “monitor expenditure and non-financial 
performance information on programmes funded by an allocation; and 
does not impose any undue administrative burden on receiving provinces 
and municipalities beyond the provision of standard management 
information”. Public managers have responsibility enforced by political 
office through legislation to manage public money correctly, and guard 
against wasteful and fruitless expenditure. 
 
The Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999 clarifies the “division of 
responsibilities between the Head of Department or the accounting officer 
and the political head or the Minister”. In terms of the Guide for Accounting 
Officers on PFMA (National Treasury, 2000:2) the political bureau “is 
responsible for policy choices and outcomes, while the accounting officer 
implements the policy and achieves the outcomes by taking responsibility 
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for delivering the output defined in the departmental budget”. Accounting 
officers are granted powers through the PFMA to manage their budget and 
achieve the defined output. The Guide for Accounting Officers on PFMA 
states that “the accounting officer’s performance contract must be 
consistent with the output defined in the budget”.  
 
The PFMA empowers accounting heads to manage and simultaneously 
make them answerable for the assets they utilise; for example, 
“accounting officers have authority to write off losses, but they must report 
and justify their decisions to the Auditor-General or to the public accounts 
committees” (National Treasury: Guide for Accounting Officers on PFMA, 
2000:2). The same guide prescribes the “strategic planning process to 
ensure commonality of purpose between the accounting officer and the 
political bureau in pursuit of government objectives and outcomes”. Senior 
public service managers account to the Minister and they together account 
to the executive and the legislature. The guide states that “the accounting 
officer must submit regular monthly management reports to the Minister 
and such responsibility must be documented in his or her performance 
agreement” (National Treasury: Guide for Accounting Officers on PFMA, 
2000:11). The PFMA grants some powers to the accounting head, while 
the accounting head’s primary obligation is to account for resources 
entrusted to him or her and justify his or her decisions to the political 
bureau.  
 
4.2.5 Limited power of senior public service managers 
 
In line with Rousseau’s (1762:12) social contract theory, it is the political 
bureau that is accountable to the public. Senior public service managers 
are merely employed by the political bureau and they account to the 
political bureau. The citizens have no contract with the administrators or 
senior public service managers. Citizens hold the political bureau to 
account for authority granted to the political office through elections. 
Hence, when citizens protest for better service delivery, their protest 
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should be directed to the Union Buildings as the seat of government, a 
Minister’s Office, a Premier’s Office and rarely to the Director-General’s 
Office. The senior bureaucrats are not mandated by the electorate to 
deliver services. However, senior public service managers are employed 
by the elected political officials to deliver services on behalf of the political 
bureau. When this understanding of the social contract is lacking on the 
part of the senior public service manager, he or she might equate his or 
her authority with that of an elected official, whereas elected officials have 
full jurisdiction over public policy direction. Senior public service managers 
are employed servants for a limited period, and their continued 
employment depends on performance and reporting to the political bureau 
in accordance with documented protocol (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 
2008:2). Senior public service managers carry the political command not 
the public order to provide services, whereas elected officials carry the 
public mandate from the people who elect a ruling political party during the 
elections. Since senior public service managers have no public mandate, 
they have no power to quarrel with the elected political authorities; public 
officials such as Vusi Pikoli at NPA, Wallace Mgoqi at City of Cape Town 
and Mamodupi Mohlala at the Department of Communications had 
unsuccessfully tried to challenge the elected officials on the basis of the 
constitution and laws guiding the independent institutions and 
departments. Thus senior public service managers can only question their 
terms of employment and present the facts on their performance, but they 
cannot change the political agenda or force the political bureau in a 
particular direction. Senior public service managers carry only the political 
mandate and not the public mandate to provide services, whereas elected 
officials carry the public mandate from the people who elect a ruling 
political party during the elections. Since senior public service managers 
have no public mandate, they have no jurisdiction to engage with the 
elected political authorities. Thus senior public service managers can only 
address their terms of employment and present the facts on their 
performance, but they cannot change the political agenda. For example, 
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the independence of the SARB is guaranteed in the Constitution, but the 
Governor cannot decide to change the country’s economic policy of 
inflation targeting, since the country’s policy agenda stems from the 
political bureau and cascades down to the administration level. When 
senior public service managers comprehend jurisdiction as understood in 
the social contract relationship, there would be no tension in the politics–
administration interface. Nevertheless, politicians will continue to dominate 
the administration which means the sustained challenge of political 
interference in administration may not be resolved. The conclusion 
regarding the authority of senior public service managers is that it is 
ordinarily limited to contractual terms of employment and performance 
agreement. 
 
4.2.6 Public managers as political beings  
 
This study argues that senior public service managers have a right to 
political affiliation but are expected to remain impartial when they execute 
their duties in the public service. The Public Service Commission 
(2002:35) states that “the Public Service and its employees stand in the 
service of the country as a whole and may not, in their functioning, 
advance the interests of any particular political party”. All citizens may 
enjoy the right to their political opinions and freedom of affiliation to any 
political party; however the Public Service should remain apolitical. The 
Republic of South Africa’s Bill of Rights, in chapter two of the Constitution, 
outlines human rights or natural rights which include political and socio-
economic rights. Public servants are also political beings working in the 
public service that is situated in the political environment. The general 
assumption is that when the accounting officer shares the same school of 
thought as the ruling party policy makers, service delivery will flow with 
minimum setbacks. Hence the political office bearers appoint accounting 
officers who are politically aligned and appreciate the political priorities of 
that time. However, the challenge is to determine where the political 
function ends and allow the autonomy and critical thinking of the 
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accounting officer to take precedence. The political arena must afford the 
accounting officer room for creativity and entrepreneurship that can 
maximize the effectiveness and efficiency of service delivery. At the same 
time, political office bearers cannot leave service delivery responsibilities 
only to senior public managers. Cloete and Wissink (2000:157) argue that 
policy decisions “are subject to the limitations of human behaviour that are 
determined by the individual’s value system. Each decision is influenced 
by the public manager’s attitudes, prejudices and personal point of view”. 
Thus the parliamentary oversight role as a watchdog for effective and 
efficient service delivery becomes crucial. 
 
4.2.7 Senior public manager temptation  
 
There is some pressure for senior public managers to exclusively satisfy 
the masters in the political bureau and operate entirely in the political 
realm instead of being innovative and decisive in their role as managers. 
Managers may work only for the gratification of their personal needs, and 
to obtain what they want, they learn to pacify the politicians. Political power 
can thus influence the decision-maker who wants to protect his or her own 
interests (Cloete and Wissink, 2000:158). As a result of political power, a 
public manager could merely satisfy a need instead of taking the best 
decision in the interest of good service delivery. It is not always a good 
public service manager that succeeds in the public service; it may be a 
manager who simply knows how to have politicians on his or her side. For 
a strong administrative bureau, managers must manage with full 
professionalism and modern management techniques. Public managers 
need to be diligent and know how to deal with pressure exerted by the 
politicians, the trade unions, the media and the general public. At the same 
time, a public manager must appreciate the relationship with the political 
office bearers when dealing with policy matters. To avoid public managers 
becoming ineffective in management and being compelled to approve 
policies developed by politicians,  they are also required to answer to the 
Auditor-General and Parliament. Public managers should also aim for 
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cordial relationships between political office bearers when dealing with 
policy matters (Svara, 1985:226). However, their priority should be to 
ensure effective and efficient public administration. A good public manager 
will be an agent of a work ethic that will result in critical thinking and 
innovation and well-developed decisions for effective policy performance. 
Senior public service managers are challenged by the temptation to satisfy 
elected officials even when the politician’s view may not be the best for 
public administration; or they may refuse to comply with the demands of a 
politician and take the best professional decision for improved service 
delivery. 
 
4.2.8 The independent public servant as an exception  
 
Koehler and Pankowski (1997:8) argue that government bureaucracies are 
rigid and formal, and political officials often believe that they can formulate 
the policies and then simply hire administrators to impose them. These 
authors further argue that political officials cannot continue to believe that 
it is their job to reinvent government but rather to entrust and expect the 
leaders in government agencies to develop management systems that 
meet or exceed the expectations of the customers they serve. The 
essence of public administration is encompassed in the Latin word 
administrare, which means “to serve” or “to assist” (Stivers, 2003:214). A 
Minister is a servant, for example, as in the church a Minister is a servant 
of God who serves or assists the people of God. Similarly, the Minister of a 
government department is appointed to serve the people. The connotation 
of the word ‘serve’ is rooted in an ethical dimension driven by the rule of 
the “greatest happiness for the greatest number of people”. The need to 
serve the people is clearly realized in the political context rather than a 
business context. The main concern with the idea of divorcing public 
administration from politics is that public administration will lose the 
element of serving the people and government departments will become 
business-like institutions, viewing citizens as customers or clients.  
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Therefore, a view that divorces public administration from politics is not 
practically suitable for a developing country such as South Africa. It is 
political pressure that forced the paradigm shift in South Africa’s public 
administration and it is the political force that drives improvement of the 
country’s financial status for the benefit of the South African people. 
Political force also drives globalisation and provides the global context for 
international economics (Maharaj, 2008:5). Separating politics from public 
administration would neglect the facts that led to the majority of African 
people being excluded from economic opportunity and continuing to live in 
poor conditions. From the political context stems the supreme law of the 
country, the Constitution, which is the foundation for public administration 
as outlined in Chapter 10 of the Constitution. Public administration is the 
vehicle for service delivery and distribution of scarce resources, albeit that 
the distribution of resources and the promotion of livelihoods has always 
been a political duty. 
 
The involvement of political officials in public administration makes public 
administration a public institution rather than a private sector matter. The 
main variance between the public sector and private sector is the role of 
the political office that ensures accountability, transparency and service 
delivery to the people as required by the Constitution. Klein, Mahoney, 
McGahan and Pitelis (2009:5) suggest that public managers should study 
and strategize the entrepreneurship concepts and advise Ministers on 
policy matters. Ministers are servants who serve the people, whereas 
public managers are employees who direct such service to the people on 
behalf of the political bureau, thus on behalf of the people. Consequently, 
a Minister is sworn into office since the Minister’s role “to serve” is spiritual 
and ethical, whereas public managers are appointed for their strategic 
management of service delivery expertise on a contractual basis. The 
responsibility of serving the people is a constitutional order to government 
not to individualise public professionals or the private sector. Ethical 
standards with respect to public office and public service apply at the very 
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least to those who hold high-ranking positions in the government 
departments and to those in any form of elected political office (Philip, 
2014:24). Farnham, Horton, Barlow and Hondeghem (1996:32) argue that 
public managers operate not in a market context but in a political 
environment, hence the researcher in this study argues that political 
officials and public administration officials’ implementation of policies 
should be characterized by the inclination to serve the public.  
 
The work of public managers should be guided by stewardship and the 
prioritising of the government agenda in line with the public interest and 
public finance guidelines, as well as being formulators and advisers on 
policies; and facilitating the provision of goods and services. Part IX of the 
Public Service Regulations states that public servants should strive for “an 
efficient, non-partisan and representative public service”. Hence public 
servants should be able to execute meticulously official instructions from 
superior political authorities. Eventually it is expected that a political 
bureau will be held politically accountable in an egalitarian society. Public 
managers work under the scrutiny of political officials, the media, trade 
unions, the international community and the public who are the tax-payers. 
At the same time, public managers are expected to be innovative, creative 
and entrepreneurial (Blaug, Horner and Lekhi (2006:17). The extent to 
which a public manager may be free to employ his or her creativity in the 
public administration is a grey area that needs more academic discourse. 
Cloete and Wissink (2002:160) argue that decision-making by public 
managers “requires discernment, discretion, knowledge and creativity. 
However, the importance of creativity in public administration is often 
underestimated, particularly with respect to unprogrammed decision-
making”.  
 
From the discussion presented above it appears that ultimate power to 
manage governance and government departments is entrusted in the 
political bureau, whereas the role of bureaucrats is performance-based for 
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a period as stated in the employment contract. According to Ballart and 
Villamayor (2009:2), the challenge that remains within the government 
machinery is that “civil servants have to be entrepreneurial in pursuing 
effectiveness but they are not politically elected and thus their discretion is 
filtered by political actors and rules”. This challenge seems to be an 
inherent tension of the government machinery. What appears certain is 
that the political bureau has a responsibility entrusted to it by the public 
through the social contract relationship which is established through 
elections in a democratic government. Therefore, the expectation of an 
independent public servant would be a deviation from the inherent nature 
of government machinery in democratic governance.  
 
4.2.9 The political power over legislations  
 
In this section the study argues that the political bureau is the ultimate 
authority over documented legislations; the claim is based on the example 
regarding political decisions below. One of the first actions by Thabo 
Mbeki when he became President of the Republic of South Africa in 1999 
was to announce the urgent establishment of the crime fighting unit within 
the National Prosecuting Authority, the Directorate of Special Operations 
or DSO (known as Scorpions). Berning and Montesh (2012:2) argue that 
as soon as the “Scorpions” was established in 2001 they began to 
investigate the arms procurement process known as the Arms Deal. The 
arms deal was concluded in 1999 and valued at R43.8 billion. It was 
allegedly a corrupt process undertaken with the collusion and knowledge 
of high profile bureaucrats and elected officials in government. When the 
administrative bureau created by the political bureau became bigger than 
the political bureau it became undesirable at the political bureau level. The 
monster had grown strong and began to devour its owner. The manner in 
which the Scorpions operated was referred to as unconstitutional by the 
political bureau, including, for example, the gathering of intelligence and 
counter-intelligence information, leaking of information to the media, and 
public investigations and arrests on camera, as well as the use of 
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prosecutors in investigations and prosecutions (Schönteich, 2014:9). Due 
to such objections, President Thabo Mbeki established the Khampepe 
Commission of Inquiry. Although the manner in which the Scorpions 
undertook their duties was found by the Commission to be of concern, the 
institution itself was found to be constitutional. In paragraph 12.1; 
Khampepe stated that, “the argument that the legal mandate of the DSO to 
investigate and prosecute serious organised crime is unconstitutional 
within the meaning of section 199(1) of the Constitution is without merit” 
(Khampepe, 2006:41). The Khampepe Commission also found that “the 
Directorate lacked political oversight thus the Scorpions were too 
independent. Section 43 of the National Prosecution Act 32 of 1998 made 
provision for the establishment of a Ministerial Coordinating Committee to 
develop regulations and standard operating procedures (SOP) for the 
members of the DSO. However, the same section did not make provision 
for the establishment of a structure or institution to oversee the DSO, 
which the Ministerial Committee was not expected to do”. Berning and 
Montesh (2012:2) argue that “mistakes by the Scorpions themselves, the 
failure of the law and executive to determine appropriate oversight over 
the unit, as well as intense political pressure as a consequence of 
pursuing investigations that involved high level politicians, all contributed 
to the downfall of the Scorpions. During December 2007, the ANC held its 
52nd National Policy Conference, where it was resolved that the 
Directorate of Special Operations should be incorporated into the South 
African Police Service. In 2009 the crime fighting unit to replace the 
Scorpions was formed, namely the Directorate for Priority Crime 
Investigation known as the Hawks. However, a few months later the 
Constitutional Court found that the Hawks did not meet the legal obligation 
of sufficient impartiality since it was open to political interference.  
 
In the case above there is a question of balance between independence of 
the administration bureau and oversight from the political bureau. When 
the Constitution refers to independent institutions, how independent should 
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they be, considering the fact that such institutions are established by the 
political bureau and their senior managers are appointed by the political 
bureau? The independence of the administrative bureau is a pursuit, a 
generally desired state in the politics–administration interface. However, 
the administrative bureau cannot be completely independent, thus the 
review of legislation is undertaken to alleviate ambiguity as a necessary 
starting point. The document analysis in this study reveals that the political 
bureau has ultimate authority over documented legislation.  
 
4.2.10 Locating the interface  
 
Interface is an imagined concept and its location is indistinguishable, 
depending on who determines it, whether the argument is for politicians or 
for managers. Svara (1998:52) argues that interface is “an aberration and 
not the founding concept of public administration”. Politics–administration 
is the dual nature of government; politics is inherently comprised of 
administration as an outcome upon which the success or failure of political 
bureaux can be established. For hundreds of years it has been difficult for 
researchers to locate the interface. Despite documented roles for the 
political bureau and the administration bureau, the roles remain 
overlapping in different degrees across governments and may be indistinct 
for any researcher who tries to locate the interface.  
 
Interface in politics–administration relationship is an aberration; it is 
unusual to expect separation between administration and politics. The 
interface between administration and  politics is an imagined shifting 
boundary, and trying to distinctly locate this interface has challenged 
researchers who have dedicated their lives to studying government 
machinery since the 18th century. From Wilson’s understanding in “The 
Study of Administration” to contemporary scholars, none have 
persuasively established the location and nature of the interface due to the 
dual nature of government machinery, which is both political and 
administrative. Since this interface is a concept, locating it depends on 
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who does the examination. The binary opposites approach to the politics–
administration relationship has failed to separate what is naturally 
inseparable. Hence Uwizeyimana (2013:170) argues that “it is impossible 
to create or imagine totally apolitical government institutions”. Therefore, 
the problem is not necessarily a tendency from political officials or public 
service officials or both parties to have some disregard for documented 
duties and responsibilities, but it is the fact that documented rules and 
responsibilities are not always clear, whereas the political bureau has 
ultimate control and is under pressure to gratify the electorate lest the 
political office loses the confidence of the people. The challenge is that 
there is no concrete demarcation between politics and administration other 
than the conceptualised interface in the academic perception.  The political 
bureau and the administration bureau should strive to work collaboratively 
and prioritise efficient and effective governance instead of contesting for 
power and control of public administration space. 
 
4.2.11 Blurred boundaries between politics and public administration 
 
Document analysis revealed that there are indistinct boundaries between 
the party and the State. The South African Constitution (section 236) 
provides for the funding of political parties from the public purse for their 
legislative responsibilities in the multi-party democracy. Similar to senior 
bureaucrats, politicians are funded by the public purse and they are 
legitimate stakeholders in the public service. There are blurred boundaries 
between politics and public administration. The ANC members who 
worked for their political party in exile such as Ayanda Ntsaluba, Vusi 
Pikoli and Mavuso Msimang also worked in the public administration as 
Directors-General between 1999 and 2009. Furthermore, most of the post-
1994 Directors-General operated in the non-governmental sector before 
they were employed in the public sector, while some were involved in 
political activities on behalf of the ANC while in exile or in prison (Miller, 
2005:97). The ANC political leadership recruited persons into senior 
management positions who were qualified (academic qualifications and 
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background) as well as officials who were more sympathetic to the ANC’s 
agenda. Remarkably, the advance of public administration in the post-
apartheid South Africa is characterised by limited boundaries between 
public administration and politics. The rapport between the political bureau 
and the administration bureau has become more crucial in the post-1994 
period than any previous era in South Africa because both parties exist to 
correct the injustices of the past governments. This study argues that the 
second phase of transforming the South African society through public 
administration requires the review of governance structure and the role of 
elected officials to focus on oversight instead of operations in the public 
service. The public administration in the post-1994 era is rooted in the 
expression of State will which is largely a political mandate, hence elected 
officials are structurally too close to the directors-general. The Director-
General in the present era would be expected to oversee the execution of 
the State will through the public administration and report directly to the 
Minister. Hence for the public service to succeed in the current structure, 
the Director-General should be able to work well with his or her Minister for 
good governance and successful service delivery to the people, since 
failure to manage such relationship in the politics–administration interface 
results in problems associated with strained relationships in the interface. 
However, the congruent relationship between ministers and directors-
general may mean indistinct boundaries between politics and public 
administration. 
 
4.2.12 Conflicting roles in the democratic government  
 
Since the beginning of the new democratic era in 1994 there has been an 
overlap in functions between the Minister and Director-General. For 
example, as prescribed by the Public Service Amendment Act of 1998, the 
Director-General is responsible for labour practices. However, it is the 
Minister who acts on behalf of the State to manage labour negotiations, 
conclude collective agreements and mediate in labour disagreements 
(Public Service Regulations, 1999:32). Furthermore, it is the Minister who 
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is responsible for administrative matters and should the labour dispute 
involve wage negotiations, it is legally the Minister’s mandate to resolve 
the disagreement which has implications for the financial management of 
the department, which is the accounting officer’s function. Consequently, 
the Minister of Public Service and Administration is the key political official 
in public service strike negotiations. Hence documented legislative 
guidelines such as the Public Service Regulations not only support blurred 
boundaries but they also promote overlapping responsibilities between the 
ministers and public administrators.  
 
4.3 LEADERSHIP STYLE: CONFLICT AND IMPACT ON THE 
POLITICS–ADMINISTRATION INTERFACE 
 
This section examines the leadership styles and impact on the interface, 
starting with the case of Advocate Vusi Pikoli’s leadership and political 
interference during the Mbeki tenure. In the introduction to this study, the 
researcher stated that the study would examine cases of political 
dominance and tension between senior public service managers and 
political officials since the ANC government came into power. First the 
main case of former Head of State Thabo Mbeki and the former National 
Director of Public Prosecutions, Advocate Vusumzi Pikoli, who was later 
dismissed by President Kgalema Motlanthe, is examined in this chapter as 
the unit of analysis.  
 
According to Pikoli, his controversial job started with a meeting with 
President Thabo Mbeki in January 2005. On Friday 21 January 2005, 
government spokesperson Joel Netshitenzhe issued a media statement 
stating: “The President wishes to announce that he has appointed 
Advocate Vusumzi P. Pikoli as the National Director of Public Prosecutions 
with effect from 1 February 2005” (Pikoli and Wiener, 2013:125). Pikoli’s 
appointment came after Bulelani Ngcuka had resigned in 2004 after 
investigating the then Deputy President Jacob Zuma for fraud and 
corruption as Zuma had been implicated in the arms deal through his 
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relationship with Durban businessperson Schabir Shaik. Pikoli argues that 
Ngcuka was asked by the political bureau to resign and there was too 
much political pressure and too much tension between him and then 
Commissioner of Police Jackie Selebi (Pikoli and Wiener, 2013:124). Pikoli 
argued: “I accepted the job because the mandate is defined in the 
legislation; all I had to do was to carry out my responsibilities in terms of 
the NPA Act and the Constitution” (Pikoli and Weiner, 2013:25). Pikoli 
underestimated the political power that usually nullifies documented 
guidelines. He went on to do his job according to the National Prosecuting 
Authority Act and the Constitution. Among other decisions, he decided to 
continue with the investigation and prosecution of Jacob Zuma. He, 
however, became more controversial when he investigated and acquired a 
warrant of arrest for then Commissioner of Police Jackie Selebi. In a letter 
dated 18 September 2007 from then Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development Brigitte Mabandla to Pikoli, the Minister castigated Pikoli for 
acquiring a warrant of arrest for the police commissioner who had close 
relations with underground drug syndicates and was a close ally of 
President Thabo Mbeki. “The potential political interference in the National 
Prosecuting Authority by the hands of those in power posed a depressing 
threat and real reminder that the slope is a slippery one” (Pikoli and 
Weiner, 2013:185). “I knew Mbeki and Selebi were friends and had been 
close since Lusaka; but I felt that irrespective of the president’s 
relationship with Selebi we had to do what was right” (Pikoli and Weiner, 
2013:237). The warrant of arrest of Selebi was issued. However, Mbeki 
suspended Pikoli just before the arrest was effected, and five days after 
Pikoli’s suspension the Presidency requested Acting National Director 
Mokotedi Mpshe to apply for cancellation of Selebi’s warrant of arrest 
(Pikoli and Weiner, 2013:277). Pikoli’s understanding of his role as the 
senior public administrator can be inferred from his statement: “Those in 
government and the ANC leadership didn’t expect me to refuse to resign 
… but they confused two important issues: my political allegiance to the 
party and my oath of office; to me the Constitution and the law come first” 
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(Pikoli and Weiner, 2013:279). He further stated: “Some felt I was being 
defiant and disrespectful to the president … those accusations didn’t worry 
me as I felt that those people were not able to draw a distinction between 
the State and the party” (Pikoli and Weiner, 2013: 287).  
 
According to Pikoli, the political bureau interferes with public 
administration, hence politicians generally appoint pliable senior officers in 
public administration to maintain the whim of the political bureau; whatever 
the President or Minister says is applied, and in such a situation, cadre 
deployment become crucial. As can be seen in this case, political 
interference in public administration can be used to protect cadres who are 
in contravention of the law and liable for prosecution. Pikoli further 
suggests that problems in the ANC include issues of corruption, cronyism 
and promotion of self-interest (Pikoli and Weiner, 2013:346), 
“We see people in positions for which they are ill-suited and cadre 
deployment is resulting in people being appointed to support 
principals when they are not qualified to do so… they are put into 
positions because it is known they can approve certain tenders 
that will benefit comrades … politicians use revolutionary-sounding 
phrases and appear militant, yet they act in a way that is counter-
revolutionary”   
 
Pikoli further argues that the driving forces behind the corruption are the 
combination of three bad factors: (i) a corrupt civil servant, (ii) a corrupt 
politician, and (iii) a corrupt business person (Pikoli and Weiner, 
2013:358). This suggests that corruption can be countered when there are 
honest and just civil servants and politicians. The challenge is that the 
concept of an honest and just politician is at present an oxymoron. More 
crucial is the general comprehension of the responsibility of the political 
party and the responsibility of the government whose distinction is 
constantly emphasized by Pikoli. When the political bureau enables fraud 
and corruption for personal gratification, they do so outside the mandate 
given by the constituency through votes that constitute a social contract. 
The Pikoli case is testament to this study’s claim that political bureaux 
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continue to dominate and interfere in public administration at different 
spheres of public administration. 
 
Gevisser (2007: 109) in his memoir about Mbeki argued that “Thabo Mbeki 
advocated for the black capitalist class as the forefront of democratic 
change. He felt that it was important to nurture a black capitalist class and 
bring it into the ruling elite and to hold it there with a set of policies and an 
ideological frame (Africanism) that resonated with its own aspirations”. 
Hence he would need to keep those who perceived his ideology as the 
ANC ideology close, while rejecting those who questioned the corrupt 
means of joining the black capitalist class; for example, Mbeki dismissed 
the National Director of Public Prosecutions, Vusi Pikoli, who tried to 
investigate and prosecute a senior ANC member, Jackie Selebi, whose 
contract as the Commissioner of the South African Police Service (SAPS) 
was renewed by Mbeki despite allegations of fraud and corruption. 
 
4.3.1 Open system of leadership finding 
 
In line with the conflicting leadership styles pre-claims, document analysis 
in this study reveals that an open system approach to leadership may 
result in positive outcomes in the politics–administration interface. 
Scheider and Somers (2006:353) argue that “in the open system positive 
outcomes in an organization can be reached from various circumstances 
and in different ways”. Therefore, the open system of leadership may allow 
for the utilisation of multiple approaches to solving a problem instead of 
trying old conventional methods. The “open systems perspective views the 
complex organisation as a set of interdependent parts that together 
constitute a whole which in turn is interdependent with some larger 
environment” (Zeithaml, Varadarajan and Zeithaml, 1988:38). 
Consequently the open system leadership considers the complex and 
interactive nature of organisations and provides multiple approaches to 
leadership for progressive outcomes. The open-systems leadership 
suggests that organisations are influenced by their internal and external 
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environment. Thus a leader in the open-systems approach considers all 
elements with potential to adversely or positively influence leadership 
outcomes (Bastedo, 2004:1). The closed-systems or machine model, also 
known as the ‘Newton’s clockwork universe’, was replaced with the more 
progressive open system which promotes the sharing of knowledge and 
broad stakeholder participation (Kotze, 1998:8). An open system is a 
leadership model that constantly interacts with its interior and exterior 
atmosphere, including peers, employees, governments, countries, 
intellectuals, political parties, the media and opponents. Furthermore, 
characteristics that are fundamentally significant to the open systems 
leadership model take into account the margins, outside atmosphere and 
multiple methods to accomplish the same result (Grove, Kibel and Haas, 
2005:4). Open systems further acknowledge that the external environment 
is unstable, chaotic and characterized by the process of empowerment, 
relationships and consensus building (Daft, 1995:13). Since the open 
systems approach considers all factors that may affect leadership 
outcomes, promotes the sharing of knowledge and considers multiple 
methods to accomplish the same result, it may result in positive outcomes 
in the politics–administration interface. 
 
4.3.2 Mandela’s collective (participatory) leadership style and 
transition to a closed system 
 
Mandela began developing his collective leadership style during his early 
childhood years while observing his guardian, Jongintaba Dalindyebo, who 
was the regent to the Thembu people. Mandela documented this fact in his 
book “Long Walk to Freedom” (1995, 24–26) where it was stated that 
“Mandela’s later notions of leadership were profoundly influenced by 
observing the regent and his court. He watched and learned from the tribal 
meetings that were regularly held at the Great Place. Everyone who 
wanted to speak did so”. Mandela argued that “such meetings were 
examples of democracy in its purest form”. Gauthier (2006:2) argues that 
“collective leadership was the leader’s efforts of leading together with other 
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leaders and constituency as partners, the capacity of a group of leaders to 
deliver a contribution in service of the common good through assuming 
joint and flexible leadership, according to what is perceived and required. 
Each collective leader feels no need to personally stand out or impose his 
or her views, but cultivates the ability to know or sense what needs doing”. 
Collective leadership was seen in the formulation of the RDP policy 
document, which was drafted in consultation with mass organisations, 
trade unions, private organisations, and academia. In 1994, President 
Mandela prefaced the Reconstruction and Development Programme 
(RDP) policy document in a manner that bore testament to collective 
leadership: “The process now under way is that of developing the detailed 
policy and legislative programme necessary to implement the RDP. In 
preparing the document and in taking it forward, we are building on the 
tradition of the Freedom Charter. In 1955 we actively involved people and 
their organisations in articulating their needs and aspirations. Once again 
we have consulted widely” (Mandela, 1994). However, the aspirations that 
were integral to the transformative vision enshrined in the RDP had 
become increasingly rare; not only had the language of managerialism and 
cost recovery displaced the language of participation and social justice but 
the ANC had rapidly disengaged itself from civil society (Heller, 2001:150). 
The collective leadership concept had been replaced with the centralised 
and closed leadership that focused on the free market economy as the 
ANC agenda in the context of GEAR.  
 
4.3.3 Collective leadership as the post-conventional leadership 
 
Cook-Greuter (1999:232) in discussing the Leadership Development 
Profile states that “conventional leaders (approximately 90%) tend to 
conform to society’s rules of conduct and expectations”. Furthermore 
“conventional leaders pursue coherent understanding, focused on things 
that could be measured accurately and have a time horizon from one to 
three years. Conventional leaders search for the most effective, efficient or 
right way and achieve organizational goals through complex co-ordination 
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of efficiently performed tasks”. Conventional leaders are inclined to be 
“ethno-centric”, that is, “concerned with the well-being of a specific group 
of people – and react critically to action logics that are different from their 
own, believing that their own worldview is the valid one” (Davies, 
1980:255). Conventional leadership is paralleled with a closed-system 
paradigm, which focuses on impersonal processes and systems for 
effectively functioning machinery.  
 
However, according to Hannary (2008:8), “a post-conventional leader does 
things ethically to keep the system complete. They pursue wisdom and are 
aware of the limitations of the rational mind. They have a time horizon that 
can extend to decades or multiple generations and prioritize options by 
viability and long-term consequences. They manifest empathy, maturely 
handle conflictual situations and see more of the whole dynamic system. 
They collaborate with diverse stakeholders to optimize among competing 
goals across generations. They tend to be world-centric, that is, concerned 
with the well-being of all living inhabitants of the Earth, and see all stages 
of development as equally legitimate and useful to an organization or 
community”. Komives and Dugan (2010:112) posit that post-conventional 
leaders “are able to communicate with every other action logic in a way 
that can be understood and accepted and open the door for further 
development. The key shift between conventional and post-conventional 
leadership is at the level of awareness and the capacity to be fully present 
to what is, rather than filtering it through mental models or past 
experience”. Cook-Greuter (1999:232) argue that “as learners, post-
conventional leaders are aware of who they are at their best, inquire 
continually into their worldview and engage others in learning together. 
They keep cleaning, refining and tuning their own “inner instrument” and 
often ask themselves: what is trying to happen through me? They are 
willing to change the way they use their will, by both exercising it and 
surrendering it to a larger will” (Cook-Greuter, 1999:232).  
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Collective leadership in the pre-democratic ANC under the leadership of 
Mandela and the leadership of his predecessors epitomized post-
conventional leadership through collective leadership which was centred in 
the well-being of the collective and did not elevate individuals. Nominating 
Mandela to be the leader of the masses was also a decision of the 
collective ANC leadership as De Waal (2013) explains:  
“Mandela and his comrades were reluctant to give a single 
personal face to their mass movement. The ANC was run by a 
collective leadership in which individuals were required to submit 
to party discipline. It was profoundly averse to any personality cult. 
Nonetheless, at the insistence of the British Anti-Apartheid 
Movement which convinced the ANC that the global campaign 
against Apartheid required a uniting figure, they contributed in 
creating Mandela’s stature to serve as a portrait for their cause”. 
 
In line with the aspirations of democratic governments, collective 
leadership that requires broad consultation is the main feature of post-
conventional leadership. 
 
4.3.4 Dominating leadership character from the political bureau 
 
A domineering elected official can take over the public administration and 
responsibilities of a senior public official if it is in the character of that 
elected official to control everything. According to Miller (2005:111), a 
strong political leader can control public administration and take on the 
work of a public administrator. Miller (2005:111) further argues that the 
dynamic of a strong Minister and weak Director-General is when the 
Minister not only provides policy direction and leadership, but is actively 
involved in the formulation of the policy and takes upon himself or herself 
some of the Director-General’s policy and sometimes implementation 
responsibilities. The Director-General is usually weak and generally 
provides advice that supports the Minister’s views and does not seriously 
challenge the Minister in an advisory capacity; in other words, the Director-
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General merely agrees to policy decisions or is complacent in the 
formulation of policy and/or implementation. The dynamic of both a strong 
Minister and Director-General may not necessarily be a problem, but does 
become a problem when both are uncompromising in their fixed positions 
so that acrimony, frustration and, at worst, conflict develops, such as in the 
case of then Communications Minister Siphiwe Nyanda and Director-
General Mamodupi Mohlala.  
 
The dynamic of a weak Minister and weak Director-General is also 
manifest in South Africa’s politics–administrative interface. The result of a 
weak Minister and weak Director-General is that the formulation of policy 
is of poor quality and administrative capacity is lacking. This relationship 
may exist if the political leadership is preoccupied with politics or lacks the 
capacity to undertake the portfolio, while the Director-General lacks the 
capacity to manage the department and engage in policy formulation. The 
case of the weak Minister and weak Director-General was observed during 
the Minister of Health Dr Manto Tshabalala-Msimang’s tenure, when she 
controlled the Department of Health through then Director-General Thami 
Mseleku. Justice Edwin Cameron (2007:105) outlined “the extent of the 
shortcomings, ranging from strategic planning and leadership, through to 
financial management and monitoring and evaluation during the tenure of 
the Health Minister, Tshabalala-Msimang, and her Director-General”. 
Schulz-Herzenberg (2007:18) argues that “the mismanagement of South 
Africa's HIV/AIDS battle stemmed from Mbeki’s questioning of the link 
between HIV and AIDS, and the politicisation of the pandemic”. 
Tshabalala-Msimang and Director-General Mseleku were implementers of 
political bureau concepts which lacked accurate advice on medical facts 
regarding HIV/AIDS. What followed from the weak health policy 
formulation were health crises and the death of 900 people per day in 
South Africa (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2007:15). A dominating leadership 
character from the political bureau may take control of the administration 
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of the public service, and decide on formulation and implementation of 
public policies.  
 
4.3.5 Authoritarian / autocratic leadership  
 
In an attempt to scrutinise the pre-claim suggesting that there could be 
conflicting leadership styles between the political bureau and the 
administration bureau leading to strained politics–administration interface, 
this section examines the autocratic or authoritarian model of leadership. 
Hoyle (2006:295) suggests that “authoritarian leaders make decisions 
autonomously with little or no contribution from the rest of the group”. 
Decision-making is usually less creative under authoritarian leadership. 
Kurt Lewin (1973:85) conducted a leadership study and established that “it 
is difficult to move from an authoritarian style to a democratic style. Abuse 
of this style is usually viewed as controlling, bossy and tyrannical”. Gastil 
(1994:955) argues that “autocratic leaders make decisions without 
consulting the group, and people in the group may dislike that they are 
unable to contribute ideas”. Authoritarian leadership is most functional in 
small groups in circumstances when there is limited opportunity and time 
for collective deliberations or in cases where the leader is the most 
knowledgeable participant of the collective. Authoritarian leadership is 
aligned with a closed system of leadership and conventional leadership 
due to its lack of stakeholder participation and domineering nature. Writing 
on the Thabo Mbeki era under review in this study, Klippenstein (2009:80) 
argues that “whether Mbeki saw himself as a big man is difficult to say; a 
democratizing figure under Mandela, he quickly centralized control, 
muzzled criticism and displayed decidedly autocratic behaviour once 
gaining the presidency”. Such claim is testament to the closed system and 
its features during the post-Mandela era. Ongoing cases of politics–
administration interface tension even outside the parameters of this study 
point to the continual occurrence of averting stakeholder participation and 
autocratic tendencies. This study argues above that after the RDP, in 
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GEAR formulation and onwards, there appeared tendencies of an 
authoritarian and closed-system leadership paradigm.  
 
4.3.6 Participatory / democratic leadership  
 
Yukl (1999:35) argues that “participatory leadership, also known as 
‘democratic leadership’, is generally the most effective leadership style”. 
Egalitarian leaders with participatory leadership ideals provide direction to 
the collective while they also contribute in the collective engagement and 
facilitate contribution from the members of the collective. Participants 
under a democratic leadership are usually “less productive than the 
members of the authoritarian group, but their contributions are of a much 
higher quality” (Weibler, 2004:332). Caroline, Ramona and Daniel 
(2003:24) argue that “participatory leaders encourage group members to 
participate, but retain the final say over the decision-making process. 
Group members feel engaged in the process and are more motivated and 
creative”. In the South African setting, the process of developing the RDP 
was participatory under the leadership of Nelson Mandela, it took a long 
time to get consensus and it went through six drafts to produce the 
seventh as the final document. However, it was generally accepted as 
South Africa’s socio-economic policy framework and the public felt that 
they owned the programme due to the nature of its formulation. Autocratic 
leaders easily become frustrated by the continuous consultation and 
discussion on what in an autocratic environment would be a matter of 
taking decisions, giving instructions and obtaining quick results. 
Leadership on a grand scale such as in the government of a country 
requires participatory leadership in order to avert conflict, political 
intolerance and civil wars. Nations of the world generally are in pursuit of 
democratic ideals in governance, and in government systems and 
structures. Participatory leadership is aligned with the open-systems 
leadership style, which is also linked to post-conventional leadership.  
 
XR Shazi 584200 PHD WSG 
142 
During the period 1999 to 2009 which is under examination in this study, 
South Africa’s leadership veered further from meaningful collective 
leadership or participatory leadership. Descriptions of President Mbeki 
during this period have ranged from “debonair”, “eloquent”, “sophisticated”, 
“enigmatic”, “suave”, “articulate, “intellectual” and “poetic” to “elusive”, 
“cold”, “ruthless” and “expedient” (Daniels, 2007:31). Klippenstein 
(2009:64) explains that, “Mbeki controlled and centralized power, which 
led to diminished accountability and corruption, and the leadership 
succession brought to light how extensively Mbeki had alienated the ANC 
grassroots supporters”. The present researcher further argues that 
ongoing cases of politics–administration interface tension even outside the 
parameters of this study point to the continual occurrence of averting 
stakeholder participation and autocratic tendencies. Therefore, overlooking 
and undermining the constituency and diminishing participatory leadership 
cannot be solely attributed to the period under review or to the person of 
Thabo Mbeki; these challenges are dormant in the ANC cadre waiting for 
deployment.  
 
4.3.7 Conflicting leadership styles case  
 
The researcher presented key leadership styles and argued that in South 
Africa there have been all affinities of leadership in government: the closed 
system, the open system, conventional leadership, post-conventional 
leadership, democratic leadership trends and autocratic leadership 
inclinations. Among the cases that depict conflicting leadership styles is 
the main case of this study, namely that of Vusi Pikoli in his post as the 
National Director of Public Prosecutions and the Head of State at that time 
Thabo Mbeki, as well as the then Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development Brigitte Mabandla. The focus of this study is not on the 
Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development, since the National 
Director of Public Prosecutions is hired or fired by the President (Van der 
Westhuizen, 2012:134). 
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When Wiener introduced Pikoli’s memoir in 2013, she stated “Vusi Pikoli is 
fiercely independent, stubbornly single-minded and has what some critics 
may term ‘an overdeveloped sense of justice”; by his own admission he is 
also “far too trusting and naïve” (Pikoli and Wiener, 2013).  
 
Pikoli is a public administrator who upholds integrity, does his job in 
accordance with documented rules and responsibilities, and proved to be 
sternly resistant to political manipulation while on his public service duty. In 
the 1990s when he was still in exile in Zimbabwe he was asked to be part 
of the committee that audited the ANC’s assets such as cars, farms and 
houses in exile. He states Pikoli and Weiner, 2013:92): 
“Controversially, I resigned and left the committee midway through its 
work simply because I felt that one or two people I was working with 
on the committee were not honest. There were properties I knew 
about that were not being declared and I started asking about the 
ANC assets that weren’t being recorded. I knew that there were 
farms, houses, cars and other assets that hadn’t been disclosed and 
I’m sure some individual members of the ANC benefited at that time - 
not only in Zimbabwe but in Tanzania, Angola and other places”.  
 
As revealed in Pikoli’s statement, he was an administrator who forestalled 
undocumented political “solutions” or interference in the public 
administration, whereas public administration naturally exists in a political 
environment. Senior public servants such as Directors-General report to 
the political bureau. However, it becomes complicated if the working 
relationship is political as opposed to professional in accordance with 
documented responsibilities. The pervasive phenomenon in governance is 
the politics–administration interface, particularly when the relationship 
between the political bureau and the administration bureau is strained due 
to various elements, including the pre-claims of this study. In the case of 
Pikoli and the then political bureau, there were, firstly, character matters 
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and secondly, leadership styles that led to an unpleasant politics–
administration interface.  
 
The character of Mbeki is presented on the ANC website as a leader who 
is an independent thinker: “People like to identify Thabo Mbeki as an 
independent and original thinker, but one who remains close to the more 
visible leadership” (ANC), whereas Vusi Pikoli is described as “fiercely 
independent, stubbornly single-minded and has what some critics may 
term ‘an overdeveloped sense of justice”. Pikoli’s (Pikoli and Wiener, 
2013:109) independent thought is revealed in his statement ratifying his 
advocacy for the independent National Prosecuting Authority: “If we do not 
have independent prosecutors who refuse to take instructions from 
political principals, then you will have a partial and unfair application of the 
law”. Thus these two characters, Pikoli and Mbeki, were the same in a 
sense that they were both independent thinkers. Hence, Pikoli would not 
be pliable to the political bureau and take instructions from the President 
and Minister on how to take certain decisions in relation to public 
prosecutions. At the same time, Mbeki as an independent thinker in the 
political authority would not always take advice from a bureaucrat who 
challenged political power.  
 
In leadership style, Pikoli demonstrated collective leadership with 
authoritarian features. When he entered the office as the National Director 
of Public Prosecutions he started by forming a clique of leadership with his 
deputies. In his memoir he states that he had a series of meetings with his 
four deputies to discuss day-to-day work or cases under investigation and 
in court (Pikoli and Weiner, 2013:128). Pikoli further states that he had 
meetings with the Minister and with the President to discuss the main 
cases on at least ten occasions (Pikoli and Weiner, 2013:264). Pikoli was 
consultative but when it came to taking decisions in line with the law, he 
proved to be autocratic and fiercely determined. Mbeki demonstrated a 
strong and visible leadership that is largely independent, conventional, 
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impersonal and authoritative. The researcher argues that comparing these 
two leaders is challenged by the fact that Pikoli led an institution (the 
National Prosecuting Authority), whereas Mbeki led the whole country. 
Comparing their leadership styles in these dissimilar environments in 
terms of magnitude could thus be flawed. However, it is evident that with 
regard to personality, they clashed due to their fiercely independent 
thinking. Since they both have features of being authoritative in their 
leadership, this could have led to the clash of these two robust leaders 
with similar characters.  
 
4.3.8 Political leadership and administration challenges 
 
What political leadership and administration challenges have taken place 
in politics–administration interface in South Africa between senior public 
service managers and political officials since the ANC government came 
into power, and which challenges resulted in conflict? This question has 
attempted to establish if the pre-claims of political dominance, conflicting 
leadership styles, political ideology differences and disregard for 
documented responsibilities as contributing factors to conflicts between 
the political bureau and administration bureau are valid.  
 
On the pre-claim of ‘disregard for documented duties and responsibilities’, 
this study suggests that the problem is not necessarily a tendency of 
political officials or public service officials or both parties to have disregard 
for documented duties and responsibilities, but it is the fact that 
documented rules and responsibilities are not always clear, whereas the 
political bureau has ultimate control and is under pressure to placate the 
public lest the political office loses the confidence of the people. This study 
has argued that there is a constant political element to public 
management; politics is a characteristic fragment of public authority. 
Political dominance in public administration has been presented and 
examined in this study as a typical phenomenon in governance. In the 
South African context, Chipkin and Meny-Gibert (2012:105) argue that 
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public administration in South Africa was highly politicised during the 
apartheid governance era, and furthermore, the NP installed its trustworthy 
supporters to various high-ranking roles in the government departments, 
hence political dominance is an old phenomenon in South Africa. In the 
present epoch, political dominance has been revealed in different spheres, 
more conspicuously in the case of Vusi Pikoli and President Mbeki as 
discussed in detail in this chapter. The researcher has also examined the 
pre-claim of conflicting leadership styles. The study argues that between 
1999 and 2009 there was a transition from the collective leadership of the 
ruling political bureau to a closed conventional leadership system where 
political power was centralized in the presidency. The conflicting 
leadership pre-claim is theoretically proven in this chapter, while the study 
has established that the characters of Vusi Pikoli and Thabo Mbeki 
clashed due to their fiercely independent thinking. 
 
4.4 DIFFERENT POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES PRE-CLAIM  
 
One of the pre-claims of this study is that political officials may have a 
different political ideology compared to the political ideology upheld by a 
senior public service official. If there is this clash of political ideologies, 
there could be conflict between the political bureau and the public service 
bureau. For the purpose of this study, “political ideology means a set of 
beliefs about the proper order of society and how it can be achieved” 
(Erikson and Tedin, 2003:64). 
 
The ANC government is in pursuit of the national development premised 
on redressing injustices of the past, achieving faster economic growth, 
raising standards of education, and ensuring stakeholder participation 
(National Development Plan, 2011:2). The ANC ideology of national 
development is challenged by the general expectation to gratify the social 
and class expectations of a broadly diverse South African society. A 
specific political ideology attracts people according to social needs and 
social class. People who have a “low socio-economic status are more 
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likely to be drawn to right-wing ideology because of largely social or 
cultural issues, whereas people who have a high socio-economic status 
are more likely to be drawn to right-wing ideology because of economic or 
capitalist reasons” (Jost, Federico and Napier, 2009:131). Therefore, 
despite relative progress in economic and infrastructural development, the 
political contestation among South African political parties is around 
gratifying both the lower and upper divisions of social classes. Owing to 
the diverse nature of the ANC membership and public service personnel, 
different personal ideologies may appear in the public service, 
camouflaged as ruling-party ideologies. Furthermore, members of 
opposition parties may further party ideologies in public service to 
sabotage the agenda of the ruling party and elevate opposition parties as 
an alternative to “fix the mess” created by the ruling party.  
 
Being the oldest liberation movement in Africa, the ANC enjoyed majority 
support in South Africa, which had led to the political bureau being largely 
content, allowing poor service delivery in some instances and political 
superciliousness to persist in the ruling party. Consequently, the ruling 
party had moved from a culture of broader consultation of stakeholders to 
a closed system of leadership where decisions were taken by the 
President and the clique in the upper echelon, with minimum consultation 
being undertaken. The ruling party dominance in the politics–
administration interface and the majority power in determining policy 
direction had resulted in internal friction and growing opposition. While 
acknowledging the disarray created by the Democratic Alliance in 
Parliament and the cases where the ruling party had been challenged in 
the judicial system, the ANC had attempted to define itself through policy 
documents and the National Development Plan (NDP), while opposition 
parties defined themselves in terms of what the ANC had failed to achieve. 
The opposition party ideology is therefore less strongly defined in South 
Africa and poor purposefulness and lack of bold policy alternatives from 
the opposition parties provides space for the dominant party to avoid 
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blame regarding sub-standard service delivery and egoism. Thus weak 
opposition results in reduced strength of democracy. Administrators and 
Ministers who were not aligned with the political ideology of a ruling party 
were frustrated and continually pressured until they were forced out of 
office. The discussion below demonstrates cases of conflict that emerged 
from different political ideologies between the political bureau and the 
administration bureau.  
 
4.4.1 The case of Zille and Mgoqi and different political ideologies  
 
While a researcher considers “what the research question will be, he or 
she must also consider what case or cases are studied as units of analysis 
together with the research question” (Baxter and Jack 2005:545). Yin 
(2003:83) argues that “potential data sources may include, but are not 
limited to, documentation, archival records, interviews, physical artefacts, 
direct observations and participant observation”. The examiner should 
ensure that the collected information is combined in an effort to 
comprehend the whole case, instead of numerous fragments of the case, 
or the influencing elements that contribute in the case. Conflict usually 
occurs when there is a clash between two or more major elements of the 
political culture or political ideology (Feldman and Zaller, 1992:269). 
Different political parties uphold political ideologies and a particular culture, 
and this differentiates political parties from one another. The community of 
a political realm is usually defined by the unique identifiers of political 
parties and not by their similarities (McClosky, 1964:362). Political parties 
tend to promote exceptionality that separates them from the rest of the 
political community. The elevation of the political bureau’s uniqueness may 
encroach into public administration and result in conflict.  
 
In addition to Erikson and Tedin’s (2003:64) definition of political ideology 
as a set of beliefs about the proper order of society and how it can be 
achieved; Parsons (1951:24) argues that “ideologies are the shared 
framework of mental models that groups of individuals possess to provide 
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both an interpretation of the environment and a prescription as to how that 
environment should be structured”. Therefore political ideology interprets 
the environment as it is and suggests an improved environment. In the 
political ideology definition, the set of beliefs that are defined as political 
ideology might be flawed and represent distortion and propaganda. For 
example, the National Party ideology that underpinned the apartheid 
system involved a hierarchy of race, an explicit elite group, and the 
dehumanization of other groups. Stanley (2015:3) argues that “when 
societies are unjust, for example, in the distribution of wealth, we can 
expect the emergence of flawed ideologies. The flawed ideologies allow 
for effective propaganda. In a society that is unjust, due to unjust 
distinctions between persons, ways of rationalising undeserved privilege 
become fossilised into rigid and unchangeable belief. Such beliefs are the 
barriers to rational thought and understanding that political bureau exploits 
through propaganda” (Stanley, 2015:3). Such beliefs further determine the 
extent of strained relationship between politicians and administrators in the 
politics–administration interface. This segment of the study reviews the 
ANC and the DA set of beliefs and their impact on the politics–
administration interface in South Africa. 
 
In 1996 when the ANC took control of the City of Cape Town for the first 
time the City Manager Keith Nicol of the formerly white government was 
replaced with the ANC’s Andrew Boraine (Edmunds, 2006). When the DA 
won the municipal elections, Boraine was replaced by Robert Maydon who 
was appointed by the DA. When the National Party formed a partnership 
with the ANC, Robert Maydon was replaced by Dr Wallace Mgoqi as City 
Manager. When the DA won the local government elections in 2006 it 
replaced Mgoqi with Mr Achmat Ebrahim. The struggle of the politicized 
public administration due to political party differences had been witnessed 
in different spheres of government and more particularly in the Western 
Cape in South Africa. The disorder started “when surrounding 
municipalities in the Western Cape were combined to form the ‘unicity and 
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party politics was introduced into local government in 2000”. John Williams 
(2007:19) recalls the case of Mgoqi and Zille: 
“In 2006 in Cape Town, the DA won 90 seats in the 210-member 
council, the ANC 81 and the ID 2. Following the elections of March 
2006 there was a precarious coalition government, under the 
executive leadership of Mayor Helen Zille. The position of the then 
CEO of Cape Town, Wallace Mgoqi, was declared unconstitutional 
by the Cape High Court on 9 May 2006”. 
 
Even before the local elections, “City Manager Wallace Mgoqi knew his 
future would be insecure if Zille were elected mayor because the validity of 
his extended contract was already in question” (Hunma, 2007:23). In the 
run-up to the local elections, Zille had accused Mgoqi of campaigning for 
the ANC, thus signalling that his future in the administration was in doubt 
and this led to the break-down in trust between them. Furthermore, the 
ANC’s values and priorities differed from those of the DA (Okecha, 
2009:96). However, in the disputes between the DA and the ANC in the 
Western Cape there is no evidence of clear political ideology differences 
except for their exploitation of the prevailing politics of identity in South 
Africa. The ANC values are entrenched in the liberation rhetoric and the 
development of previously disadvantaged people. Johnson (2003:200) 
argues that decolonisation and democratisation in South Africa during the 
1994 transition brought to power anti-colonial liberation movements that 
took control of the state machinery and reorganised themselves as political 
parties; however, the inherited terrain on which the liberation movements 
found themselves was one they were not prepared for. When the ANC 
was fighting for the liberation of all South Africans, particularly the Africans 
and the working class, the socialist movement represented by Eastern 
Europe, China and Cuba had deteriorated, resulting in the reshaping of the 
ANC ideology towards Thatcherism and capitalism. By the 1990s, the ANC 
ideology that was initially based on the ideals of socialism reflected a 
variety of ideologies including capitalism and liberalism as well as 
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socialism and communism. Booysen (2012) argues that the ANC’s set of 
values seemed to be characterised by ideological hybrid. According to 
Terreblanche (1999:3), the South African Foundation (SAF) comprising the 
fifty largest corporations rejected the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP) which was based on socialist ideals, and proposed a 
macro-economic policy based on industrialist ideals. Thus the Growth 
Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) programme was promulgated in 
June 1996 to replace the RDP. During the period of this study (between 
1999 and 2009) the ANC ideology reflected multiple modes of governance 
with features of industrialist ideologies reflected in the macro-economic 
programme and socialist ideals in the land reform and social development 
agenda. Therefore, the ANC ideology is socialist in rhetoric but capitalist in 
praxis, as evidenced by dwindling support from the working class and the 
destabilisation of the tripartite alliance.    
 
The DA has its roots in the liberal ideology of the apartheid era in the 
Progressive Party (PP) which later became the Progressive Federal Party 
(PFP). The PFP merged with other small liberal parties to form the 
Democratic Party (DP) in 1989. The DP further merged with the New 
National Party (NNP) in 2000 to form the DA (Mottiar, 2014:108). During 
the 1994 campaigns the DP attacked the ANC as it posed as the true 
adherent of liberal-democratic values; stating that “neither the ANC nor the 
NP had a deep-seated commitment to either liberal democracy or market-
oriented economics” (Pombo, 2009:127). By 2004 the DA’s constituency 
had grown and it became the official opposition party on a liberal-
democratic ideology platform. However, the DA’s policy solutions were 
also a hybrid of ideologies overwhelmingly free market, and constituted a 
policy environment that was essentially incompatible with the party’s 
proposal for a Basic Income Grant. It had to portray itself as a liberal-
democratic party, yet it also pursued voters who were in favour of the 
death penalty (Booysen, 2005:132). The South African politics in both the 
ANC and the DA is not based purely on governance ideology but on the 
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politics of identity. Friedman (2015) argues that South Africans across the 
board tend to vote for parties they feel speak for them, not those that pass 
an ideological test, thus politics in South Africa is about identities. The DA 
and the ANC represent different groups in the suburbs, the rural African 
communities, the white conservatives, the wealthy and the middle class, 
the poor, and the township communities. What is important for both the 
ANC and the DA is obtaining or maintaining political power, and that is 
done by attempting to obtain as many votes as possible. Therefore, 
ideology is used by political parties as a tool to appease the electorates, 
while empirically political parties exploit the racial suspicions and identities 
of constituencies to gain political power. 
 
Political parties in South Africa tend to thrive on flawed ideologies to entice 
voters; they use a hybrid of ideologies to sell propaganda disguised as 
ideology.  According to Walton (1997:383), the term propaganda originally 
referred to a committee of church officials called in Latin the Congregatio 
de Propaganda Fide (Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith) 
during the meetings of Pope Gregory XIII with three cardinals in 1572-
1585 that had the aim of combating the reformation that was being 
demanded within Catholicism by the Protestants. The term propaganda in 
its modern connotation is a term of reproach to concealed associations for 
the spreading of opinions and principles which, if clearly defined and 
revealed, may be repulsive and aversive (Fellows, 1959:182). Thus in the 
absence of genuine political ideology within the political parties, politicians 
utilise prevailing general stereotypes and opinions, and incorporate them 
into propaganda disguised as ideology. Bernays (1928:9) argues that the 
conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organised habits and 
opinions of the masses is an important element in democratic society. 
Therefore, the political bureau gains constituency support and power 
through manipulating the communities using prevailing public opinions. In 
the case of Zille and Mgoqi, there is no evidence of the study’s pre-claim 
suggesting that conflict over political ideologies is one of the factors 
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resulting in strained relations in the politics–administration interface. 
However, it is possible that there might be a contest for the prevailing and 
better constructed propaganda concealed as political ideology in the 
politics–administration interface. 
 
The conflict between a governing party and an opposition party is 
expected and is the conventional nature of such political relationships. 
According to Hofmeister and Grabow (2011:13), the role of an opposition 
is less attractive but parties in opposition exercise an important function in 
a democratic system as a “watchdog” of government and they provide 
policy alternatives for the future. It is the duty of opposition parties to 
critique a ruling party and position themselves as an alternative 
government that will perform better. The DA in 2008 argued that the 
Western Cape had received a clean audit report except for the 
departments that were inherited from the ANC’s poor administration under 
Mayor Mfeketo and the ANC’s lackey, the municipal manager Dr Wallace 
Mqoqi (Parliamentary Monitoring Group: Hansard Minutes 16 May 2008). 
Therefore what can be interpreted as conflict between the political parties 
due to ideology differences is usually a normal political relationship in a 
democratic governance system. Opposition parties are there to highlight 
the failures of government and suggest how governance can be improved; 
hence it is not the duty of opposition parties to praise government but to 
identify all governance deficiencies.   
 
4.4.2 The case of Buthelezi and Masetlha  
 
One of the pre-claims of this study suggests that when there are different 
political ideologies between the political bureau and the administration 
bureau, working relations may lead to a strained politics–administration 
interface. The case below examines the relationship between the founder 
of the IFP, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, in government as the Minister in 
the Department of Home Affairs and his Director-General, Billy Masetlha, 
who was deployed by the ANC. 
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Since the Government of National Unity (GNU), Mandela and the ANC had 
strategically accommodated the founder of the IFP, Chief Mangosuthu 
Buthelezi, in government as the Minister in the Department of Home 
Affairs, whereas his Director-General was the former ANC intelligence 
officer Billy Masetlha. Buthelezi and his Director-General appear to have 
had a conflicted relationship. Buthelezi argued that the ANC had imposed 
Masetlha on him (Koopman, 2001). Buthelezi further suspected his 
Director-General of sabotaging plans by the ANC: “… he would regularly 
denounce in Parliament his department’s lack of financial means and 
present it as some form of political tactics from the ANC against him. 
Kabwe-Segatti and Landau (2008:100) argue that “Despite the 
underfunding of Home Affairs, numerous reports since 1994 had 
highlighted instances of serious mismanagement”. When Buthelezi and 
Masetlha disagreed over the political agenda, service delivery at Home 
Affairs was in a poor financial situation.  
 
Masetlha’s contract was controversially extended in 2001 by a year 
despite objections from Mangosuthu Buthelezi, then Minister of Home 
Affairs, citing an irretrievable breakdown of relations with his Director-
General. Relations between the two men weakened even further, 
particularly about the Immigration Bill and a number of further other 
objections, including Masetlha’s alleged insubordination. After the 2004 
elections, Thabo Mbeki strategically offered Buthelezi the Deputy 
Presidency so that the ANC could gain control of KwaZulu-Natal Province 
which, at that time, was being led by the IFP (Gumede, 2005:313). 
Buthelezi declined the offer after discussing it with his party. He was thus 
no longer in the Cabinet but remained a Member of Parliament (MP) 
representing his party. During the Buthelezi and Masetlha tenure, the 
conflict between them depicted two centres of political power. Throughout 
the Mbeki administration, the positions adopted by the government were 
allegedly not those of the ANC and foreign policy was the area in which 
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the claim had been repeatedly made (Friedman, 2009:5). The ANC policy 
adopted since 1996 was that government officials would be supported by 
the ANC leadership in government. The ANC government felt that the 
government’s approach to African foreigners was not that of the ANC. This 
was ascribed to alleged evidence suggesting that the Department of Home 
Affairs was controlled by the leader of the IFP, which meant that the 
government approach may have not been shaped by the ANC but by one 
of its opponents (Friedman, 2009:5). The challenges of conflict between 
Masetlha and Buthelezi were generally interpreted as a struggle between 
two political parties. The ANC officials questioned the migration policy, 
when then Minister Buthelezi’s team of advisers, “in particular Mario 
Ambrosini, tried to speed up the policy transformation process by 
conducting a process of legislation-drafting in parallel with the consultative 
circuit” (Wa Kabwe-Segatti and Landau, 2008:80). Buthelezi surrounded 
himself with IFP colleagues to propagate policies that were usually 
challenged by the ANC. In 2002 he accused the Cabinet of ignoring him 
before publishing regulations on migration (Neocosmos, 2006:97). The 
rapport between the political bureau and the administration bureau, in this 
case the Office of the Minister of Home Affairs and the Office of the 
Director-General, was strained and resulted in a fiercely contested 
politics–administration interface.  
 
Buthelezi (2009:6) argued that the IFP had no political ideology but would 
utilise whatever worked for its constituency: “we are not about ideology, 
labels such as “left”, “centre” or “right” do not help in identifying what is 
needed, we are pragmatists focused on what works best”. The 
predecessor of the Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe which later became the 
Inkatha Freedom Party was Inkatha kaZulu which was established in 1922 
as a cultural organisation founded by Solomon, the son of King Dinizulu 
(Cope, 1993:218). Therefore, the foundation of the IFP is seen as being 
the promotion of the Zulu monarchy and cultural values rather than 
political ideology. The Buthelezi and Masetlha conflict in the politics–
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administration interface could not have been as a result of political 
ideology differences since there is no evidence of extensive political 
ideology differences between the ANC and the IFP. In the early 1970s 
Buthelezi claimed to represent the ANC and he had met with the ANC 
president Oliver Tambo in London to discuss the role of Bantu homelands 
in strengthening the ANC membership (Sellström, 2002:521). Since 
Buthelezi’s days in the ANC there has been no evidence that he formed 
any new political ideology for his IFP except for the promotion of Zulu 
identity and the Zulu Royal exclusiveness. During the Multi-Party 
Negotiation Process (MPNP) in 1993, Buthelezi and the IFP demanded 
special recognition of the Zulu monarchy and threatened to boycott 
elections if there were no political recognition of the Zulu nation in a 
federal arrangement (Fessha, 2010:38). In line with the general state of 
the South African political bureau, IFP politics is based on constituency 
identities instead of any distinguishable political ideology whereas the ANC 
seems to exploits both constituency identities and populism based on 
socialism rhetoric. 
 
Despite the IFP’s promotion of Zulu self-sufficiency, predominantly in 
KwaZulu-Natal Province, the ANC had managed to attain a strong 
presence and become the leading party in the province. The populism 
culture continued to grow within the ANC during the Mbeki tenure 
particularly from 2005 when the populism movement with the ANC 
structures and the tripartite alliance blamed Mbeki’s leadership for the 
growing poverty and inequality (Pretorius, 2008:137). The ANC shifted 
further towards populism leadership that promised to focus on listening to 
people’s demands. Bryder (2009:4) argues that the term “populism” 
originates from the Latin word “populous” which means “people”. 
Therefore populism is the political communication style of enticing voters 
into believing the political bureau by exploiting people’s opinions of 
economic injustice and the tension between the working class and the elite 
class. Populism is usually misconstrued as a political ideology since it is 
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always associated with the Marxist-Leninist ideals. Hence, despite the 
populist characteristics in the ANC leadership, there is no evidence that 
there was ever a political ideology that could result in a strained politics–
administration interface. Contrary to the pre-claim of this study, political 
ideology in the South African politics is not a prevalent feature in the 
politics–administration interface. Although there had been conflicts 
between Buthelezi and the ANC over policies such as the migration policy, 
the political parties utilised constituency identities to define their values 
and ideals, thus political ideology had not been a major influence in the 
politics–administration interface conflict.  
 
The case of Buthelezi and Masetlha illustrated that political aspiration to 
implement political party power is one of the factors resulting in strained 
relations in the politics–administration interface. However, there is no 
evidence of political party ideology differences between the IFP and the 
ANC. The case examined above suggests that where there are different 
political intentions and power struggles between the political bureau and 
the administration bureau, conflicting views may lead to a strained politics–
administration interface. However, the political power struggle in the 
politics–administration interface could not be linked to political ideology 
differences between the political parties. The study concludes that despite 
the noted features of propaganda and populism in the political bureau, 
there is no evidence to suggest that the Zille–Mgoqi conflict and the 
Buthelezi–Masetlha conflict were due to any distinguishable political 
ideology differences. 
 
4.5 DISREGARD FOR DOCUMENTED RULES AND 
RESPONSIBILITIES 
 
This study argues that there is no evidence to suggest that there is intent 
on the part of senior public administration officials or from the elected 
officials to disregard documented rules and responsibilities. However, in 
some cases the documented rules and responsibilities are not always 
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clear, resulting in grey areas in the politics-administration interface that are 
ultimately claimed by the political bureau. There is a power struggle 
between the political bureau and the administration bureau in the interface 
due to a lack of clarity in documented roles resulting in a strained politics-
administration interface. In the South African context, political bureau roles 
and senior public service manager roles are documented in regulatory 
documents such as the Constitution of South Africa (Chapter 10), 
regulations and institutional policies. The Public Service Regulations, 2001  
(No. R1 of 2001 amended by R9795 of 2012) Chapter 1(G) states that the 
“Minister may, under justifiable circumstances, authorize a deviation from 
any regulation and may authorize such deviation with retrospective effect 
for purposes of ensuring equality”. The challenge with Regulation G is that 
it refers to “justifiable circumstances” under which the Minister in the 
political bureau may authorize a deviation from any regulation. Justifiable 
circumstances can be subjective: what in the Minister’s view are justifiable 
circumstances may not always be sufficient reason to deviate from the 
regulations. This provision to deviate from regulations may cause some 
political bureau officials to encroach on administration territory, and take 
what on paper is defined as public service manager’s responsibilities.  
 
Furthermore, Chapter 1 Part II(A) of the Public Service Regulations 
requires the “executing authority to provide the Heads of Department with 
appropriate powers and authority”. The term ‘appropriate powers and 
authority’ can be subjective. It is thus not clear what authority can be 
ceded by the executive bureau to the administrative bureau. In the 
politics–administration interface, there are “grey areas” or regions of 
intersection. Grey areas can be contested by both parties, that is, between 
the political bureau and the administrative bureau. Such grey areas may 
be a contributing factor to strained relations in the politics–administration 
interface. Further to the phenomenon of the contested grey area, Miller 
(2005:111) presented the problem of a weak or strong Minister or Director-
General as a contributing factor to negative relationship in the politics–
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administration interface. She argues that the policy formulation process 
between a strong Director-General and weak Minister can be explained as 
follows:  
“The Director-General initiates the policy and discusses it with the 
Minister who provides the Director-General with the scope to develop 
the policy further. The Minister and Director-General would discuss 
the policy and the Minister would approve the policy on the advice of 
the Director-General’s specialized knowledge and accepts the 
advice. The Director-General also has an intimate knowledge of 
political dynamics, is aware of the political needs of the Minister and 
shares the same ideological values as the political leadership. The 
dynamic of a strong Minister and weak Director-General is when the 
Minister not only provides policy direction and leadership, but is 
actively involved in the formulation of the policy and takes on some of 
the Director-General’s policy and sometimes implementation and 
responsibilities”. 
 
The Director-General is usually weak and generally provides advice that 
supports the Minister’s views, and does not seriously challenge the 
Minister in an advisory capacity; in other words, the Director-General 
merely approves policy decisions or is complacent in the formulation of 
policy and sometimes implementation.  
 
The dynamic of both a strong Minister and Director-General may not 
necessarily be a problem, but does become a problem when both are 
uncompromising in their fixed positions that result in acrimony, frustration 
and, at worst, conflict. An example of this is the former Director-General 
for Health, Dr Olive Shisana and Minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma.  
 
The dynamic of a weak Minister and weak Director-General is also evident 
in South Africa’s political-administrative interface. The result of a weak 
Minister and weak Director-General is that the formulation of policy is then 
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of a poor quality and administrative capacity is usually lacking. This 
relationship may exist if the political leadership is preoccupied with politics 
or lacks the capacity to undertake the portfolio, while the Director-General 
lacks the capacity to manage the department as well as engage in policy 
formulation. An example of this is “the former Director-General of Home 
Affairs, Albert Mokoena, who was accused of maladministration and 
Minister Buthelezi who at the time was preoccupied with conflict and 
politics in the province of KwaZulu-Natal” (Miller, 2005:111). The grey area 
concern was also raised in the Parliamentary Monitoring Group on 5 June 
2013 where it was stated that there was a contradiction that Ministers had 
no power to hire or fire senior public service managers. Thus, despite 
some attempts to document roles and responsibilities of the political 
bureau and of the administrative bureau in the Constitution, Public Service 
Regulations and Treasury Regulations, some powers and responsibilities 
are still not clear and are therefore contested by both parties in the 
politics–administration interface.  
 
What were the political leadership and administration roles of political 
officials in the execution of services to the public between 1999 and 2009? 
This question has provided a basis for examination of political leadership 
and administration responsibilities of high-ranking bureaucrats in the 
execution of services to the public and reporting to the political bureau. 
The study examines documented roles and grey areas or contested roles 
and unclaimed roles that may be the contributing factors that strain 
working relations in the politics–administration interface. The study further 
argues that despite documented rules and responsibilities, there are 
unclear areas in the interface; such unclear areas can be claimed by either 
the political bureau or administrative bureau depending on who is strong 
enough to win control of such areas. This study further argues that the 
ultimate governance responsibility is vested in the political bureau through 
the social contract. The study also argues that the interface is an imagined 
concept which is difficult to locate in the politics–administration 
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relationship. This chapter concludes that the problem is not necessarily a 
tendency on the part of political officials or public service officials or both 
parties to disregard documented duties and responsibilities, but it is a fact 
that documented rules and responsibilities are not always clear, whereas 
the political bureau has ultimate control and is under pressure to gratify the 
public lest the political office loses the confidence of the people.  
 
4.5.1 Agenda-setting role in the political bureau  
 
The direction of the public administration and public policy is proposed and 
decided at the party-political bureau. In the South African setting, the 
Constitution is the ultimate decree of the country and the basis of the 
political mandate of the ruling party. McCombs and Shaw (1972:185) 
argue that agenda-setting is the power to structure issues in public in such 
a way that people think about what they are told. The State of the Nation 
Address by the President should be based on the pledges of the 
Constitution and gives Ministers and senior public managers direction on 
policy development; for example, on 3 February 2006 then Head of State 
Thabo Mbeki in his State of the Nation Address focused on the celebration 
of the Soweto uprising and Bambata rebellion by introducing an economic 
programme revolution aimed at increasing the pace of human 
development, introducing ASGISA and JIPSA. The address was followed 
by a focus on learnerships and internships in government departments to 
function within the guidelines as set out by the President in his address. 
The political office bearers and accounting officers develop policies and 
programmes from such agenda-setting in presidential addresses. Both 
ASGISA and JIPSA were products of the political direction at that time but 
these programmes became defunct after the Mbeki administration. 
Likewise, the concept of public entrepreneurship is driven by the national 
agenda through the political office; for example, the privatisation of State-
owned assets is a political initiative that begins from the ruling party’s 
executive agenda; later a discussion paper is debated in Parliament 
(Eberhard, 2005:5312). Throughout the process, public managers provide 
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an advisory role to political officials, but the extent of the role played by 
public managers is not clear until the stage of implementation and 
evaluation of policies and programmes. Certainly, public managers are not 
independent from politics since they are employees appointed to 
administrate service delivery on behalf of the political office, meaning on 
behalf of the people. 
 
4.5.2 Political bureau as the ultimate watchdog in public service  
 
In the context of unclear documented rules and responsibilities for the 
ministers and heads of departments, the political bureau takes ultimate 
responsibility. Section 44 of the Constitution of South Africa states that the 
national legislative authority is vested in Parliament to pass legislation with 
regard to any administration matter, including matters within a functional 
area listed in Schedule 4 of the Constitution. The political function in public 
administration is to guide and lead public administration, which is 
necessary for South Africa’s democracy to promote accountability and 
transparency (Pauw et al., 2002:33). The political office bearers are 
appointed to execute policies after they have converted them into specific 
advantages, or outcomes to be received by the people. Where there is 
failure to provide those outcomes, the public will hold the political party 
and the specific Minister accountable (Kuye et al., 2002:122). The political 
arena controls policy direction and service delivery, and provides answers 
on who gets what, how and when. The agenda setting and policy direction 
emerge from the State of the Nation Address by the President and political 
addresses such as the Budget Speech from the Minister of Finance. The 
Directors-General and other senior administrators of government 
departments then formulate on behalf of the political bureau, adopt, 
implement and evaluate policies that stem from the agenda set by the 
State of the Nation Address and addresses by government department 
Ministers. 
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4.5.3 Legitimacy of the political bureau 
 
While the documented rules and responsibilities are unclear as to where a 
head of department stops and where the minister takes over the 
administrative duties, the politicians’ dominance is justified by the social 
contract relationship with the electorate. According to Rousseau (1762:18), 
the public surrenders its mandate to the political bureau through elections, 
and such relationship is referred to as ‘the social contract’, as explained. In 
a democratic system, the public grants legitimacy to the political bureau 
through votes that determine the majority will. South Africa’s parliamentary 
system of the separation of powers between the parliament, the executive 
and the judiciary provides the basis for political bureau leadership on 
behalf of the electorate and public participation. The Constitution of South 
Africa (Section 42) states that “members of parliament are elected to 
represent the people and to ensure government by the people”. Section 42 
further states that “the National Council of Provinces (NCOP) represents 
people in the provinces to ensure that provincial interests are taken into 
account in the national sphere of government by participating in the 
national legislative process and by providing a national forum for public 
consideration of issues affecting people in the provinces”. The public 
renders the political party that is voted into power by the majority legitimate 
to govern on behalf of the people. Section 159 of the Constitution states 
that “people’s needs must be responded to and the public must be 
encouraged to participate in policy-making”. Hence the people’s role is to 
elect government representatives and provide their opinions during the 
legislative drafting process. People’s power is granted to the elected 
political party and the public also has direct access to governance 
processes through public participation. The political party does not have 
the capacity to execute the political agenda and hence the political bureau 
employs skilled professional individuals to execute the political agenda on 
behalf of the political bureau. The political bureau comprises mainly 
elected officials, whereas the administration bureau comprises hired 
officials. In the South African context, as the Public Service Regulations 
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demonstrate below, the Minister has more clear authority compared to the 
hired Director-General. 
 
Figure 1: Core objectives of government stakeholders (adopted from 
the “strategic plan for third parliament-RSA”) 
 
 
 
 
 
4.5.4 Parliament and its political supervisory role 
 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996, provides 
for a “single, sovereign democratic State where governance is brought into 
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action through Parliament, the Executive and the Judiciary”. In the country 
“legislative authority is vested in Parliament, the executive authority is 
vested in the President and the judicial authority is vested in the courts”. 
Parliament’s role and ultimate outcome is to represent the people and 
ensure government by the people under the Constitution, as well as 
represent the provinces in the national sphere of government (South 
Africa, Strategic Plan for Third Parliament 2004–2009, 2008:30). The 
Constitution established Parliament to pass laws, scrutinise and oversee 
executive action, facilitate public participation, oversee co-operative 
government, and oversee international relations. Parliament is the “highest 
elected authority and legislature in the country that is responsible for 
ensuring that public services are delivered in the most appropriate, 
economical, efficient and effective manner” (Pauw et al., 2002:48). 
Parliament monitors public policy processes and public service delivery on 
behalf of the people, and senior public managers undertake the actual 
execution of policies that are manifest in service delivery. Parliament has 
the supervisory responsibility, on behalf of the public, and needs 
appropriate mechanisms for reporting by the Executive (Kuye et al., 
2002:104). Parliament established parliamentary portfolio committees for 
each department, including the Parliamentary Committee on Finance and 
the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA). All these 
committees play a supervisory role and monitor policy implementation on 
behalf of the people. All divisions of Parliament such as the National 
Assembly, the NCOP and Committees are established for their 
supervisory role to ensure that the government machinery functions 
efficiently. Such committees are established in a political setting to provide 
the link between the political arena and public administration sphere. The 
supervisory role of the parliamentary portfolio committees ensures there is 
guidance for accounting officers so that they take decisions that support 
the national agenda instead of their own wishes. 
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4.5.5 Standing Committee on Public Accounts as the political entity 
guarding public managers 
 
It is necessary to discuss the role played by SCOPA in ensuring 
democratic values in public finance management. Section 245 of the Rules 
of the National Assembly provides extensive control to SCOPA to inspect 
matters. The committee receives reports of actions taken and not taken by 
accounting officers, and the committee may endorse disciplinary measures 
against the accounting head who failed to appropriately manage public 
finances. Sanctions may range from salary deductions and demotion to 
dismissal. “In the event of a serious problem, the public accounts 
committee will want to determine culpability” (PFMA Guide for Accounting 
Officers, 2000:13). To demonstrate whether an accounting head has 
committed an offence, the committee will scrutinise whether he or she had 
utilised the endorsed best practice technique to circumvent the challenge. 
The SCOPA is thus a watchdog for proper spending of public money for 
public interests. Kuye et al., (2002:105) argue that “SCOPA oversees the 
effective, efficient, economical and transparent management of 
departments, based on the Auditor-General’s report”. Kuye et al further 
argue that SCOPA also makes recommendations on the improvement of 
financial management in government and in departments. Thus SCOPA 
performs the parliamentary supervisory function together with 
parliamentary portfolio committees and the Parliamentary Committee on 
Finance. All these committees are in a political setting providing 
supervision and guidance to public managers on behalf of the people. 
 
4.5.6 Auditor-General as an independent watchdog supporting 
political supervision 
 
It should be noted that according to section 181(2) and 181(3) of the 
Constitution, “the Auditor-General is independent, subject only to the 
Constitution and the law; must be impartial; and must exercise its powers 
without fear, favour or prejudice” (Craythorne, 2003:241). The Auditor-
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General is not guided by political officials and should not be under political 
pressure. It is within the Auditor-General’s remit to decide the nature and 
degree of an audit, and to request details and statements of account which 
he or she considers essential. In this regard, the Auditor-General may 
decide the due date and format in which the requested specifics, reports of 
justification and fiscal accounts must be submitted. Whenever the Auditor-
General exercises authority or performs a responsibility as required by the 
Auditor-General Act, “he or she may, in writing, require any person in the 
employment of an institution whose accounts are being audited to appear 
in person and to produce all such records, books, vouchers and 
documents in the possession or under the control of such person as the 
Auditor-General may deem necessary for the exercise of his or her powers 
or the performance of his or her duties” (Craythorne, 2003:241). Therefore, 
the Auditor-General is an independent watchdog supplementing the 
political supervision. 
 
The Public Audit Act 25 of 2004 sections 4 and 5 states that “the Auditor-
General may investigate any public entity or audit the financial statements 
of any public entity”. An investigation or audit “may be executed either by 
the Auditor-General or a person appointed by the Auditor-General”. The 
Auditor-General “may also claim the reasonable cost of performing the 
duties and annually report to parliament on specific and general findings 
regarding the accountability of the public entities”. The government 
departments are bound “to keep records of all financial transactions and 
subject them to external audit firm, especially in the case of large 
government departments”. The Auditor-General is obliged to report on 
matters where the public interest is at stake and has a general 
responsibility “to ensure honesty and integrity in the execution of public 
affairs by the heads of government departments”. For example, with 
regard to the R29.9 – R70 billion arms deal in 1999, the Auditor-General’s 
report queried the government’s choice of expensive options with 
deviations from the accepted procurement procedures (Parliamentary 
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Monitoring Group, 2000:2). The Auditor-General has a central 
responsibility to monitor and question government to ensure efficient 
public service.    
 
4.5.7 Roles of the citizens  
 
If the citizens feel that they are being cheated by the government, they 
have a constitutional right to take the government to the Constitutional 
Court. This has been happening in many instances in the South African 
context. For example, an ordinary citizen Mr Hugh Glennister challenged 
the decision taken during the ANC’s elective meeting in 2007 to disband 
the country’s elite corruption-fighting unit, the Directorate of Special 
Operations (DSO) known as the “Scorpions”. The judgement was handed 
down on 17 March 2011 stating that the dissolution of Scorpions was 
illegal (Cameron, 2011:395). Furthermore, in an earlier case “the 
Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) took the Health Minister to court for not 
giving antiretroviral drugs to HIV-infected patients” (Saloojee and Pettifor, 
2005:431). It was a political decision stemming from the deficiency of 
political will on the part of the Department of Health to provide antiretroviral 
drugs to patients. The public employees of the department had no power 
to change the policy and they had to yield to the political leadership. 
However, the people have the constitutional power to bring change in 
policies if they feel that the political office representing them is acting 
contrary to the requirements of the principal law which is the Constitution. 
Therefore, the Government of South Africa is under pressure to achieve a 
maximum rate of service delivery to meet the conditions of the social 
contract. To achieve efficient and effective service delivery, the political 
officials must be in a good working relationship with senior public 
managers so that they share the political mandate that informs public 
policy formulation and implementation. In a democratic system of 
governance every sector is responsible, the public feel entitled to service 
delivery, thus the people can also address the politics–administration 
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interface conflict and create pressure through protests from communities 
demanding improved service delivery. 
 
4.5.8 The New Public Management and role of politics 
 
The public administration has grown to increasingly equate itself with 
private sector business. Consequently, documents such as the King Code 
of Corporate Governance (King Report, 2002) are vital to both the public 
and private sector to ensure values of corporate governance are upheld. 
The King Report had become a key document in government departments 
to inform the Board of Directors and Audit Committee, to guide financial 
reporting and internal control, and to inform accounting and auditing 
procedures. Nevertheless, the King Report is not a guidebook for public 
finance management matters. It was drawn into public administration to 
introduce elements of corporate governance and effective service delivery. 
Public finances are also managed using the new management 
procedures. Kuye et al. (2002:101) argue that approaches to modernising 
the financial management processes of the public sector have been 
introduced in governance public administration. The Ministers and senior 
public managers are seeking modern management techniques to 
effectively render service delivery to the people. The political bureau 
therefore requires highly skilled managers with advanced knowledge of 
modern management techniques and NPM principles. The role of the 
political bureau is to employ such managers to execute the political 
agenda translated into service delivery.  
 
4.5.9 Dominant party deliberation  
 
How has one dominant party in South Africa’s democracy affected 
administration? The question led to the examination of the relationship 
between the political bureau and public administration in South Africa. 
“One dominant party’ is defined as a system in which despite the multi-
party situation, only one party is so dominant that it directs the political 
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system and is firmly in control of State power over a fairly long duration of 
time that even opposition parties make little if any dent in the political 
hegemony of a dominant governing party” (Matlosa and Karume, 
2004:10). The researcher argues that being the oldest liberation 
movement in Africa, the ANC enjoyed majority support in South Africa 
which had led to the political bureau being content to allow poor service 
delivery in some instances and political superciliousness to persist in the 
ruling party. Consequently, the ruling party had moved from a culture of 
broader consultation of stakeholders to a closed system of leadership 
where decisions are taken by the President and the clique at the upper 
echelon with minimum consultation. This situation has further resulted in a 
review of the effects of the ANC dominance in politics–administration 
interface and the majority power in determining the strength of political 
bureau dominance. In the context of South Africa’s prevalent politics of 
identity as opposed to politics of principle and ideology, the political 
opposition that seeks to replay the politics of identity is likely to promote 
governing party dominance. This study argues that the ANC’s dominance 
in government is due to its electorate which is passionately attached to the 
party as a liberation movement; thus the majority of the public identifies 
with the governing party despite its public inadequacies in government. 
 
4.6 CONCLUSION  
 
In conclusion, this chapter has explained the four pre-claims of this study. 
The study has examined the documented roles and grey areas or 
contested roles as well as unclaimed roles which may be the contributing 
factors that challenge working relationships in the politics–administration 
interface. The study argued that despite documented rules and 
responsibilities, there were unclear areas in the interface, and such 
unclear areas could be claimed by either the political bureau or 
administrative bureau, depending on who was strong enough to win 
control of such areas. This section further argued that the ultimate 
governance responsibility was vested in the political bureau through the 
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social contract. The study argued that the interface was an imagined 
concept which was difficult to locate in the politics–administration 
relationship.  
 
The chapter concluded that regarding the first pre-claim the problem was 
not necessarily a tendency from political officials or public service officials 
or both parties to disregard documented duties and responsibilities, but it 
was a fact that documented rules and responsibilities were not always 
clear, whereas the political bureau had ultimate control and was under 
pressure to gratify the public lest the political office loses public 
confidence.  
 
Furthermore, the study found that political dominance in public 
administration may be related to ambiguous documented rules and 
responsibilities that created grey areas in the politics–administration 
interface. The study established through the literature examined and the 
cases reviewed that it was a tendency or at least a generally accepted 
trend that politicians dominated public administration to control the political 
mandate in practice.  
 
Drawing on the case of Pikoli and Mbeki, the study concluded that the 
political bureau could interfere with administration to protect comrades 
from investigation and prosecution. Thus political interference could be 
used to protect corrupt colleagues and cronies.  
 
This study further found that the politics–administration interface in South 
Africa was tainted by corruption, cronyism and self-interest such as access 
to tenders or government business agreements. The South African 
political bureau has deviated from the collective leadership to a 
conventional and closed leadership system, averting stakeholder 
participation and showing autocratic tendencies. This study found 
sufficient documented evidence suggesting that certain leadership styles 
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can result in conflict in the politics–administration interface. Therefore an 
autocratic Minister can impose on an indecisive democratic director-
general; and such a combination of leadership styles can lead to tense 
working relations. Although theoretical data suggested that conflicts can 
stem from incompatible leadership styles, there is no case study that 
compellingly suggests this pre-claim in South Africa during the period 
under review. However, comparing Vusi Pikoli and Thabo Mbeki is 
challenged by the fact that Pikoli led an institution (the National 
Prosecuting Authority) whereas Mbeki led the whole country. Comparing 
their leadership styles in these dissimilar environments in terms of 
magnitude could be flawed although it is evident that when it came to their 
characters, they clashed due to their fiercely independent thinking. Since 
they both have features of being authoritative in their leadership, this could 
have led to the clash of the two strong leaders with similar characters. The 
study further established that different political ideologies from different 
political parties with different agendas could not exclusively lead to conflict 
in the politics–administration interface. However, there could be conflicts in 
the politics–administration interface due to struggle over political control. 
The study has established that it is the nature of opposition parties to 
confront governing parties and such conflict could not be linked to political 
ideology differences. This finding was supported by contemporary 
scholarship and case studies, in the cases of Zille and Mgoqi, and of 
Masetlha and Buthelezi respectively. Further to the pre-claim of different 
political ideologies, this study revealed that the political agenda to 
implement governance alternatives is one of the factors resulting in 
strained relations in the politics–administration interface. There is no 
evidence suggesting that political ideology variance is a factor that 
influences the politics–administration interface. 
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CHAPTER 5 
ANALYSIS OF THE INTERVIEWS FINDINGS 
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
This chapter presents the study findings and discusses the findings in the 
context of the research scope in South Africa between 1999 and 2009. It 
further discusses all four pre-claims and presents a discussion based on 
the collected data. The first pre-claim suggesting that there could be a 
tendency from the political officials or from bureaucrats or both parties to 
disregard documented duties and responsibilities are presented through 
the collected data. The second pre-claim suggesting that it is a tendency 
and accepted norm that political officials should dominate the public 
service function is presented in the light of the collected data. The 
collected data also provides further elucidation of the pre-claim proposing 
that there could be conflicting leadership styles between the political 
bureau and the administration bureau, which leads to a strained politics–
administration interface. Finally, the study presents data to confirm or 
refute the pre-claim suggesting that there could be different political 
ideologies between the political bureau and the administration bureau 
leading to strained politics–administration interface. The response from the 
public administrators, academics and political officials is presented in line 
with the pre-claims and the research questions as specified in the first 
chapter of this study.  
 
The study theory, which is the politics–administration interface, suggests 
boundaries of politics and administration and declares the “separation of 
roles between elected officials and administrators in a democratic 
government” (Wilson, 1887:18). It is at this point of intersection where 
there is conflict between political bureau officials and their senior 
professionals in public administration. The contested territory at the point 
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of intersection needs to be carefully defined and managed for the political 
bureau and administration bureau to work together effectively for the 
common good. However, it is usually not clear who should manage this 
point of intersection. This study examines the politics–administration 
interface in South Africa between 1999 and 2009 to better understand the 
underlying factors that result in conflict between the political bureau and 
public administration bureau. 
 
5.2 POLITICAL BUREAU INTERFERENCE 
 
With regard to political bureau interference, this study found that during the 
period 1999 and 2009 there was political bureau interference because 
there was no clear role interpretation for politicians and Heads of 
Departments to know which roles to assume and which roles to leave for 
administrators. The senior researcher from the Limpopo Provincial 
Legislature (SO-LMPL0114) argued that “the blurry line between politics 
and administrative functions at government was due to the pre-1994 
culture and values of political activism that result in political patronage or 
partisanship”. Public administration in South Africa is rooted in the 
aspirations of the emancipation struggle rhetoric which was facilitated by 
the political bureau; hence during the democratic government it has 
become difficult to separate the party from the State.  
 
The manager from the Gauteng Provincial Treasury (SOGPT-0114) 
argued that “politicians end up interfering because when the portfolio 
committees either in Parliament or at the legislatures need answers, the 
political office must be able to answer in most cases not the bureaucrats”. 
The political bureau is ultimately accountable for success or failure of the 
public service; hence Ministers work closely with Directors-General to 
ensure that they are conversant with the progress on policy 
implementation congruent with the national policy agenda facilitated by the 
political bureau. The manager from the Gauteng Provincial Treasury 
(SOGPT-0114) further argued that “one of the ways of combating political 
XR Shazi 584200 PHD WSG 
175 
interference would be to introduce a non-politicised institution between the 
directors-general and elected officials and such institution would report to 
parliament”. Such an assertion suggests that the problem around the 
politics administration interface is fundamentally structural and can be 
resolved by reviewing the public service governance structure.  
 
The former head of a government department who is a lecturer (PCT-
0114) argued that “practical observation reveals that every time there is a 
change in government such as new Ministers, most of them do not prefer 
to work with the existing management they find in their new portfolios”. 
Thus “they will often bring in new people they trust”. The lecturer (PCT-
0114) further argued that “some Ministers also frustrate the old 
management cohort and in some instances transfer them to positions 
where they become irrelevant”; “politicians even get involved in 
recruitment processes and tell the department who to hire and who not to 
hire regardless of interview and vetting results”. 
 
The Professor at the University of Pretoria’s School of Public 
Administration (PUP-02-14) argued that “it is the nature of government that 
it contains the political bureau as one of the important stakeholders; 
however, the politicians’ role is key and desirable if it adds value for good 
governance that does not promote mismanagement of public funds and 
mismanagement of government resources. If the governance intentions 
are not authentic towards ensuring improved service deliver and good 
governance, public managers can collude with the political officials to 
mismanage the resources which may result in poor governance”. 
Therefore, the natural presence of the political bureau in government 
brings in the political agenda in the public administration, if public officials 
yield to political influence and become politically discriminatory in the 
public administration.  
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The lecturer who is also the former director of a national government 
department (PUP-0114) made the following points: “executive mayors 
consider themselves heads of administration (not the municipal 
managers). Appointments are made based on political affiliation not on 
merit due to political pressure. Ministers appoint Heads of Department on 
the basis of political expediency not skills. Heads are dismissed after 
differences of opinions with the political bureau. There is no possibility of 
creating or maintaining expertise in administration of government 
institutions”. This study found that such viewpoints suggest that the 
politics-administration interface is controlled by elected officials through 
partisan public servants. 
 
5.3 PREVALENCE OF LEADERSHIP TENSIONS BETWEEN THE 
POLITICAL BUREAU AND THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION BUREAU 
 
This study found that political power was prioritized by politicians over 
documented rules in the Constitution and legislation, resulting in tension 
between the political bureau and the administration bureau. Among the 
cases mentioned by participants were the arms deal, the matter of 
Buthelezi and his Director General at Home Affairs, the Head of the 
National Prosecuting Authority Vusi Pikoli and the political bureau, former 
Police Commissioner Selebi disbanding the Scorpions, former Minister 
Nyanda in the Communications Department procurement processes, 
former Minister Pule in Communications procurement processes, and 
Police Commissioner Cele in the leasing of buildings. The Head of 
Department in the Parliament of South Africa in Cape Town (EOD-1014) 
stated: “You will also remember the former Minister of Communication Mr 
Siphiwe Nyanda who once locked his Director-General out of the office.” 
The senior lecturer from the University of Pretoria (PUP-0214) also 
referred to the case of former Minister Pule as an example of interference 
that caused tension in the politics and administration relationship. The 
manager at the National Department of Basic Education (SODBE-0114) 
stated that: “The case of former Police Commissioner Bheki Cele provides 
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an example of interference in public administration duties.” A lecturer from 
Wits University (PWU-0114) referred to the case of former Minister Pule in 
the Communications Department procurement processes as an example 
of tension between the political bureau and the administration bureau.  
 
The former lecturer from the University of Zululand (PUZ-0114) stated that 
“the cases of conflict between the politicians and senior public officials are 
numerous; thanks to the media the public gets to know about them. The 
case of Director General Masetlha and Minister Buthelezi and the case of 
Minister Joemat-Pettersson and Director-General Langa Zita are just 
examples of the prevalence of conflicts between the elected officials and 
the professional public officials in the politics–administration interface”. 
 
Furthermore, the researcher from the Limpopo Provincial Legislature 
(LMPL-0113) stated that there was interference by politicians to amass 
tender contracts for themselves and their allies. The researcher mentioned 
that at the Department of Roads and Transport there was political 
interference and procurement irregularities; such a finding was also made 
by the Public Protector3 in 2012. The manager from the Gauteng 
Provincial Treasury (SOGPT-0114) explained that: “The problem of 
political interference is exacerbated by the political appointment term of 
office which is only five years. As a result of this period, people want to 
accumulate more resources before their term of office comes to an end.” 
The cases cited above signify the prevalence of leadership tension 
between the political bureau and the public administration bureau. 
 
5.4 POLITICAL BUREAU INTERFERENCE IN THE PROCUREMENT 
PROCESS CONTROL TO INFLUENCE TENDERS 
 
This study found that in some instances there is political bureau 
interference with administration duties for procurement process control to 
                                                            
3 On the point about tenders: a report was presented on an investigation into allegations of impropriety and 
corruption practices relating to awarding of contracts for goods and services by the Limpopo Department of 
Roads and Transport 2012/2013. 
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influence the granting of tenders. A former senior public official from the 
Office of the President (SOPRE-0114) revealed that politicians give 
instructions to Heads of Department (HODs) verbally for HODs to 
document the instructions when they give them to staff. When a politician 
is redeployed an HOD has to account in Parliament for the outcomes of 
that politician’s tenure. The lack of documented instruction from the 
politicians means that the HODs are accountable for negative outcomes 
since the political bureau interference usually has no paper trail t to show. 
The former Director from Gauteng Provincial Government (SODGP-0114) 
explained that due to the unpredictability of a political career and also as 
Heads of Departments (for example, Pikoli is no longer employable in 
government and nor is the Reverend Chikane, as stated by Pikoli in his 
book My second initiation); and due to the five-year term of office which is 
a limited employment period, politicians and HODs may want to 
accumulate as much wealth as possible before the end of their term of 
office. Their attitude is: “If I miss this opportunity I might die poor while my 
comrades are getting rich every day.” In the procurement process, people 
want to establish businesses and get contracts to sustain themselves 
before the end of their term of office. As one participant from the national 
government department explained, “If they miss this opportunity where 
else will they get it?”  
 
The former Member of the Parliament of South Africa, currently a deployed 
diplomat (EOD:0214) argued that “it is a norm that politicians will want to 
award government contracts to party loyalists at the expense of quality 
service delivery”. The senior professor from the University of Limpopo 
(PLM-0113) referred to the expelled ANC youth leader and the Premier 
who had amassed wealth through tenders from their political connections. 
The retired MP of the Parliament of South Africa from the opposition 
political party (EOO-0114) further revealed that “politicians will always 
have conflicting interests in the public administration milieu”. This is 
“because they have to serve the public, their political parties and at the 
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same time enrich themselves with government resources that are meant to 
serve the public”. Therefore officials from the political bureau may interfere 
with procurement process to control and influence the awarding of tenders 
to applicants who are allies. 
 
“I think politicians do put pressure on senior public officials sometimes in 
order to get what they want such as awarding tenders to certain people,” 
argued one senior public official from the Gauteng Provincial Legislature 
(SOGOP-0114). The lecturer from the University of South Africa (PUN-
0114) stated that “the oversight role of the political bureau is not always 
explicit in legislation.” This presents a gap that is abused by the political 
bureau. The former MP argued that by pressurising officials in 
administration to accept particular tenders or make specific appointments, 
officials may succumb to the request to be able to gain advantages for 
themselves. 
 
Some of the responses provided on political bureau interference made 
reference to Auditor-General reports as explained below. 
 
On an annual basis, the Auditor-General informs South African 
stakeholders of the audit findings in its consolidated general report on local 
government audit outcomes. Administration is undermined by negative 
findings of awards of tenders made to persons in the service of the State 
as well as family members of people in such key positions (Auditor-
General, 2009–10). As explained in the Auditor-General Consolidated 
Local Government Audit Outcomes (2009–10), the key positions relating to 
these awards included Councillors, Mayors, Municipal Managers, Senior 
Managers and Supply Chain Managers. Other findings include 
uncompetitive behaviour or unfair procurement processes, deviations from 
procurement that are not justifiable and inadequate public invitations 
(Auditor-General, 2009–10). During the 2009–10 financial year, “irregular 
expenditure incurred by municipalities as a result of contravention of 
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supply chain management policy and legislation amounted to R3.9 billion 
and this made up 94% of the total irregular expenditure” (Auditor-General, 
2009–10:70). Furthermore, a significant number of suppliers failed to 
declare their relationship with the public servants employed at a particular 
municipality (Auditor-General, 2009–10:39). Municipalities “were found to 
be awarding tenders to family members of persons in the serving of the 
municipality without adequately disclosing the award” (Auditor-General, 
2009–10). As presented above, the study found that the political bureau 
may interfere with the public administration process in order to gain control 
of procurement processes to determine who obtains government projects. 
 
5.5 CADRE DEPLOYMENT REVIEW  
 
This research found that cadre deployment should be based on skills and 
abilities instead of exclusive political affiliation as a prerequisite for 
deployment. The manager at the Office of the Premier in Gauteng 
(SOGOP-0114) argued that cadre deployment would be acceptable if 
cadres were sufficiently skilled, and able to separate the party and 
administration. Furthermore, the former Member of Parliament (EOMOP-
0114) argued that cadre deployment would be acceptable if deployees 
would adhere to the constitution and guiding legislation. The professor 
from Wits University (PWU-0114) stated that the problem with the current 
pattern of deployment was that jobs were given to comrades who were 
previously arrested for political reasons, or had been in exile, or were 
strong supporters of political principals. The problem that was identified is 
that poor performance of cadres was usually blamed on staff, unless the 
cadre was no longer trusted by a politician, as explained by the professor 
of Public Administration at the University of Limpopo. The Head of 
Department in the Parliament of South Africa in Cape Town (SOCTP-
0114) stated that the constructive factor of cadre deployment was that a 
political party would be able to evaluate policy effectiveness and efficiency 
for policy direction. Cadre deployment is not necessarily wrong if the 
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deployee is skilled and sufficiently competent to manage the senior 
position that he or she is placed in. 
 
In contrast, the professor from Wits University School of Public Health 
(PWU-0114) argued that cadre deployment negatively affects service 
delivery as the person is likely to prioritise the interests of the party above 
the interests of the public. The Gauteng Provincial Government Director 
(SOGRT-0113) stated that “appointed cadres tended to feel that they 
owed allegiance to the political parties that put them in office and forgot to 
serve the public. The State departments could be better if they were run by 
a board or council as is the case of companies. This will reduce the 
problem to some extent as the leader of a department will be accountable 
to a team of people from different backgrounds”. 
 
The senior researcher at Wits University referred to the case of Vuyo 
Mlokoti vs Amathole District Municipality and Mlamli, where the court ruled 
that the appointment of a municipal manager was illegal if it was taken as 
a result of the unauthorized or unwarranted dictates of an outside party 
structure (Vuyo Mlokoti vs Amathole District Municipality and Mlamli 
unreported judgement, Case No. 1428/2008, 2008). In this case, the panel 
tasked by the District Council to appoint a Municipal Manager was advised 
by the ANC Regional Executive on who should be appointed. This ANC-
recommended candidate was less qualified and inexperienced compared 
to all the other candidates the panel had shortlisted.  
 
As argued above, cadre deployment is not always based on skills and 
abilities but is driven by partisan factors. The challenge regarding cadre 
deployment is that it is the extension of the political bureau in the 
government departments; deployed officials remain committed to serving 
the political bureau that gave them employment, and they seldom prioritize 
public administration for improved public service. 
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5.6 POLITICIANS’ INVOLVEMENT IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND 
INCREASE IN CORRUPTION 
 
This study found that the involvement of politicians in public administration 
increased corruption. Document analysis revealed that driving forces 
behind corruption were a combination of three negative factors: (i) a 
corrupt civil servant, (ii) a corrupt politician, and (iii) a corrupt business 
person (Pikoli and Wiener, 2013:358). The manager from the South 
African Local Government Association argued that the arms deal was 
testament to the negative outcome of political bureau involvement in public 
administration. Twenty-one (84%) of twenty-five participants argued that 
politicians should only play an oversight role and give policy direction. The 
Manager at the Gauteng Provincial Government (SOGOP-0114) argued 
that people still saw public office as a means to accumulate resources for 
themselves. The Professor of Public Administration at the University of 
Limpopo (SOLMPL-0113) suggested that “politicians should [undergo] 
intensive training to understand their role - perhaps they can be a ‘watch-
dog’ against corruption”. The manager (SOSAL-0114) at the South African 
Local Government Association (SALGA) argued that political bureau 
involvement could only reduce corruption if politicians acted with integrity 
and honesty. When politicians are corrupt, political bureau involvement 
can promote corruption. The Wits University Professor from the School of 
Public Health suggested that political involvement in administration would 
not reduce corruption in Africa, since politicians would say that: “We did 
not suffer in the struggle to come and suffer in our government.” The 
manager at the National Department of Basic Education (SODBE-0114) 
stated that corruption could be reduced if the country could utilize 
independent government institutions for policy evaluation and monitoring 
and take their recommendations seriously. Furthermore, as one senior 
public service official from the South African Parliament in Cape Town 
observed, “I don’t see corruption dwindling in Africa because the majority 
of politicians see government as a wealth amassing vehicle”. . The lecturer 
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at the University of Pretoria; School of Public Administration (PUP-0214) 
noted that an incident such as the arms deal in South Africa is another 
example of corruption that emanated from the involvement of politicians in 
procurement processes. As discussed above, this research established 
that the involvement of politicians in public administration results in 
increased corruption and a politics–administration interface that is 
dominated by the political bureau.  
 
5.7 MANDELA’S LEADERSHIP 
 
The leadership of former President Nelson Mandela was examined in this 
study to review the pre-claim suggesting that there could be conflicting 
leadership styles between a political official and a senior public service 
official. The manager from the Department of International Affairs and 
Cooperation argued that former President Mandela was a leader who was 
passionate about equality of people. He was a paternalistic, charismatic 
leader who embraced fairness, justice and non-discrimination. He was 
also referred to as the ‘collective leader’ who strove for consensus in 
decisions taken by the government. Furthermore, the former Member of 
Parliament (EOMOP-0114) explained that “President Mandela’s leadership 
traits were very reconciliatory because the primary concern to the 
government during his leadership was to avert possible civil war in South 
Africa. The TRC is an example of the reconciliatory nature of Mandela’s 
leadership. It was important to understand that his leadership was 
premised on a vision of peace and uniting South Africa. At that point in 
time it was desperately needed.” 
 
The former member of the opposition in parliament (EOO-0114) argued 
that former President Mandela sought congruent government machinery 
and tolerant political parties which was crucial for a positive politics–
administration interface. The lecturer at the University of South Africa 
(PUN-0114) suggested that Mandela was reconciliatory and strong on co-
operation and collective leadership. Mandela acknowledged the need to 
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reconcile divergent views. In examining the leadership styles in the 
politics–administration interface, this study established that collective 
leadership during the Mandela era as the President of South Africa 
resulted in elected officials and public administrators under his leadership 
feeling they were part of the decision-making processes in government. 
Incidents of tension in the politics–administration interface became more 
prevalent after Mandela’s retirement as explained through the cases that 
occurred between 1999 and 2009.  
 
5.8 MBEKI’S LEADERSHIP 
 
The researcher from the Limpopo Provincial Legislature argued that 
“former President Thabo Mbeki was a visionary leader who did things 
independently, his weakness was to succumb to political pressure on 
matters such as privatisation and dismantling of the Scorpions.” Mbeki 
compromised on certain policies to please his allies in the political bureau. 
Document analysis in this study suggests that Mbeki appeared to 
improperly disregard the provisions of the constitution and wanted to be 
elected for a third term in office as the President of the party and 
potentially of the country (Singh, 2006:164). The manager from the South 
African Parliament (SOCTP-0114) observed that Mbeki appeared to be 
autocratic, pushing ill-informed health policies on HIV and AIDS. The Wits 
University professor  (PWU-0114) suggested that Mbeki was not a 
charismatic leader but was somewhat professional. The Member of 
Parliament (EOC-0113) felt that Mbeki was systems-oriented and 
passionate about economic growth and stability. The professor from the 
University of Limpopo noted that Mbeki was a visionary leader who 
believed more in his ability to lead and that this strong belief in his ability to 
lead may have been the cause of his downfall. 
 
Mbeki’s leadership focused on economic change and growth for the 
country, according to the manager from the Limpopo Provincial 
Legislature. The manager from the Office of the Premier in Gauteng 
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(SOGOP-0114) suggested that the aloofness of his leadership style had 
alienated many ordinary citizens. The independent researcher of systems 
thinking (SOGPP-0113) noted that Mbeki had placed emphasis on 
creating an intellectual elite class, which was not necessarily wrong, but 
that South Africa was perhaps not ready for such a shift at that time. The 
manager at the National Department of Basic Education (SODBE-0114) 
suggested that Mbeki’s vision was for economic growth and stability in the 
country, as espoused in the NPM style of government. The lecturer (PUP-
01-14) from the University of Pretoria, who is also a former public servant, 
argued that Mbeki was internationally focused and had lost touch with the 
rank and file. The lecturer at the University of KwaZulu-Natal (PUK-0114) 
observed that “Mbeki was an intelligent leader who was always trusted 
within the ANC; as a result he was handpicked by Mandela to succeed him 
as President of the ANC. His downfall came due to his centralisation of 
power and his controversial views on public health policy”. 
 
In examining the leadership styles in the politics–administration interface, 
this study established that domineering leadership during the Mbeki era as 
President of South Africa resulted in elected officials and public 
administrators under his leadership feeling excluded in the decisions of 
government. The cases of tension in the politics–administration interface 
became more prevalent during the Mbeki tenure as discussed in this study 
and as demonstrated by the cases from the period 1999 to 2009. 
 
5.9 SEPARATION OF POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION  
 
The question that emanates from the “politics–administration dichotomy” 
introduced by Woodrow Wilson, suggesting the separation of politics and 
administration, was reviewed through open-ended questionnaires. All 
participants (ten senior public officials, ten professors and five elected 
officials) acknowledged that politics and administration were practically not 
completely separable since policy direction and evaluation came from the 
political bureau. It is the nature of the politics–administration interface 
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relationship to be complex and dynamic. Participants further revealed that 
politicians have a final say in administration because eventually they 
account to their political party and to Parliament. The former Member of 
the South African Parliament (EOMOP-0114) stated that heads of 
departments were hired servants employed by politicians so they complied 
with their superiors and their views were unlikely to take precedence, 
whereas resolutions taken by politicians mattered. The former Member of 
Parliament from the opposition (EOO-0114) stated that as long as public 
officials are accountable to political office bearers there will always be a 
problem of political interference. The professor at the University of Cape 
Town (PCT-0114) argued that, to some extent, politics and administration 
can be separated. However, the separation requires the adoption of 
policies that clearly explain the role of politicians versus that of public 
officials.  
 
Document analysis confirmed that the political bureau should be more 
accountable to the public whereas the former Director of Public 
Prosecutions Pikoli had argued that South Africa needed a presidential 
system of government where the public could elect MPs and also elect the 
President. For the presidential system to succeed it should be more 
thorough, whereby, after electing members of parliament, the citizens can 
go further to elect Ministers for different portfolios from among the elected 
MPs. “We must understand our political legacy to understand that it was 
absolutely necessary to have a politics–administration overlap post-1994. 
The issue now is whether that overlap must continue or is so entrenched 
that it cannot be stopped going forward,” argued a senior consultant and 
independent researcher in government.  
 
The professor of public administration at UNISA (PUN-0214) observed that 
“separation of politics and administration could not be to the extent of 
complete separation because the politics–administration interface was not 
unique to South Africa”. The former Professor at Durban University of 
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Technology (PDU-0114) stated that “politics is an inherent part of public 
administration; we can try to create buffers between these two spheres but 
it would be difficult to imagine the total separation”. The developed and the 
developing countries such as the Brazil, United States, Great Britain and 
Australia are still challenged by the interface but have reached a degree of 
consensus on the interference. It is time for South Africa to find consensus 
on the politics–administration interference and therefore the politics–
administration consensus study should be a complete study on its own. 
 
This study established that Heads of Departments should be politically 
sensitive but not political activists. It was further established that it is not 
entirely possible to separate politics and administration since the political 
bureau should account to the public through parliamentary processes.  
 
5.10 RESPONSE TRENDS SUMMARY 
 
5.10.1 Disregard for documented rules and responsibilities  
 
The data collected through questionnaires and document analysis is in 
congruence with the political bureau interference pre-claim, revealing that 
there is political bureau interference because there is no clear role 
interpretation for politicians and heads of departments to know which roles 
to assume and which roles to leave for the other party. The study found 
that the documented rules and responsibilities themselves are not always 
clear in order to circumvent political interference. The manager from the 
Gauteng Provincial Treasury (SOGPT-0114) argued that the blurred 
boundaries between politics and administration are the result of legislation 
that is not explicit in defining roles and limits for both elected officials and 
administrators. The uMkhonto we Sizwe veteran (EOR-0113) noted during 
the discussions that “it is difficult for the government to document every 
little action that needs to be taken in the public service, but whatever role 
that is not clear whether it falls within the responsibility of an administrator 
must be taken by the elected official since he or she is ultimately 
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responsible to account to his or her peers and superiors in parliament”. 
This study found that if the documented roles are not clear in determining 
who takes responsibility between the elected official and the administrator, 
power struggles and political bureau dominance in the politics–
administration interface becomes more likely. The Public Service 
Regulations (Chapter 1) proved to have ambiguous documented roles 
resulting to in a lack of clarity and grey areas that are ultimately claimed by 
elected officials. 
 
5.10.2 Political dominance 
 
The study found that politicians interfered because they knew that they 
were ultimately responsible when the portfolio committees either in 
Parliament or at the legislatures needed answers and where the political 
office would be required to respond rather than the bureaucrats. For 
example, on 12 February 2008 the Minister of Social Development, Dr 
Zola Skweyiya, set out the priorities for Social Development, including a 
comprehensive social security net, a targeted and detailed approach to 
eradicating poverty and unemployment, establishment of a mandatory 
retirement fund and coverage of low income groups, and poverty 
alleviation (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2008). The democratic 
government structure empowers the political bureau to have jurisdiction 
over service delivery matters in the public administration, resulting in 
tension between the political bureau and the administration bureau. 
Furthermore, questionnaires and document analysis confirmed that politics 
dominates public administration; the challenge lies in the location of the 
interface in the politics–administration relationship. Corruption as an 
underlying intent was also confirmed as a factor that resulted in political 
interference and conflict between the political bureau and the 
administration bureau. The deployment of comrades in order to award 
tenders to relatives and friends of politicians was revealed by participants, 
and more precisely by Vusi Pikoli in cases he witnessed in government. 
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5.10.3 Conflicting leadership styles  
 
The study established that during the Mbeki era the leadership changed 
from collective leadership to an independent, closed and centralized 
leadership system. The cases of strained relationships between the 
politicians and administrators revealed leadership traits that can result in 
conflict. However, this study could not conclude that the leadership styles 
between Mbeki and Pikoli were a major contributing factor to a strained 
interface relationship. The study revealed the likelihood that the fiercely 
tenacious and independent personalities of Mbeki and Pikoli resulted in 
conflict and strained relationships. Through document analysis there was 
sufficient evidence to conclude that political power was used to manipulate 
State institutions in order to maintain political power and to protect political 
allies from investigation and prosecution.  
 
5.10.4 Political ideological differences 
 
Political struggle to control administration was also revealed as a 
contributing factor to conflict and strained relationships in the politics–
administration interface instead of political ideology variance. The former 
HOD at the Department of Health (SOFDH-0114) stated that “political 
parties value their cultures and political agenda which makes them claim 
uniqueness but even the parties with similar values and culture may not 
work together because of this claimed uniqueness”. This study found that 
the South African politics is premised more on population identities and 
less on political ideologies. The political bureau is ultimately responsible 
for agenda-setting and accounting to Parliament, thus if the Head of 
Department does not support the political party agenda there could be 
conflict and strained relationships in the politics–administration interface. 
Central to the cases of Buthelezi and Masetlha as well as Zille and Mgoqi 
was the political struggle to control administration with no conclusive 
evidence of political ideology variance as an influence on conflict in the 
politics–administration interface. 
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5.11 CONCLUSION  
 
The study found sufficient data to conclude that the political bureau 
interferes with public administration matters in South Africa. The study 
further concluded that rules and responsibilities of both the political bureau 
and the administration bureau are not always explicit, which leaves room 
for political bureau interference. There was, however, a lack of evidence to 
conclude that there is a collective intention by the political bureau to 
disregard documented rules and responsibilities. The study further 
concluded that it was an accepted norm that the political bureau 
dominated in public administration since the political official was ultimately 
accountable to Parliament.  
 
The study could not compellingly conclude from the examined cases that 
leadership styles are a contributing factor to problematic politics–
administration interface relationships. However, the study established that 
certain personality traits could contribute to strained politics–administration 
interface relationships. Finally, the study concluded that the politics of 
identity and political agenda between the political bureau and the 
administration bureau may be a factor in strained politics–administration 
interface relationships. However, there is no evidence suggesting that the 
conflict in the politics–administration interface is linked to political ideology 
variance between the elected officials and the heads of departments.  
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The politics–administration interface concept is the relationship between 
administration and politics with a study problem that is grounded in 
establishing the nature of the interface between politics and administration. 
The scholarly discourse on the concept of politics–administration interface 
became a strong academic focus in the nineteenth century and it is the 
distinctiveness of this relationship that enlivens modern day academia in 
the public administration and political science schools. This study has 
examined the politics–administration interface through the pre-claims as 
conceptualised by the researcher in this contribution to contemporary 
academic discourse.  
 
The main claim of this study was that there are leadership clashes 
between political bureaux and public service bureaux when there are 
conflicting opinions on how service delivery must be achieved. The main 
claim was based on the case of the former Head of State Thabo Mbeki 
and the National Director of Public Prosecutions in 2008 after a struggle 
with the political bureau, particularly then President Thabo Mbeki and 
Minister of Justice Brigitte Mabandla. The first reason for the main claim of 
leadership conflict was that there is a tendency by political officials to 
dominate the public service function. The researcher has examined the 
notion that political officials want to dominate the public service function 
because they want to influence the public service’s supply chain and the 
awarding of tenders. Hence the reason for seeking to control public 
service function could be political authority and corruption as the 
underlying intent. The second reason for the main claim was that there 
could be conflicting leadership styles between a political official and a 
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senior public service official. If, for example, there are particular personal 
behavioural traits as well as leadership styles that are dominant in a 
political bureau and not in the public service bureau or vice versa, there 
could be leadership and governance conflicts. Leadership conflicts may 
also occur due to the leaders’ allegiance to either closed systems or open 
systems of leadership. The third reason to the main claim was that political 
officials may have a different political ideology compared to the political 
ideology upheld by a senior public service official. If there is a clash with 
regard to political ideologies there could be conflicts between the political 
bureau and the public service bureau. The fourth reason for the claim of 
this study was that political officials or public service officials or both 
parties have some disregard for documented duties and responsibilities. 
Hence there could be overlapping actions between political bureau and 
public service bureau. Such overlap could be related to the state and 
political party overlap which could be one of the challenges of one 
dominant party state model in the Westminster system of democracy. The 
four pre-claims could be the contributing factors to politics–administration 
interface challenges. The study was limited to examining the politics–
administration interface in relation to the four pre-claims presented above 
as possible contributing factors to conflict between the political bureau and 
the administration bureau. 
 
6.1.1 Disregard for documented duties and responsibilities or unclear 
rules  
 
This study has presented one of the pre-claims suggesting that there is a 
tendency on the part of political officials or public service officials or both 
parties to have some disregard for documented duties and responsibilities. 
The researcher has studied legislative roles and ambiguous sections as 
well as the unclaimed obligations that could be the influential elements that 
contribute to occasionally tense relationships in South Africa’s politics–
administration interface. The rules and responsibilities for the elected 
officials and the senior administrators are documented in legislation and 
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employment contracts, where there is ambiguous interpretation and 
unclear wording of the rules and responsibilities there could be politics–
administration interface conflict. The decisive governance authority is upon 
the political bureau which accounts to the constituency that votes for the 
government representatives. The researcher further concluded that the 
politics–administration interface is a conceptual phenomenon, thus any 
attempt to measure and identify demarcation marks and overlaps 
becomes technically problematic. Therefore, even in instances where the 
political bureau would wish to observe boundaries, the challenge would be 
that there are no boundaries except for conceptual lines in the minds of 
governance theorists. Furthermore, the political bureau is under pressure 
to deliver and show the constituency that it has delivered before the next 
elections lest the electorate declines to give it further political power to 
govern. Such dilemmas create haphazard working conditions due to the 
elected officials’ political pressure and the administrators’ desire to perform 
according to contractual agreements. The politics–administration interface 
conflict becomes unavoidable in some instances where there are unclear 
or ambiguously documented rules and responsibilities.   
 
6.1.2 Political interference, ideologies and leadership styles  
 
In chapter 4 the study established through the examined literature as well 
as reviewed cases that there is a tendency or a generally accepted trend 
that politicians dominate public administration to assure and control the 
political mandate in practice. The study further established that different 
political parties with different agendas may have conflict in the politics–
administration interface; however, such conflicts were not linked to political 
ideology variance. The study found that political parties may clash at the 
politics–administration interface due to the struggle for political control 
instead of political ideology variance. This finding was supported by 
contemporary scholarship and the case studies of Zille and Mgoqi as well 
as Masetlha and Buthelezi. The case of Pikoli and Mbeki suggests that 
these leaders clashed due to personalities as opposed to leadership styles 
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although there was insufficient evidence to support leadership styles as an 
influential factor in the politics–administration interface. 
 
6.1.3 Political dominance and unclear rules and responsibilities  
 
The study found sufficient data to conclude that the political bureau 
interferes with public administration matters. The study also concluded that 
rules and responsibilities of both the political bureau and the administration 
bureau are not always explicit which leaves space for political bureau 
interference. There was insufficient data to conclude that there was a 
collective intention by the political bureau to disregard documented rules 
and responsibilities. The study further concluded that it is an accepted 
norm that the political bureau dominates in public administration since the 
political official is ultimately accountable to parliament. The political bureau 
is part of the public service through the mandate it gives in legislative 
development. The political bureau accounts for the performance of public 
administration in parliament, together with accounting officers. Thus the 
political role in the public administration is justified by the legislative 
obligations and the government structure of South Africa. Therefore, 
during the working relations between the elected officials and the heads of 
administration, politicians dominate the politics–administration interface.  
 
6.1.4 Unclear areas in the interface 
 
This chapter discusses conclusions and recommendations for the politics–
administration interface discourse.  The researcher has examined 
ambiguity or contested roles as well as unclaimed roles which may be 
contributing factors that strain working relationships in the politics–
administration interface. The study has reviewed the legislative ambiguity 
in the politics–administration interface. The researcher concluded that the 
politics–administration interface is an artificial demarcation as opposed to 
empirical and concrete segregation. The political bureau is constitutionally 
authorised through the election processes or the social contract mandate 
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to represent the public and formulate government policies. Senior 
administrators are employees appointed on a contractual basis to perform 
administrative duties on behalf of the political bureau which represents the 
electorate or the people. The political bureau takes the ultimate authority 
and control over unallocated supervisory responsibilities in the politics–
administration interface. 
 
6.2. RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
6.2.1. Disregard for documented responsibilities 
 
One of the four pre-claims of this study suggested that there is a tendency 
on the part of political officials or public service officials or both parties to 
disregard to some extent their documented duties and responsibilities. 
This study found that disregard for documented laws is a common feature 
of African politics, where dominant political parties assume all authority 
due to the liberation credentials that they believe will justify their privileged 
political positions (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997:62).  Bratton and Van 
de Walle (1994:455) further argue that “disregard for documented 
responsibilities and engaging in personal relationships are the base and 
superstructure of the political institutions in Africa”. However, a senior 
public official from the Office of the President (SOPRE-0114) noted that 
“although it can be argued that politicians interfere with public 
administration, the legislation around governance responsibilities is not 
always explicit”. Legislation such as the Public Service Amendment Act 
No. 86 of 1998 was found to have ambiguous wording on the authority of 
senior public servants relative to the authority of the minister, thereby 
giving ministers control of administration. Furthermore, the Public Service 
Regulations provide ultimate authority to the minister as they stated that 
Ministers could take a decision regarding the transfer of functions between 
departments (Chapter 1 Part III(H) of the Public Service Regulations). The 
Minister shall determine rates of compensation for overtime through the 
collective bargaining process (Chapter 1 Part V(D)). The Minister may 
XR Shazi 584200 PHD WSG 
196 
issue directives regarding the training of employees or categories of 
employees in the public service (Chapter 1 Part IX(C)). The Minister may 
issue directives regarding the manner in which vacancies must be 
advertised within the public service (Chapter 1 Part VII(C.2.7)). The 
manager from the Gauteng Provincial Treasury (SOGPT-0114) argued 
that “one of the ways of combating political interference would be to 
introduce a non-politicised institution between the directors-general and 
elected officials”. This study therefore recommends that laws and 
regulations should be reviewed in order to have greater clarity and be 
more explicit and give independent senior public servants powers to 
implement policies. In the current governance structure, ministers are too 
close to the day-to-day operations of government departments and some 
regulations (as demonstrated by the Public Service Regulations) give 
ministers authority to take professional decisions. This study recommends 
that matters such as human resource management, training, procurement, 
payroll and staffing should be the sole responsibility of the administration 
bureau and be managed by senior public servants who should also be 
subjected to constant monitoring and evaluation by the Public Service 
Commission in accordance with the proposed structure in this study. Such 
change of structure and responsibilities would be aligned with the duties of 
public administrators which are “planning, organising, staffing, directing, 
co-ordinating, reporting and budgeting”, or the POSDCORB approach as 
outlined by Gulick and Urwick (1943:58).  
 
6.2.2 Governance and legislative intervention: review legislation to 
remove ambiguity 
 
This study has established that the problem is not necessarily a tendency 
on the part of political officials or public service officials or both parties to 
overlook their documented duties and responsibilities, but that this may 
also be due to the fact that documented rules and responsibilities are not 
always clear, whereas the political bureau has ultimate control and is 
under pressure to gratify the public lest the political office lose the 
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confidence of the people.  For example, the Public Service Amendment 
Act 1997, section 9 states that the services of the Director-General may be 
terminated before the completion of his or her contract; and any other 
matter which may be prescribed by the Minister. The legislative wording, 
“any other matter which may be prescribed by the Minister” provides a 
Minister with the authority to impose through this region of law ambiguity. 
Therefore, the starting point when seeking to alleviate conflict in the 
politics–administration interface relationship is to review legislation to 
clarify any ambiguity regarding responsibilities in relation to borderline or 
grey areas.  
 
6.2.3 Political dominance and generally accepted norms  
 
Another pre-claim of this study was that the political bureau is 
conventionally in the forefront of governance and thus it dominates public 
administration. The Head of Department from the Limpopo Provincial 
Legislature (LMPL-0113) explained that “the blurry line between politics 
and administrative functions at government was due to the pre-1994 
culture and values of political activism that result in political patronage or 
partisanship”. The struggle for political change in South Africa was led by 
the political bureau, thus politicians find it acceptable to take control of all 
governance and public administration. The manager from the Gauteng 
Provincial Treasury (SOGPT-0114) concurred that “politicians end up 
interfering because when the portfolio committees either in Parliament or 
at the legislatures need answers, the political office must be able to 
answer in most cases not the bureaucrats”. Consequently, ministers and 
MECs usually have ultimate authority over public administration which 
results in them controlling the politics–administration interface. The 
researcher therefore recommends a governance structure review to fully 
utilise the Public Service Commission as the neutral institution between 
the political bureau and the administration bureau. 
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6.2.4 Political dominance and leadership styles  
 
The study found that politicians dominate public administration to 
safeguard and regulate the political mandate at the implementation stage. 
The manager from the Gauteng Provincial Treasury (SOGPT-0114) 
argued that politicians interfere with public administration because they 
need to be updated about the operations in order to report to parliament. 
This study further found that politicians may interfere with public 
administration processes if they need to protect their colleagues or cadres 
from investigation and prosecution and conceal corruption. Furthermore, 
the leadership aspect of a proactive and autocratic minister versus an 
indecisive democratic director-general was identified as one of the causes 
of strained relationships in the politics–administration interface. This 
suggests that leadership characters between the political bureau and the 
administration bureau may experience tensions which result in strained 
politics–administration interface when a dominant leader dictates and 
imposes direction over public administration activities. This study 
recommends a review of the structure with administrators reporting 
indirectly to the political bureau through the Public Service Commission in 
accordance with the proposed public service structure in this study. While 
there will always be different leadership styles and potential conflicts in 
any leadership structure, the proposed structure would provide senior 
public servants with a new focus for administration without intimidation and 
direct control by the political bureau. 
 
6.2.5 Different political ideologies in the interface 
 
Another pre-claim of this study suggested that the politics–administration 
interface could be strained by political officials who may have a different 
political ideology when compared to the political ideology upheld by a 
senior public service official. According to Baradat (1984:164), the political 
bureau is the cradle of ideology and has the obligation to advance policies 
that emanate from its main ideology. It is expected in a developing country 
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that a senior public manager appreciates the political ideology of the 
leading political bureau. However, this study found no evidence of the 
political ideology difference effect in the politics–administration interface 
except for political power conflict. The researcher argues that since the 
democratic government structure of the politics–administration interface 
had been utilised for more than twenty years and suffered the negative 
effects of politicised administration, this provides an appropriate time for a 
new structure of public service governance that will utilise an independent 
institution as a buffer between the political bureau and the administration 
bureau.   
 
6.2.6 Justification of the proposed non-partisan administrative 
structure  
 
According to the manager from the Gauteng Provincial Treasury (SOGPT-
0114), the governance structure is such that “politicians end up interfering 
with administration processes because when the portfolio committees 
either in Parliament or at the legislatures need answers, the political office 
must be able to answer in most cases, not the bureaucrats”. The political 
bureau is ultimately responsible for the success or failure of the public 
service and Ministers thus work closely with Directors-General to ensure 
that they are acquainted with the progress on policy implementation 
congruent with the national policy agenda facilitated by the political 
bureau. This study found that in the current governance structure, the 
political bureau had the definitive authority in the public service whereas 
the government structure locates the political bureau too close to the 
administration bureau which may contribute to conflict between a director-
general and a minister (Public Service Regulations, 1999, Chapter 1). 
Senior public servants such as directors-general report to the elected 
officials in the political bureau; the political heads account to the legislature 
on how the vote of the department is used in the public interest (Pauw et 
al, 2002:30). In the current structure the political bureau is the ultimate 
authority in the public administration (Public Service Regulations, 1999, 
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Chapter 1). For example, Chapter 1 Part III(H) of the Public Service 
Regulations makes provision for Ministers to make a determination 
regarding the transfer of functions between departments. Ministers may 
also “determine a code of remuneration for occupational category and an 
occupational classification system” (Chapter 1 Part III(I)). The Minister may 
also provide guidance on the work of the public service institutions and 
departments. For example, Chapter 1 Part III(J) states that “the annual 
report shall include such information on planning, service delivery, 
organisation, job evaluation, remuneration, benefits, personnel 
expenditure, the utilisation of consultants, affirmative action, recruitment, 
promotions, termination of services, performance management, skills 
development, injury on duty, labour relations, leave and discharge due to 
ill-health, as the Minister determines”. Furthermore, Chapter 1 Part III(K) 
requires Ministers to “issue directives to assess and report on the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the human resource management function 
and practices in supporting departments to meet service delivery 
objectives, including assessment tools to be utilised by departments for 
purposes of assessment and reporting”. In Part IV(B.1), the Minister’s 
responsibilities are described as being to determine a “job evaluation 
system or systems that shall be utilised in the public service; determine a 
range of job weights derived from the system or systems for each salary 
range in a salary scale; and determine a job or category of jobs that an 
executing authority must evaluate. The Minister may also review the 
application of job evaluation in the public service and issue directives on 
the application of the job evaluation system; and evaluate any job” (Part 
IV(B.2)). Chapter 1 Part V(B) of the Public Service Regulations specifies 
that, the “Minister shall determine a salary scale for employees who fall 
within the ambit of the Labour Relations Act in the course of the collective 
bargaining process; and for other employees by determination”. 
Furthermore, the Minister “shall determine rates of compensation for 
overtime through the collective bargaining process” (Chapter 1 Part V(D)). 
The Minister “may issue directives regarding the training of employees or 
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categories of employees in the public service” (Chapter 1 Part IX(C)). The 
Minister “may issue directives regarding the manner in which vacancies 
must be advertised within the public service” (Chapter 1 Part VII(C.2.7)).  
 
As demonstrated above, when examining Public Service Regulations it 
becomes clear that the political bureau is the controlling authority in 
procedures and systems in the public administration, where ministers are 
in fact the ultimate managers of the public administration bureau, they 
employ senior public managers and manage their performance, and if 
managers fail to perform as expected they lose their job. 
 
This study found that the interface problem is usually structural and 
influenced by the location of the political bureau and the administration 
bureau in terms of elected officials and administrators’ proximity in the 
reporting line. Public administration in a developing country like South 
Africa cannot be completely isolated from politics since political office is 
the institution that addresses the question of who gets what, how and 
when. The political office provides a platform where public managers can 
better account for the public money for the political office to account for the 
votes of the constituencies. However, the response to over-politicisation of 
public administration could be in the further elevation of the Public Service 
Commission (PSC) to fully monitor and manage public administration 
instead of ministers.  The Manual for the Public Service Commission 
(2000:2) states that “the Public Service Commission is an independent 
and impartial public institution, established in terms of Section 196 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. The PSC is the only 
institution established in terms of Chapter 10 of the Constitution. It derives 
its mandate from sections 195 and 196 of the Constitution, 1996, which 
sets out the values and principles governing public administration which 
should be promoted by the PSC, as well as the powers and functions of 
the PSC. Its current duties amongst others are to investigate, monitor, and 
evaluate the organisation and administration of the Public Service. The 
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PSC mandate also entails the evaluation of achievements, or lack thereof, 
of Government programmes. The PSC is vested with custodial oversight 
responsibilities for the Public Service and monitors, evaluates and 
investigates public administration practices. It also has the power to issue 
directives regarding compliance with personnel procedures relating to 
recruitment, transfers, promotions and dismissals. The PSC is accountable 
to the National Assembly but must report on an annual basis to provincial 
legislatures on its activities in provinces. Five of the Commissioners are 
based at the PSC’s head office in Pretoria. A Commissioner is appointed 
for a term of five years, which is renewable for one additional term. The 
PSC is headed by a Chairperson who is the Executive Authority. The 
Chairperson is appointed by the President”.  
 
The semi-federal structure of the PSC with Offices in the provinces may 
successfully function when professionalism is the fundamental feature 
despite the nature of governance in Africa which is characterised by 
centralisation. However, Cameron (2012:2) states that “decentralising 
power is often seen as a risky endeavour in Africa within a context of 
political instability, most notably where ethnic and regional cleavages 
exist”. Politicians fear that there might be a disconnection between the 
national structure and provincial structure and this could result in 
politicians losing political influence to constituencies. However, the 
researcher argues that South Africa’s democracy may be ready for a 
professional public administration without politicians managing the public 
administration operations.  
 
The PSC Manual (2011:2) in accordance with the “Promotion of Access to 
Information Act No. 2 of 2000” states that “the PSC’s work is structured 
around the key performance areas; that is, leadership and human 
resource reviews; labour relations improvement; governance monitoring; 
service delivery and compliance evaluations; public administration 
investigations; and professional ethics”. In the proposed structure, the 
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PSC would be responsible for most of the duties currently performed by 
the minister. The PSC would maintain accountability “to the National 
Assembly and report on an annual basis to provincial legislatures on its 
activities in provinces” as it presently does. This would mean that the 
Constitution could be amended to give more authority to the 
commissioners instead of a minister. The Director-General would report to 
the commissioner who would then report to the Chairperson of the PSC. 
The five national Commissioners would be empowered with sufficient 
resources and be responsible for the national government departments. 
The existing nine provincial Commissioners would be responsible for the 
provincial administration and report to the national commissioners. From 
analysing the current Public Service Commission structure, the researcher 
proposes a national structure that may enhance the work of the 
commission in a manner consistent with the National Development Plan 
objectives. Figure 2 below depicts the typical structure to address political 
dominance in public administration. 
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Figure 2: Typical PSC structure to shift the political bureau from day-
to-day public administration 
 
 
                                                         The national assembly and the NCOP 
 
 
The PSC Chairperson and the Minister of Public Service and Administration (The PSC Chairperson as the 
executive authority that will keep the minister informed) 
     Politics                                               Politics  
                               
 Administration  Administration 
Commissioner 1            Commissioner 2              Commissioner 3              Commissioner 4                     Commissioner 5      
 
 
                                                                         National Deputy Commissioners 
National Deputy Commissioners responsible for the national government departments (each commissioner 
responsible for one department). The Directors-General of national government departments reporting to the 
National Deputy Commissioners. 
 
 
 
Provincial Commissioners (to keep the premiers informed) 
Nine Provincial Commissioners responsible for the nine provincial administrations 
 
  
 
Provincial Directors 
 
In such a structure the political bureau would be distanced from interfering with public administration, so that 
politicians can only provide political guidance in line with agenda setting at the political bureau. 
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6.2.7. Public Service Commission and its history of being influenced 
by the political bureau 
 
The Public Service and Pensions Act of 1912 established the Public 
Service Commission in August 1912. The commission was established in 
congruence with colonial objectives characterised by enforcement of racist 
laws and was controlled by the political bureau in government. Public 
services formed part of the control mechanisms for dominating the majority 
black population (Reuters, 2005:127). However, the objective of the post-
apartheid government is non-racialism and to guarantee independence of 
the Public Service Commission in accordance with section 195 and 196 of 
the Constitution of South Africa as well as the ideals expressed in Chapter 
10 of the Constitution. The guarantee of independence provided by the 
Constitution does not mean that politicians will cease to seek control of 
government departments but that the intent of the rule of law would be 
enforced by the Public Service Commission and by the courts where 
necessary to maintain an autonomous Public Service Commission.    
 
6.2.8 Why the Public Service Commission is best suited for the 
proposed structure  
 
The Public Service Commission was established to create a buffer 
between the political bureau and the administration bureau (Mthembu, 
2013:2). The development of South Africa’s Public Service Commission is 
informed by developments in Britain. Following the work of the Northcote-
Trevelyan Commission in 1855, a Civil Service Commission was 
established as the custodian of a meritocratic administration and to secure 
the accountability of the civil service to the monarch, thereby removing it 
from political interference (Hughes, 2007:299). The Public Service 
Commission is suitable for the proposed structure since its mandate as 
documented in the Constitution clearly confers independence and the 
supervisory role over the South African public service. The PSC derives its 
mandate from sections 195 and 196 of the Constitution, 1996, which 
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outlines the functions, “values and principles governing public 
administration which should be promoted by the PSC”. The PSC is 
required by the Constitution to “execute its powers and to perform its 
duties without fear, favour or prejudice”. The Constitution upholds the 
PSC’s autonomy resolutely with its neutrality and “no organ of State may 
interfere with the functioning of the PSC”. The Public Service Commission 
(PSC) is an autonomous institution established in Chapter 10 of the 
Constitution with specific focus on the Public Service and a supervisory 
role over public administration. The importance given to the PSC in 
Chapter 10 of the Constitution demonstrates its significance as an 
organisation that binds democratic government as well as the importance 
of an institution to provide oversight over public administration. 
 
The Constitution stipulates that “there is a single PSC for the Republic of 
South Africa, consisting of 14 members. The PSC is headed by a 
Chairperson appointed by the President from the nominated 
Commissioners. The PSC is accountable to the National Assembly and 
must report to it annually. It must also report to the Legislature of the 
province concerned on its activities in each province”. The recommended 
structure suggests that the PSC is well positioned in government and well 
authorised in terms of the Constitution to respond to the structural design 
challenge of the politics–administration interface. 
 
6.2.9 Justification for the proposed five national commissioners  
 
Under the proposed structure, national departments would be grouped into 
five clusters for purposes of compliance monitoring and evaluation; each 
national commissioner would be responsible for one cluster of national 
departments. Therefore, the five commissioners from the Public Service 
Commission would be responsible for the five national department 
clusters. The offices of the five commissioners would be staffed with legal 
practitioners and compliance officers as inspectors of public service to 
ensure professionalism, objectivity in service delivery, productivity and 
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appropriate management of public resources. The commissioners would 
be recruited on the basis of non-partisanship and professional expertise. 
Furthermore, the commissioners would be expected to uphold 
professionalism and not participate in political activities. Such 
professionalism would be documented in the Commissioners’ code of 
ethics that would be enforced and monitored by the bureau of the 
Chairperson of the Public Service Commission through continuous 
monitoring. The typical grouping of departments is presented in the table 
below.  
 
Table 1: Example of five clusters of national departments  
 
The Presidency: 
Governance headed by the President, Deputy President, Minister of the 
National Planning Commission and Minister of the Public Service and 
Administration. 
 
The executive:  
The National Assembly 
NCOP 
The Judiciary (Justice and Constitutional Development, Office of the Chief 
Justice) 
 
Public Service Commission Commissioner 1: Governance and co-
ordination of independent institutions 
 
Chapter 9 institutions (Public Protector; SAHRC; Commission for gender 
equality; Auditor-General; IEC; Commission for the Promotion and 
Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities) 
 
Public Service Commission Commissioner 2: Public service affairs 
and social development 
 
Public Service and Administration 
Co-operative Governance 
Communications 
Government Communication and Information System (GCIS) 
Telecommunications and Postal Services (previously Communications) 
International Relations and Co-operation 
Social Development 
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Arts and Culture 
Home Affairs 
Sport and Recreation South Africa 
Women 
Traditional Affairs 
Public Enterprises 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
Mineral Resources 
Energy 
Environmental Affairs 
Health 
Labour 
Human Settlements 
Public Works 
Rural Development and Land Reform 
Small Business Development 
Transport 
Water and Sanitation 
 
Each National Government Department with an independent compliance 
and monitoring office headed by a National Deputy Commissioner  
 
Public Service Commission Commissioner 3: Education and public 
development  
 
Basic Education 
Higher Education and Training 
National School of Government (previously Palama) 
Planning Monitoring and Evaluation 
Statistics South Africa 
Science and Technology 
 
Each National Government Department with an independent compliance 
and monitoring office headed by a National Deputy Commissioner. 
 
Public Service Commission Commissioner 4: Security and 
rehabilitation 
 
State Security Agency 
SA Police Service 
Defence 
Military Veterans 
Independent Police Investigative Directorate 
Civilian Secretariat for Police 
Correctional Services 
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Each National Government Department with an independent compliance 
and monitoring office headed by a National Deputy Commissioner. 
 
Public Service Commission Commissioner 5: Finance, trade and 
revenue administration 
 
National Treasury 
Economic Development 
SA Revenue Service 
Trade and Industry 
Tourism 
 
Each National Government Department with an independent compliance 
and monitoring office headed by a National Deputy Commissioner. 
 
 
 
6.2.10 Political interference in the proposed structure and the rule of 
law 
 
According to the manager from the Gauteng Provincial Treasury (SOGPT-
0114), “there is a justified political interference such as the appointment of 
senior officials and the monitoring of departmental performance in order to 
report to parliament”. The Member of the Parliament of South Africa (EOC-
0113) argued that “in most cases what is seen as an interfering minister is 
due to a minister wanting to be updated on departmental performance in 
line with his or her duty to answer during parliamentary sessions”. 
Therefore, it is possible that the proposed non-partisan public service 
might also suffer interference by the political bureau; however, the 
democratic principle of constitutionalism and upholding the rule of law 
should prevail. According to Llanos, Weber, Hely and Stroh (2014:6), “in 
democratic regimes, political actors operate in a particular institutional 
environment where constitutional rules matter; they define the power of 
courts as well as how much leeway the elected branches formally have to 
influence them”. Therefore, in a similar fashion as the chief justice is 
selected by the Head of State, the chairperson of the Public Service 
Commission is appointed by the President, although both the Judiciary 
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and the PSC are deemed to be independent institutions. The PSC in the 
proposed structure would exercise independence and maintain 
administrative legal justice despite the possibility of political interference. 
The South African Constitution (section 1(c)) guarantees the “supremacy 
of the constitution and the rule of law”.  The law is binding and should be 
upheld by both the political bureau and the administration bureau. 
Consequently, if the rule of law is upheld in the politics-administration 
interface, the proposed structure will have a positive impact in neutralising 
the public administration.  
 
6.2.11 Public Service Managers and elected officials in public service  
 
One of the significant purposes of the National Development Plan is to 
“build a professional public service that serves government, but is 
sufficiently autonomous to be insulated from political patronage. This 
requires a clearer separation between the roles of the political principal 
and the administrative head”. The National Planning Commission should 
enact guidelines for public service managers and politicians to assist them 
to appreciate the dual nature of public administration and that the 
government performs two basic functions, one political and the other 
administrative. The political bureau’s responsibility involves the expression 
of the State will while the administrative function involves the execution of 
the State will. The word ‘administration’ etymologically stems from the 
Latin word ‘administrare’ which means ‘to serve’, ‘to assist’, as well as ‘to 
direct’. The ‘administrare’ element is the politics–administration function ‘to 
serve’ makes the public sector a serving institution. Public managers and 
political officials are in place to serve and should have a commitment to 
serving the public. The political bureau and the administration should work 
together to minimise and censure personal gratification and promote 
professionalism in serving the public.  
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6.2.12 The role of provinces in the proposed structure  
 
The powers and responsibilities of the provinces in the proposed structure 
are of importance and align with the constitutional structure of governance 
in South Africa. The Constitution of South Africa (Chapter 6) outlines the 
provincial authority role in the country’s governance structure which 
includes provincial policy development and assigning legislative powers as 
a Municipal Council. Chapter 4 of the Constitution defines the role of the 
National Council of Provinces and the representation of provincial 
constituencies in policy development and governance. The current Public 
Service Commission structure includes Provincial Commissioners who 
promote synchronised administrative efforts in the country. The continued 
role of Provincial Commissioners in the proposed structure would be 
essential to co-ordinate governance cascading from the office of the Public 
Service Commission Chairperson at the national level.  
 
6.2.13 Anticipated negative outcomes of the proposed structure 
 
The change that seeks to distance the political bureau from public 
administration might encounter resistance from the political bureau in 
favour of the status quo. This was the case with Canada which upholds 
political deployment despite the Public Service Commission that promotes 
non-partisan public administration (Eichbaum and Shaw, 2010:68). The 
political bureau might attempt to influence and control the Public Service 
Commission. However, the Commission would be able to withstand 
political pressure and comply with the law if the commissioners and senior 
public servants are non-partisan employees who are recruited for their 
professionalism and positive outcome-driven work ethic.  
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6.2.14 Expected positive attributes of the proposed structure  
 
The proposed structure would be independent and non-partisan with the 
focus mainly on public administration and progressive work ethics. The 
expectation of the proposed structure is that it would minimise conflict 
between the elected officials and senior public servants since there would 
be less interaction between these two offices. The Commission-led public 
service is expected to promote professionalism and be informed by the 
legislation without undue political influence being exerted. Such a structure 
would provide a return on investment rather than political favouritism and 
cronyism, and procurement would be undertaken according to the 
legislation and protocols.  This would enable the Commission to promote 
accountability rather than opaque processes. Non-partisan public service 
would be expected to promote public scrutiny of its work and promote an 
environment that fully reduces any opportunities for corruption and bribery. 
The non-politicised structure could maintain public administration stability 
when political leadership changes. Furthermore, the proposed structure 
could minimise wasteful and fruitless expenditure since there would be 
constant monitoring of compliance with procedures that are fully 
documented in policies. Since public administration would not rely on 
political deployment for strategic positions, the new structure would also 
improve quality of expertise and productivity in the government 
departments. It is not the expectation of the researcher that the proposed 
structure will be without flaws, but that it would be an improved framework 
that will contribute to the greater efficiency of the public service that avoids 
under-utilisation of time and resources on power struggles and political 
differences.  
 
6.2.15 Contemporary scholars and further research  
 
During this study the researcher identified the following areas that are 
recommended for further research: 
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6.2.15.1 South Africa reviewed in comparison with non-partisan 
public services  
 
Although an attempt was made to compare South Africa with as many 
relevant countries as possible, in this study the researcher could not find 
purely non-politicised public administration to compare with South Africa. 
Therefore, further research is required in the area of progressive non-
partisan public administration to learn from such jurisdictions and propose 
further recommendations for South Africa.  
 
6.2.15.2 Political ideologies and the politics–administration interface 
 
While this study found no evidence to suggest that differing political 
ideologies between the political bureau and the administration bureau may 
be one of the contributing factors to strained politics–administration 
interface, there was not sufficient evidence to prove that what caused 
conflict in the two reviewed cases was political ideology and not political 
differences of the political parties in their efforts to control governance 
using propaganda concealed as political ideology. 
 
6.2.15.3 Challenges that may undermine non-partisan public service 
in Africa 
 
This study examined certain African countries such as Nigeria, Ghana, 
Botswana and Uganda.  However, many countries were found to have 
politicised public administration and were struggling to combat corruption 
and poor service delivery. The countries in the continent of Africa share a 
similar history of colonialism and subjugation, except for Ethiopia, and 
therefore any country’s public administration in Africa may be examined in 
view of the apparent sudden advanced non-partisan administration 
whereas governance itself is deficient. Further studies should be 
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conducted to review governance challenges that are unique to Africa with 
regard to the politics–administration interface. 
 
6.2.15.4 African leadership challenges and the politics–
administration interface 
 
Despite the leadership attributes that may influence the relationship in the 
politics–administration interface as discussed in this study; there is a need 
for comprehensive examination of the influence of conventional leadership 
which might be linked to dictatorship and compromised democracies in 
Africa.  
 
The academia should be actively engaged in identifying improved 
governance alternatives to an academic discourse and research output on 
the relationship between senior public service managers and political 
officials for the development of public administration contemporary 
theories in governance. 
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX 1: STUDY QUESTIONNAIRE   
 
To assist the researcher in collecting data in order to examine the research 
problem through the pre-claims; the questionnaire questions below were 
formulated:  
 
Questionnaire WSG Research 2013  
 
 
Subject matter: Politics and administration: participants’ information       
 
 
 
Designation:……………………
Institution/organization:……………………
……………………………………. 
 
Date:……………………………
…………… 
Tel:.............................................................
. 
...... 
 
1. What is your opinion of the political bureau’s role in the public administration 
bureau? Do you think there is a problem of political bureau interference in 
South Africa’s public administration? Yes/No Why: 
 
2. Do you know of a case or cases of leadership tension between the political 
bureau and the public administration bureau in South Africa? 
Yes/No If yes, provide example(s) (e.g. from media): 
 
3. Do you think politicians in South Africa interfere with public administration 
duties (including tendering process or procurement)? Yes/No Why: 
 
4. Do you think that cadre deployment to public service by political parties is a 
good practice in South Africa? Yes/No Why: 
 
5. Do you think that cadre deployment to public service by political parties is a 
bad practice in South Africa? Yes/No Why: 
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6. Can politicians’ involvement in public administration increase corruption in 
South Africa? Yes/No How: 
 
7. Can politicians’ involvement in public administration reduce corruption in South   
Africa? Yes/No How: 
 
8. How would you define former Presidents Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki’s 
leadership styles? Key leadership traits (provide example(s)) 
 
9. Do you think politicians work beyond their roles and responsibilities to interfere 
with public administration? Yes/No Why: 
 
10. Do you think there is an overlap between the roles of the political bureau and 
the responsibilities of the public administration bureau? Yes/No Why: 
 
11. Can politics and public administration be separated in South Africa? Yes\No 
Why: 
 
XR Shazi 584200 PHD WSG 
248 
APPENDIX 2: PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
 
STUDY TITLE 
 
THE POLITICS‐ADMINISTRATION INTERFACE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
This  study  is  on  politics‐administration  interface  in  South  Africa  based  on 
Woodrow Wilson’s article  in  1887  ‘The  Study  of  Administration’  and  the  book 
by  Frank  Goodnow  in  1900  ‘Politics  and  Administration’.  The  researcher  is 
specifically  studying  the  contributing  factors  to  strained  relations  between  the 
political bureau and the administration bureau. 
 
In this study, you will be asked to answer 11 main questions with follow‐up 
sub‐questions. The study  typically takes about 30 minutes. 
 
You may decide  to  stop being  a part of  the  research  study  at  any  time without 
explanation.  You  have  the  right  to  ask  that  any  data  you  have  supplied  be 
withdrawn. You  have  the  right  to  omit  or  refuse  to  answer  or  respond  to  any 
question  that  is  asked of  you. You have  the  right  to have  your questions  about 
the  procedures  answered.  If  you  have  any  questions  as  a  result  of  reading 
this  information  sheet, you should ask the researcher before the study begins. 
 
There  are  no  known  risks  for  you  in  this  study.  The  researcher  will  keep  your 
personal  information  confidential  at  all  times.  Only  the  views  will  be  in  the 
findings  without  linking  them  to  names  or  designations  of  persons.  There will 
be  no  known  benefits  to  participants;  you  are  voluntarily  contributing  to  this 
study  for  the  sake  of  knowledge  development  and  information  sharing  with 
contemporary scholarship. Your participation  in this study  is voluntary thus there 
is no payment  whatsoever  given  to  participants.  Feedback  and  outcome  of  the 
study will be kindly provided when  request by participants. 
 
No one will link the data you provided to the identifying information you supplied 
(e.g., name,  address,  email)  the  personal  information will  not  be  in  the  report. 
The  collected data  in  the  form of  opinions and suggestions will only be used for 
this study purposes. The collected data will not be used  in  commercial books or 
articles outside of academia to generate profit or  income  in any form. When  the 
data  is  used  for  this  study,  questionnaires  will  be  destroyed;  however  the 
compiled data (without  names  or  positions  of  participants)  will  be  kept  in  the 
report  at  P&DM  University  of  the  Witwatersrand. 
 
The  information  provided  in  this  questionnaire  is  confidential;  therefore  the 
names of participants will  not be disclosed  in the report or  in any discussion. The 
views presented  in  this questionnaire  are  not  meant  to  represent any office or 
institution; they are  treated as personal views  from  targeted  individuals for their 
experience and opinions in leadership. 
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APPENDIX 3: INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
 
TITLE: THE POLITICS‐ADMINISTRATION INTERFACE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
PROJECT SUMMARY 
 
This  study  is  on  politics‐administration  interface  in  South  Africa  based  on 
Woodrow Wilson’s article  in  1887  ‘The  Study  of  Administration’  and  the  book 
by  Frank  Goodnow  in  1900  ‘Politics  and  Administration’.  The  researcher  is 
specifically  studying  the  contributing  factors  to  strained  relations  between  the 
political bureau and the administration bureau. 
 
By  signing  below,  you  are  agreeing  that:  (1)  you  have  read  and  understood 
the  Participant  Information  Sheet,  (2)  questions  about  your  participation  in 
this  study  have  been  answered  satisfactorily,  (3)  you  are  aware  of  the 
researcher’s  pledge  of  confidentiality  and  there  will  be  no  known  risk  or 
rewards  to  your  person  as  a  result  of  you  participating  in  this  study,  and  (4) 
you are  taking part in this study voluntarily (without coercion). 
 
 
 
Participant’s Name (Printed)* 
 
  
 
Participant’s signature*                                                                                   Date 
 
Raymond Shazi 
 
  
 
Name of person obtaining consent (Printed)                   Signature of person 
obtaining consent 
 
*Participants wishing to preserve some degree of anonymity may use their initials 
 
WSG Study, 2014 RS 
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APPENDIX 4: STUDY CODES KEYS FOR PARTICIPANTS 
 
Academic Officials 
 
1. The lecturer at the University of South Africa: (PUN‐0114) 
2. The lecturer at the University of South Africa: (PUN‐0214) 
3. The lecturer at the University of Pretoria: (PUP‐01‐14) 
4. The lecturer at the University of Pretoria School of Public 
Administration: (PUP‐0214) 
5. The lecturer at the University of Cape Town: (PCT‐0114) 
6. The lecturer at Wits University: (PWU‐0114) 
7. The lecturer at the University of Limpopo: (PLM‐0113) 
8. The former lecturer at the University of Zululand: (PUZ‐0114) 
9. The lecturer at the University of KwaZulu‐Natal: (PUK‐0114) 
10. The former Professor at Durban University of Technology: (PDU‐0114) 
 
Political bureau officials 
 
1. Retired Member of The Parliament of South Africa: EOMOP‐0114  
2. Senior member of the uMkhonto weSizwe veterans: EOR‐0113  
3. Former Member of  t he Parliament of South Africa, currently a deployed 
diplomat: EOD:0214  
4. Retired MP of the Parliament of South Africa from the opposition political 
party: EOO‐0114  
5. Member of the Parliament of South Africa: EOC‐0113   
 
Public Service Officials 
 
1. Director at the Gauteng Provincial Legislature: (SOGOP‐0114)  
2. The Director at the National Department of Basic Education (SODBE‐0114)  
3. Senior Manager at Gauteng Provincial Treasury:  (SOGPT‐0114)  
4. The Head of Parliamentary Research Unit in the Parliament of South Africa: 
(SOCTP‐0114)  
5. The Specialist Researcher (Government Consultant): (SOGPP‐0113)   
6. The HOD at Gauteng Provincial Government: (SOGRT‐0113)  
7. The HOD at South African Local Government Association: (SOSAL‐0114)  
8. The HOD at The Limpopo Legislature: (SOLMPL‐0113)  
9. The former HOD from the Office of the President: (SOPRE‐0114) 
10. Former HOD at The Department of Health: (SOFDH‐0114) 
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Code Keys  
P: Professor  
UN: Unisa 
UP: University of Pretoria 
CT: University of Cape Town 
WU: Wits University 
LM: University of Limpopo 
UZ: University of Zululand 
UK: University of Kwa‐Zulu Natal 
DU: Durban University of Technology 
EOMOP: Elected Official Member of Parliament 
EOR: Elected Official Retired  
EOD: Elected Official (Diplomat former MP) 
EOO: Elected Official from the opposition 
EOC: Elected Official currently at office 
SOGOP: Senior Official Gauteng Province 
SODBE: Senior Official Department of Basic Education 
SOGPT: Senior Official Gauteng Provincial Treasury 
SOCTP: Senior Official Cape Town Parliament 
SOGPP: Senior Official Gauteng Province Private researcher 
SOGPG: Senior Official Gauteng Provincial Government 
SAL: HOD at South African Local Government Association: 
LMPL: HOD at the Limpopo Legislature 
PRE: Former HOD from the Office of the President 
FDH: Former HOD at the Department of Health  
1st two digits: interviewee number  / 2nd two digits: year of the interview 
